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I.  ABSTRACT 
The field of environmental law embodies a deep 
contradiction—it is a product of the state, yet the state is the 
primary agent of development.  This contradiction infuses state-
supported resource regimes (energy, forestry, agriculture, water 
use) that have long been agents of environmental erosion while 
they have remained resistant to progressive reform. It also 
underpins the theoretical framework for proposed reforms today, 
ecological modernization.  The result is that environmental law 
extends, rather than resolves, society’s underlying environmental 
“problematic.”  This can now be seen in institutional responses to 
climate change and the “green economy.”  To address this 
situation, the authors apply a critical new approach—green legal 
theory (GLT)—to analyze these historical resource regimes and 
today’s emerging issues.  GLT does so by expanding the 
conception of law to address the “constitutive” or “regulatory” 
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effects of those “system dynamics” that set the larger economic, 
political, and cultural conditions for social/environmental 
relations.  In this task, GLT aims to help move “legal” analysis 
into the pursuit of the systemic re-formations that exist beyond 
the liberal limits of environmental law. 
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III. INTRODUCTION 
Barack Obama had been in office barely one year when the 
British petroleum-owned Macondo well exploded in the Gulf of 
Mexico on April 20, 2010.  Eventually unleashing more than 200 
million gallons of oil, much of which washed ashore in Louisiana, 
this was to become the worst environmental disaster in American 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
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history and the world’s largest accidental oil spill.  An assault on 
a fragile environment and an affront to big business, the spill was 
also an impeachment of the regulatory credibility of government.  
This article addresses the historical and contemporary nature of 
the dynamics of the state and its economic partners, and what 
these portend for a new approach to “regulation” that looks 
beyond the limits of environmental law. 
Speaking at a White House press conference, President 
Obama acknowledged the problem: “For years there’s been a 
scandalously close relationship between oil companies and the 
agency that regulates them. . . . [T]he oil and gas industry has 
leveraged such power that they have effectively been allowed to 
regulate themselves.”1  The President pointed to the industry-
tailored law that allows only thirty days for the Interior 
Department to review an exploration plan, far too little time to 
conduct an environmental review.  Instead, environmental 
reviews are routinely waived.  In contrast to the common 
criticisms of “over-regulation,” Obama pointed to “the oil 
industry’s cozy and sometimes corrupt relationship with 
government regulators [that] meant little or no regulation at 
all.”2  When questioned whether this situation could be attributed 
to the Bush Administration when his own administration had 
continued to give drilling permits under questionable 
circumstances, Obama admitted that the culture “in which oil 
companies were able to get what they wanted, without sufficient 
oversight and regulation” had not yet “fully” changed.3 
 
 1. Presidential News Conference on the Gulf Oil Spill, 2010 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 2 (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter The President’s News Conference], 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000422/pdf/DCPD-
201000422.pdf (referencing a recent Inspector General’s report detailing 
widespread corruption within the Minerals and Management Service, the 
agency in charge of approving permits and enforcing laws, during the Bush 
years); see Donald C. Hubbard, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT – 
ISLAND OPERATING COMPANY ET AL. CASE NO. PI-GA-09-0102-I (Feb. 29, 2009), 
available at http://www.eenews.net/public/25/15844/features/documents/2010/ 
05/25/document_gw_02.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2013) (this investigative report 
was initially created in response to routine Freedom of Information Act 
requests; however, it was made public by the Department of Interior shortly 
after the Deepwater Horizon disaster). 
 2. The President’s News Conference, supra note 1, at 2. 
 3. Id. at 9. 
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Even more pointed was the question as to whether he 
regretted his decision, announced only three weeks prior to the 
disaster, to open up offshore drilling in previously protected 
areas.4  Obama’s answer revealed a telling conundrum: “[T]o the 
extent that we’re using oil, it makes sense for us to develop our oil 
and natural gas resources here in the United States and not 
simply rely on imports. That’s important for our economy; that’s 
important for economic growth.”5  At the same time, he 
acknowledged the increasing expense and risk involved with 
extracting ever-dwindling oil reserves: 
The fact that oil companies now have to go a mile underwater 
and then drill another three miles below that in order to hit oil 
tells us something about the direction of the oil industry. . . . And 
we as a society are going to have to make some very serious 
determinations in terms of what risks are we willing to accept.6 
Like the recent financial crisis, this latest environmental 
crisis would, in his opinion, force Americans “to do some soul 
searching.”7 
At the time, the BP spill had all the makings of a game-
changer.8  As Hoffman and Jennings point out, public awareness 
of the negative environmental effects of human activities was 
higher than ever in the age of climate change—the public was 
skeptical of high-profile players like BP, an oil company that had 
been aggressively rebranding itself as “green” (“Beyond 
Petroleum”), and its partner in the Gulf, Halliburton Co., a name 
 
 4. These included parts of Alaska, the eastern Gulf of Mexico, and parts of 
the Atlantic coast.  This was the biggest expansion of offshore oil drilling in the 
U.S. in fifty years. 
 5. Id. at 11. 
 6. Id. at 13. 
 7. Id. at 15. 
 8. Andrew J. Hoffman & P. Devereaux Jennings, The BP Oil Spill as a 
Cultural Anomaly? Institutional Context, Conflict, and Change, 20 J. MGMT. 
INQUIRY 100, 101 (2011) (“When an event or issue poses a potential challenge to 
a dominant technological or economic institutional order, conflict ensues over 
the nature, meaning and response to the event. If this challenge is significant 
enough to generate substantial conflict, the event can become a ‘cultural 
anomaly’ for the current order.”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
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almost synonymous with Dick Cheney.9  As the spill ravaged Gulf 
Coast communities, it rekindled old feelings of shame for the 
bureaucratic incompetence and compassion for the political 
indifference that followed the devastation wrought on New 
Orleans by Hurricane Katrina.  Once again, unethical behavior 
and corruption were alleged against a federal agency, the 
Minerals Management Service.  All the while, an underwater 
geyser of oil gushed uncontrollably, threatening an ecological 
Armageddon and eroding the faith in engineering and technology 
upon which future energy development depended. 
But there was still a source of hope.  Barack Obama, the 
“most environmentally-friendly president ever,”10 assured 
everyone that his administration would do whatever was 
necessary to protect and restore the Gulf Coast.  Quickly, the 
President announced a six-month moratorium on drilling new 
offshore oil wells and a halt to the controversial environmental 
waivers.11  He also committed to putting in place “aggressive new 
operating standards and requirements for offshore energy 
companies.”12  In addition, his administration would suspend 
planned exploration off the coast of Alaska, cancel proposed lease 
sales in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of Virginia, and 
suspend action on thirty-three deepwater wells currently being 
 
 9. Id. at 103-04; see also HENRY A. WAXMAN, HOUSE COMM. ON GOV. REFORM, 
FACT SHEET: HALLIBURTON’S IRAQ CONTRACTS NOW WORTH OVER $10 BILLION 
(Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070 426011102/http:/ 
oversight.house.gov/documents/20050916123931-74182.pdf (Dick Cheney was 
the CEO of Halliburton from 1995 until 2000 when he retired to run for U.S. 
Vice President.  However, ties between Cheney and Halliburton were shown to 
remain, leading to controversy when Halliburton was awarded several major 
contracts worth more than $10 billion in connection with the 2003 Iraq War). 
 10. Sandip Roy, Sierra Club’s Carl Pope: BP Has Gulf in a ‘Hostage 
Situation’, NEW AMERICA MEDIA, July 13, 2010, http://newamericamedia. 
org/2010/07/carl-pope-on-bp-oil-spill.php. 
 11. See Tim Dickinson, The Spill, The Scandal and the President, ROLLING 
STONE, June 8, 2010, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-spill-the-
scandal-and-the-president-20100608 (the moratorium would purportedly affect 
only thirty-three deepwater wells or less than one percent of drilling operations 
in the Gulf.  In addition, records indicated that both waivers and permits 
continued to be granted with at least six waivers granted in the first four weeks 
after the moratorium was announced); see also Ian Urbina, Despite Moratorium, 
Drilling Projects Move Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2010, at A1.  
 12. The President’s News Conference, supra note 1, at 2. 
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drilled.  Moreover, he would provide a new safeguard by 
separating those issuing permits to the oil industry from those 
regulating it.13 
As news coverage stretched from days to weeks, the media 
expanded its focus beyond the impacts of the spill on the marine 
ecology to its effect on the economy and, by extension, the 
political survival of Barack Obama.  A report by the International 
Energy Agency noted that regulatory changes to offshore drilling 
could jeopardize nearly one million barrels of new crude 
production daily.14  A spokesperson for the American Petroleum 
Institute remarked, “It would be unfortunate if this accident were 
to cause implementation of laws, rules or regulations that reduce 
US production, cost American jobs or reduce energy security.”15  
Meanwhile, analysts at JP Morgan Chase saw a silver economic 
lining in the disaster, noting that the massive cleanup effort from 
the spill might even offset the negative economic impacts of a 
two-month drilling moratorium and actually boost U.S. economic 
growth.16  And, as weeks turned to months, the prospect of 
cultural soul-searching gave way to a Popular Mechanics-style 
fascination with the sci-fi wizardry of the “junk shot” or “top kill” 
that might cap the spill.17 
After eighty-seven days of continuous gushing, on July 14, 
2010, BP succeeded in temporarily capping the well.  Three weeks 
later, the government released findings from a report that 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Nathan Vander Klippe, Spill Could be “Game Changer” for Oil, GLOBE & 
MAIL (June 10, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/spill-could-be-game-changer-for-
oil/article1599917/. 
 15. Shawn McCarthy, Fate of US Drilling Hinges on Spill Resolution, GLOBE 
& MAIL (May 26, 2010, 7:13 PM), http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/static/ 
business/article1582170.html. 
 16. Luca Di Leo, Oil Spill May End Up Lifting GDP Slightly, WSJ BLOGS - 
REAL TIME ECONOMICS (June 15, 2010, 9:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
economics/2010/06/15/oil-spill-may-end-up-lifting-gdp-slightly/) (citing a JP 
Morgan report, the article notes that 4,000 unemployed people hired for cleanup 
efforts could be worth between $3-6 billion.  “If realized, this would likely mean 
a near-to-medium-term boost to activity that might offset the drags.”). 
 17. See Gillian Grace, Top kill? Junk shot? A Primer on BP’s Wacky Oil Spill 
Terminology, NAT’L POST, May 31, 2010, http://news.nationalpost.com/2010/05/31 
/top-kill-junk-shot-a-primer-on-bps-wacky-oil-spill-terminology/. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
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claimed that 74% of the oil had either evaporated or been burned, 
skimmed, recovered from the wellhead or dispersed much of 
which is in the process of being degraded.18  Broadcast across the 
national morning news, it suggested that all might soon be well, 
despite imperfect technology, engineering, and politics.  One 
commentator remarked that this was “a public relations coup for 
a White House eager to get the oil spill story off the front pages, 
reassert control over a narrative that had gotten away from them, 
and calm fears.”19  Two weeks later, there was much less fanfare 
when the study’s lead author, Bill Lehr, retracted these 
assurances and admitted in congressional testimony that “most of 
[the oil] is still in the environment.”20 
When the well was permanently capped in September 2010, 
so too were any lingering challenges to oil exploration and 
extraction.  By mid-October the government announced new rules 
for offshore drilling and lifted the drilling moratorium.  With the 
Obama Administration proclaiming a new, safer, and more 
cautious era of drilling, the oil industry proceeded apace with 
production.  Even with the moratorium and stricter regulations, 
the national rig count for November 2010 totaled 1,683, an 
 
 18. See JANE LUBCHENCO ET AL., NOAA, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BUDGET: 
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OIL? (2010), available at http://www.noaanews.noaa. 
gov/stories2010/PDFs/OilBudget_description_%2083final.pdf (unmentioned were 
the unprecedented 1.84 million gallons of the oil dispersants, Corexit 9580 and 
9500A, applied during the cleanup effort and the many concerns over the 
adverse health effects of the dispersants); see Krishnan Sriram et al., 
Neurotoxicity Following Acute Inhalation Exposure to the Oil Dispersant 
COREXIT EC9500A, 74 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 1405 (2011); Stacey E. 
Anderson et al., Potential Immunotoxicological Health Effects Following 
Exposure to COREXIT 9500A During Cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill, 74 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 1419 (2011). 
 19. Dan Froomkin, Questions Mount About White House’s Overly Rosy Report 
on Oil Spill, HUFFINGTON POST, May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2010/08/20/overly-rosy-report-on-oil_n_688142.html. 
 20. Suzanne Goldenberg, BP Scientist Retracts Assurances Over Success of 
Cleanup, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 19, 2010, 4:34 PM, http://www.guardian.co. 
uk/environment/2010/aug/19/bp-oil-spill-scientist-retracts-assurances; see also 
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, NOAA SCIENTIST: RELEASE OF OIL SPILL 
REPORT DONE BY WHITE HOUSE, NOT NOAA (2010), available at http:// 
oversight.house.gov/noaa-scientist-release-of-oil-spill-report-done-by-white-
house-not-noaa/ (Dr. Lehr informed congressional investigators that the report 
“was released by White House officials and not scientists at the NOAA.”). 
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increase of 576 or 52% over the same time the previous year.21  
By February 2011, BP reported fourth quarter profits of $5.6 
billion, a 30% increase from a year earlier, and resumed its first 
dividend payouts to shareholders since the disaster.22 
The BP disaster could have kicked off a critical examination 
of the dominant economic and political order.  But its 
containment and astute political management meant that a 
serious challenge to America’s oil addiction never appeared on the 
public radar.  After all, to challenge oil is to challenge what oil 
fuels—a growing economy that demands cheap and reliable 
primary resource inputs.  Centuries of economic achievement 
have produced the cultural expectation of an ever-expanding 
economy flowing seamlessly from its past.  Economic growth, 
coupled with productivity-enhancing technology, has answered 
the demands of labor not by redistributing the economic pie, but 
by increasing its overall size.  And stable economic management 
lies at the core of modernist state politics with its attendant need 
for ever more energy, ever more consumption, and ever more 
extractions from nature, all at the least possible cost.  Thus does 
a seemingly irresolvable conundrum between economic 
production and environmental protection pervade the modern 
state—in the oil fields and the world’s great forests, in 
mountainous rivers and coastal estuaries?  This is not just an 
economic or political problem, but a cultural one as well, with 
centuries of material progress providing the foundation for an age 
of high consumption that has defied critical evaluation. 
Environmental law was born not to resolve this conundrum 
but to bolster one side of it by providing a bulwark against 
ecological erosion.  Such a rebalancing, it was believed, could 
overcome specific challenges through governmental intervention 
and legal adjustment, as Obama so dexterously achieved in the 
wake of a potential environmental catastrophe.  But what if 
something more fundamental is at stake?  In what could have 
been a description of the background to the BP oil spill (except 
 
 21. See Baker Hughes Announces November Rig Counts, BAKER HUGHES (Dec. 
7, 2010), http://investor.shareholder.com/bhi/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID 
=535481. 
 22. BP Profit Rises to $5.6 billion US, CBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2011, 11:58 AM, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/02/01/bp-quarterly-profit.html. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
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that it was written years before), Mary Wood writes that the 
bureaucratic scale of the modern “administrative state is geared 
almost entirely to the legalization of natural resource damage . . ., 
the majority of agencies spend[ing] nearly all of their resources to 
permit, rather than prohibit, environmental destruction.”23  
Understanding this conundrum, and how it has shaped the whole 
character of environmental law, requires a critical debate about 
the legal field, its relation to larger structural dynamics, and 
broader discourses that draw on contemporary theoretical 
knowledge and critiques.  It requires discussions of the nature of 
well-worn legal strategies, not only whether they are efficacious 
for the immediate challenges at hand, but also how they might 
affect more fundamental changes to the contexts that give rise to 
these challenges. 
This is the starting task of what we call “green legal” 
analysis and critique.  The present paper begins (Part II) by 
reviewing briefly diverse legal regimes that regulate a range of 
resource sectors, looking at the interaction between state 
interests, economic objectives, and regulatory designs, and what 
this interaction has meant for environmental law.  In each case, 
state agencies are faced with the contradictory mandate of 
protecting the very resources that the state relies on for royalties, 
export revenues, industrial development, and economic growth.  
And the state has not merely been an incidental participant or 
disinterested manager in the process of the construction of these 
diverse industrial structures—it has been central to their design 
and construction.  A survey of legal literature reveals that critical 
thought about these relations is slight in both directions, 
environmental law paying scant attention to critical legal theory 
while such critical legal theory pays little heed to the role of 
nature in economic and political life.  In Part III, we interrogate 
the field’s inherited liberal foundations and many of its prized 
strategies, particularly its embrace of the economistic theory of 
“ecological modernization.”  In doing so, we bring to light 
ideological and institutional assumptions underpinning the field, 
 
 23. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to 
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): 
Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 55 
(2009). 
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and consider whether these are consistent with, or 
counterproductive to, the ambitions of the field.  Continuing with 
this inquiry, Part IV examines what we call the “contradictions” 
in environmental law, and looks at how these play out today in 
strategies to overcome climate change and promote “green” 
alternatives.  We conclude in Part V with a preliminary 
explication of a larger, theoretically-grounded, critical vision of 
law and social change that can take us beyond environmental 
law, what we call “green legal theory” (GLT).24  GLT attempts to 
address the structural character of the environmental 
“problematic” which, unlike environmental law, it treats as 
“constitutional” in nature but not only in the limited meaning of 
that word.  Instead, GLT seeks to open up the broader and more 
powerful “constitutive” processes of institutional and cultural 
“regulation” some of which are made apparent throughout this 
article.  These processes are of a de facto “legal” (i.e. socially 
regulative) character but are captured neither by environmental 
law nor, any form of “legal” law.  It is our hope to initiate a 
conversation toward this broader approach that will provide both 
a counterpoint for, and critical reach beyond, environmental law. 
IV.  HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF   
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A.  Legacy of Reform 
Environmentalists have put a great deal of struggle and hard 
work into establishing the vast array of environmental laws that 
we know today.  These laws have had an enormous practical 
impact, from removing lead additives in gasoline to protect brain 
development in children, to making many previously polluted 
streams and rivers drinkable, and protecting large swaths of 
 
 24. We define “green legal theory” as an approach to “social regulation” that 
moves nature from the periphery to the center of political, economic, and 
cultural life. See generally R. Michael M’Gonigle & Paula Ramsay, Greening 
Environmental Law: From Sectoral Reform to Systemic Reformation, 14 J. 
ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 342 (2004); R. Michael M’Gonigle, Green Legal Theory: A New 
Approach to the Concept of Environmental Law, 4 OKOLOGISCHES WIRTSCHAFTEN 
34 (2008); R. MICHAEL M’GONIGLE, EARTH RULES: ON THE LAWS, BEHIND THE 
LAWS, THAT HOLDS US TO ACCOUNT (forthcoming 2014). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
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wilderness to facilitate biodiversity conservation.  Though the 
field may be “ramshackle, replete with inconsistencies and 
paradoxical gaps, and surrounded by critics urging its 
fundamental redesign,” nevertheless, notes Richard Lazarus, it 
has internalized “discernible evolutionary convergences in 
regulatory approaches based on decades of actual experiences 
with what works well and what does not [so that] the basic 
architectural features of U.S. environmental law seem essentially 
in place.”25  Its scope is certainly huge, and this section will 
necessarily be limited in the detail of its analysis of 
environmental laws.  Its goal is rather to make clear the 
conundrum posed by the interaction of the liberal 
economic/political context with its environmental regulatory 
constraints.  As we discuss below, this leads to what might be 
called environmental law’s “problematic.” 
Although some important environmental laws in the United 
States reach back sixty years,26 environmental law in its modern 
guise is commonly seen to have taken shape in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  This was marked by the passage of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969, the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, and the 
avalanche of legislation that followed, including the Clean Air Act 
(CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Endangered Species Act (ESA), 
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA).  Early successes in resource conservation include the 
Wilderness Act of 1964, the Land and Water Conservation Fund 
Act of 1964, and the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems of 
1968.27  Between 1960 and early 2000, the National Park System 
more than tripled in size from 25 million acres to over 83 million 
acres.  Since 1964, Congress has set aside 106 million acres of 
land and designated over 10,800 protected miles of rivers.  The 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 has been characterized as “one of 
 
 25. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 206-07 (2004). 
 26. See KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945-1970 38ff (2009) (tracing the earliest environmental 
laws to shortly after World War II). 
 27. MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS 177-82 (4th ed. 
2006). 
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the strongest federal environmental laws” that “symbolizes the 
nation’s commitment to resource conservation goals.”28  Its most 
celebrated successes include recovery of the American bald eagle, 
the peregrine falcon, and the California grey whale.  By 2006, the 
Fish and Wildlife Service had designated 470 critical habits, and 
it had developed over 500 habitat conservation plans and around 
1,000 approved recovery plans.29 
Natural resource management has become a burgeoning field 
that has changed the nature of raw material extraction, whether 
of renewable resources like forests and fisheries or non-
renewables such as minerals and oil and gas.30  Legislation 
designed to conserve natural resources and reduce ecological 
damage include the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the 
Forest Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 and 
1978, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, the 
National Forest Management Act of 1976, the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, and the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act of 1978.  Each imposes both procedural 
obligations shaping planning and development, as well as 
substantive standards that such development must adhere to. 
Environmental regulations have had a direct effect on human 
health, for example, by decreasing urban smog and improving 
water quality.  The EPA’s 2008 Report on the Environment 
reported a 96% drop in lead levels between 1980 and 2006; a 
decline of 75% in the anthropogenic carbon monoxide emissions 
between 1980 and 2002; a decrease of 41% of ambient 
concentrations of nitrous oxides between 1980 and 2006; and a 
decline of 37% in sulphur dioxide emissions between 1990 and 
2002.31  The decline of nitrous oxides and sulphur dioxide has 
resulted in a decrease in acid rain across most of the U.S., which 
in turn has lowered the acidity of many rivers and lakes.  In 
addition, between 1970 and 1985, the Clean Water Act led to a 
 
 28. Id. at 192. 
 29. Id. at 47. 
 30. Note that the term “natural resource” derives from a utilitarian 
understanding of the earth that shapes and limits related analysis and 
discussion. 
 31. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2008 REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 2-14, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/roe/docs/roe_final/EPAROE_FINAL_2008.pdf. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
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32% increase in the number of people served by wastewater 
treatment plants, resulting in a 46% drop in the annual release of 
organic wastes in the U.S.32  The Safe Drinking Water Act, 
moreover, has led to improvements in drinking water quality, 
particularly in cities, with the worst point-source water pollution 
mostly eliminated.33 
Many more laws have indirectly improved human health, for 
example, by changing the nature of the materials allowed in 
consumer products.  The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 led 
to the review of more than 50,000 existing chemicals by the EPA.  
In addition, EPA reviews approximately one thousand new 
chemicals each year and regulates their manufacture, sale, use, 
and disposal to prevent “unreasonable risk of injury to health or 
the environment.”34  The 1986 Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act requires manufacturers to report 
annually to the EPA the quantity of more than 650 toxic 
chemicals that have been released by them into the air, water, 
and land.35  Some of these regulations have been aimed 
specifically at changing industrial and market processes to 
improve their resource efficiencies, to mandate resource recovery 
and recycling, or to shape patterns of consumption.  The National 
Energy Act of 1978, for example, led to an array of tax credits to 
improve energy efficiency in homes and increased taxes on gas 
guzzling cars.  As a result, appliances became 75% more efficient 
from the late 1970s to early 1990s, while passenger automobiles 
increased their gas mileage from fourteen to twenty-two miles per 
gallon between 1973 and 1991.36  The Pollution Prevention Act of 
1990 helped usher in comprehensive state-level recycling laws 
and innovative municipal programs leading to an increase in 
 
 32. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 32. 
 33. RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 281 (1999). 
 34. LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 73. 
 35. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lcra.html (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013); see KRAFT, supra note 27, at 36; R. Michael M’Gonigle et al., 
Community Right to Know: Improving Public Information about Toxic 
Chemicals, 5 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 95 (1995). 
 36. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 164-65. 
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recycling of municipal waste from 6% in 1960 to 33% in 2005.37  
Similarly, generation of hazardous waste decreased by nearly 
20% between 1999 and 2005.38 
The breadth, depth, and diversity of what the environmental 
law hath wrought is impressive.  Yet, amidst these successes, 
many serious environmental problems have persisted or gotten 
worse.  For example, despite achievements in wilderness 
conservation, ecologically critical wetlands continue to be lost to 
development,39 with the amount of developed land in the U.S. 
increasing by 47% between 1982 and 2002.40  The Endangered 
Species Act may be the hallmark of environmental commitment 
in America, yet relatively few species have made it off the 
endangered list since the passage of the Act in 1973.  And while a 
wide array of resource management statutes impose planning 
requirements and environmental standards, the implementing 
agencies are given “great discretion to interpret and implement 
the statutes” as they attempt to juggle economic exploitation of 
public resources with environmental protection.41 
In terms of air and water quality, atmospheric concentration 
of greenhouse gases went up by 16% between 1990 and 2005.42  
While reduction of nitrous oxides and sulphur dioxide led to a 
drop in acid rain, high nitrogen and phosphorous concentrations 
affect 30% of shallow streams.43  Incidentally, the Clean Water 
Act fails to target non-point sources of nitrogen and phosphorous, 
deriving primarily from agricultural runoff.  Likewise, the EPA 
reported in 2008 that around 60% of shallow wells tested in 
agricultural areas contained pesticides.44  And despite thousands 
of chemicals now being regularly reviewed and regulated, 
 
 37. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT: HIGHLIGHTS OF 
NATIONAL TRENDS 21 (2008) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT], 
available at http://www.epa.gov/roehd/pdf/roe_hd_layout_508.pdf. 
 38. Id. at 23. 
 39. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 212. 
 40. REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 37, at 20. 
 41. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 179, 181. 
 42. REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 37, at 8. 
 43. Id. at 11. 
 44. Id. at 12. 
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extensive chemical use continues in ways that put public health 
and the environment at risk.45 
Some inroads were definitely made with fuel efficiency.  At 
the same time, the Gas Guzzler Tax excluded small trucks, 
leading to an explosion in the market for inefficient minivans and 
SUV’s.  By 2004, this loophole allowed for an average level of fuel 
efficiency that was less than what had been achieved almost two 
decades earlier.46  Likewise, the size, expanded functions, and 
sheer abundance of appliances have cancelled out many of the 
gains made by efficiency standards for home appliances.  
Although pollution prevention laws help to increase recycling, the 
amount of waste generated in the U.S. regularly increases in pace 
with consumer spending.47  As a result, the amount of solid waste 
generated per person has remained the same at about four and a 
half pounds per day.48  Richard Andrews notes: 
[W]ith few exceptions – leaded gasoline, PCBs, and a very few 
pesticides – none of these policies were designed to systematically 
reduce the actual production and use of serious pollutants.  Nor 
were they designed to manage more pervasive causal factors in 
human behavior patterns and economic activity, such as the 
continuing urbanization of the landscape and its ecosystems and 
the increasing use of energy and materials per capita.49 
A systematic analysis of how diverse underlying economic 
and political forces have created the environmental problem is 
critical to understand what might be called the “problematic” of 
environmental law.  This term generally refers to the 
“configuration of theoretical concepts presupposed in a text of 
discourse” thus defining “the ‘field’ of questions which can be 
posed and the forms the answers must take.”50  The occasional 
 
 45. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 35. 
 46. TERRY TAMMINEN, LIVES PER GALLON: THE TRUE COST OF OUR OIL 
ADDICTION 71 (2006). 
 47. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 40. 
 48. REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 37, at 21. 
 49. ANDREWS, supra note 33, at 253. 
 50. BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOCIAL THOUGHT 513 
(William Outhwaite & Tom Bottomore eds., 1994) (our usage adapts this 
meaning to refer to the underlying configuration of power relations and 
intellectual frameworks that create a “problem,” and that then sets the 
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acknowledgement of the need to address root causes, or carping 
about the development of the “consumer society” points to an 
implicit recognition of the existence of an underlying 
environmental problematic.  But environmental law itself does not 
address this problematic; it operates within it.  In the next 
section, we will therefore consider the economic and political 
context of these environmental problems, highlighting the 
structure of production and consumption, and the role of law 
within that structure. 
B.   Structures from History 
In contrast to the limited focus of most environmental law, it 
is important to cast back to reveal the structural dynamics that 
create the environmental “problem.”  This entails a broader 
understanding of law in its economic and political context, that is, 
seeing law through a lens that can make visible those larger 
constitutive processes of which the regulatory regimes are just 
one part.  This is the lens of political economy.  When political 
economy gives prominence to the place of nature, it is known as 
political ecology.  What follows might then be characterized as a 
political ecology perspective, one that is designed to illuminate 
the problematic that shapes environmental law rather than the 
problems that environmental law addresses.  To do this, the 
following section will briefly review the history of law and policy 
in five primary resource sectors: oil and gas, biofuels, forestry, 
agriculture, and water. 
a.  Oil and Gas 
When President Obama announced his “Comprehensive Plan 
for Energy Security” in the spring of 2010, many of his 
environmental supporters were shocked to hear that large areas 
of U.S. coastal waters in the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and 
 
boundaries that limit the discourse about the nature of those relations and their 
resolution). 
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the Arctic would be opened to oil and natural gas drilling.51  
Obama told his audience: 
This is not a decision that I’ve made lightly. . . . But the bottom 
line is this: Given our energy needs, in order to sustain economic 
growth and produce jobs and keep our businesses competitive, 
we’re going to need to harness traditional sources of fuel even as 
we ramp up production of new sources of renewable, home grown 
energy.52 
George Bush put it more bluntly in his 2006 State of the 
Union Address stating: “We have a serious problem: America is 
addicted to oil. . . .”53  Addiction is a well-chosen word because it 
recognizes something that is fundamental to character, long 
established, self-destructive—and difficult to change.  The U.S. is 
the world leader in per capita oil consumption, which with only 
4.6% of the world’s population, produces 21% of the global GDP, 
and consumes 26% of its oil.54  But the addiction is worldwide 
with every national government committed to the economic 
growth and increased productivity that oil enables.  Such goals 
are only achievable with an ever-swelling use of energy and 
growing consumption of resources.  As the oil and gas industry 
has warned U.S. administrations since the 1930s, “unless the 
federal and state governments worked with the oil and gas 
industry to increase production . . . [the] U.S. oil and gas industry 
would decline and the nation would become more dependent on 
foreign oil.”55 
In the United States, domestic energy policy from the late 
nineteenth century to the present has been based on a 
fundamental link between the level of energy production and 
 
 51. Remarks by the President on Energy Security at Andrews Air Force Base, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-energy-security-andrews-air-force-base-3312010. 
 52. Id. 
 53. State of the Union Address by the President, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 31, 
2006) http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/. 
 54. DAVID HOWELL & CAROLE NAKHLE, OUT OF THE ENERGY LABYRINTH: 
UNITING ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT TO AVERT CATASTROPHE 68 (2007). 
 55. See Alex Mills, Obama Energy Policies Bring Rationale Questions, GO SAN 
ANGELO, Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2009/oct/17/obama 
energy-policies-bring-rationale-questions/?print=1. 
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gross domestic product.  In general, as more energy is produced, 
prices remain stable or relatively low and the GDP grows to 
increase general welfare.56  As a result, low oil prices amount to 
the best prescription for an inflation-free economic boom.  This is 
reflected by business cycles, the rises and falls of which have 
since 1973 echoed the patterns of oil prices.  Until 1998, oil prices 
played a stronger and statistically more significant role than 
interest rates in American unemployment levels.57  Profit 
margins widen dramatically as the price of energy falls.58  
Demand gains strength fuelling rising stock markets and higher 
wages.  And, of course, voters reward politicians for all of these 
things—low inflation, high employment, and booming economic 
growth. 
Energy law and policy, and the environmental law and policy 
related to it, are thus framed by the overriding commitment to 
economic development and growth based on access to cheap 
energy resources.  Important degrees of difference exist (for 
example, between more collectivist European and more 
individualist American approaches), but access to stable and as-
cheap-as-possible energy animates the energy and environmental 
policies of all major players on the world stage.  While 
conservation measures and environmental regulations can 
mitigate some of the negative impacts of growth, they do not 
challenge the broad goal of expanding production to allow 
increased consumption.59 
This productionist orientation of energy industries, markets, 
and regulation in the U.S. assumed the shape it has today nearly 
a century ago.  For example, the common law developed the “rule 
of capture,” which allocated ownership of oil to the person who 
 
 56. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 383 
(2004). 
 57. JOHN BACHER, PETROTYRANNY 259 (2000). 
 58. Id. (the economic boom from 1993 to 1999 has sometimes been attributed 
to the “tech” revolution, but others now argue that it was the product of an oil 
glut and breakdown of OPEC discipline). 
 59. MATTHEW ALAN CAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTIONS: THE TENSION 
BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
105 (1995). 
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found and took control of it.60  This spurred landowners to “drill 
as many holes as possible so as to extract . . . oil and gas before 
his neighbor.”61  Two provisions in the Tax Act were later 
introduced in an effort to increase domestic oil and gas 
production.  The expensing of intangible costs of drilling and dry 
holes was introduced in 1916, allowing oil and gas producers to 
write off a significant portion of the costs incurred in “bringing a 
well to production.”62  The percentage depletion allowance came 
into effect in 1926 enabling producers to deduct 27.5% of revenue 
from their gross income annually, even allowing deductions in 
excess of the cost of their investment.63  These and many other 
tax breaks reduced effective tax rates and ultimately the costs of 
production, thereby increasing exploitation.64  Royalties may also 
be reduced or waived to encourage oil exploration and 
development in difficult physical conditions.65  In addition, the 
 
 60. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (1840) (“That the person who 
owns the surface may dig the rein, and apply all that is there found to his own 
purposes at his free will and pleasure.”); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, 
The Rule of Capture - An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 899 (2005) 
(the rule of capture was also applied to groundwater, game animals, and 
minerals). 
 61. Kramer & Anderson, supra note 60, at 899. 
 62. SALVATORE LAZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33578, ENERGY TAX POLICY: 
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT ISSUES 5-6 (2008) (intangible drilling costs include 
such things as labor and material costs, equipment repairs, hauling and drilling 
site preparation.  Dry holes make up about 80% of all wells drilled.  Expensing 
of these costs, provided through the Tax Act, allows them to be deducted against 
other types of income). 
 63. Id. at 6. 
 64. See Joseph Mandarino, A Survey of Federal Energy Tax Incentives, 14 
DIALOGUE 6 (2006); GILBERT METCALF, MIT JOINT PROG. ON SCI. & POL’Y OF 
GLOBAL CHANGE NO. 142, FEDERAL TAX POLICY TOWARDS ENERGY (2007); 
TAMMINEN, supra note 46, at 60 (estimating the annual value of credits or 
subsidies for 2006 as follows: 2005 Energy Policy Act, $6 billion; depletion 
allowance, $784 million to $1 billion; fuel production tax credit, $769-900 
million; enhanced oil recovery tax credit, $26-100 million; foreign tax credit, $1-
3 billion; foreign income “deferral,” $183-318 million; and accelerated 
depreciation allowance, $1-4.5 billion). 
 65. See, e.g. JOHN DUFFIELD, OVER A BARREL: THE COSTS OF U.S. FOREIGN OIL 
DEPENDENCE 75-76 (2007) (the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty 
Relief Act of Nov. 1995 reduced or eliminated royalties in existing leases of oil 
and gas resources in deep-water areas, and suspended royalties on new leases in 
specified water depths in the Gulf of Mexico for five years.  Likewise, the 
government issued new regulations in 1996 that lowered royalties on federal 
lands that produced heavy oil). 
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U.S. federal government spent more than $100 billion on energy 
research and development between 1974-2000.66 
In fact, the energy sector is one of the world’s most subsidized 
industries, receiving total government handouts of between $240-
$310 billion per year.67  According to a report by the 
Environmental Law Institute, federal fossil fuel subsidies in the 
U.S. totaled $72.5 billion between 2002-2008.68  The majority of 
subsidies were made up of just a handful of tax breaks, the two 
most significant for that period being the Foreign Tax Credit at 
$15.3 billion and the Credit for Production of Nonconventional 
Fuels at $14.1 billion.69  These were followed by exploration and 
development expensing at $7.1 billion, percentage over cost 
depletion at $5.441 billion, and the credit for enhanced oil 
recovery at $1.575 billion.70  Although earning record profits, oil 
companies are nevertheless expected to receive more than $32.9 
billion in handouts between 2008-2013.71 
 
 66. Id. at 76 (at its peak spending between 1978-1981, nearly 75% of this 
budget went to research on synthetic fuels from coal and oil shale despite their 
low net energy potential and highly toxic byproducts.  By contrast, 14% of R&D 
spending went to traditional oil and gas research leaving only around 10% for 
alternative energy). 
 67. “Global Green New Deal” Environmentally-Focused Investment Historic 
Opportunity for 21st Century Prosperity and Job Creation, UNITED NATIONS 
ENV’T PROGRAMME (Oct. 22, 2008),  http://www.unep.org/Documents. 
Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=548&ArticleID=5957&l=en. 
 68. ADEYEYE, ADENIKE ET AL., ENVTL. L. INST., ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENT 
SUBSIDIES TO ENERGY SOURCES: 2002-2008, 6 (2009), available at http://www 
.elistore.org/Data/products/d19_07.pdf. 
 69. Id. at 3-18. 
 70. Id. 
 71. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, BIG OIL, BIGGER GIVEAWAYS (2009), available at 
http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/72/4/447/FoE_Oil_Giveaway_Analysis_200
8.pdf.  The $32.9 billion subsidy includes tax benefits, royalty relief, research 
and development subsidies as well as accounting gimmicks such as the “last in, 
first out” method which reduced income taxes in times of inflation by recording 
the most recently produced items as sold first.  There is a chance that these 
subsidies could be tempered in the future in light of the recent congressional 
fights over the defeated Ending Big Oil Tax Subsidy Act, H.R. 601, 112th Cong. 
(2011), and President Obama’s announcement in September 2011 of a deficit 
reduction plan that includes eliminating $41 billion in subsidies (tax loopholes) 
to the oil and gas industry. See Daniel Weiss & Valeri Vasques, Big Oil’s 
Mountain of Cash, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www 
.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/ big_oil_cash.html. 
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Thus the true costs of fossil fuel dependence are buried in the 
law beneath a myriad of formal (direct and indirect) public 
subsidies.  On top of these, however, are a variety of informal or 
implicit subsidies including countless so-called environmental 
“externalities,” such as air pollution, acid rain, oil spills, health 
impacts, and premature deaths, which have long been treated as 
manageable economic costs.72  Almost as significant, but in 
different ways, is the massive subsidy provided through the 
maintenance of active military support, a subsidy that skews the 
whole orientation of federal budgets, expenditures, foreign 
relations, and “military-industrial” politics.73  In addition, Oil 
Change International reports that the U.S. Congress provided 
more than $15.6 billion in international “oil aid” financing 
between 2002-2007.74  While often presented as “development 
assistance,” such aid commonly amounts to a subsidy for some of 
the wealthiest oil corporations.75  The details of energy law and 
policy may vary with the political persuasion of governments, but 
the general orientation does not.76 
 
 72. These externalities are not fully manageable and, in monetary terms, are 
not fully measurable.  This is clearly the case with, for example, climate change, 
the costs of which some have conservatively estimated to be $1 trillion per year 
or more. See NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES: HOW TAX 
DOLLARS CAN UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 80-81 (2001).  
According to the 2006 U.K. governmental report The Economics of Climate 
Change, “solving” climate change (by holding the increase in CO2 in the 
atmosphere to 500 ppm, even though the consensus level that is needed to 
stabilize the climate is the much lower figure of 350 ppm) would take an 
estimated 1% of global GDP. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xiv (2007). 
 73. The largest financial subsidy that is unaccounted for in American energy 
policy is military intervention that helps provide security for oil operations in 
countries such as Iraq, Colombia, and oil-rich regions of Central Asia and West 
Africa.  U.S. military interventions, particularly under the umbrella of the war 
on terror, have worked to establish favorable conditions for implementing the 
U.S.-directed projects in Iraq and Colombia that have opened up oil reserves for 
exploitation by multinational oil corporations. See GARRY LEECH, CRUDE 
INTERVENTIONS: THE UNITED STATES, OIL AND THE NEW WORLD (DIS) ORDER 4  
(2006). 
 74. Steve Kretzmann, Aiding Oil, Harming the Climate, OIL CHANGE INT’L 
(Dec. 6, 2007), http://priceofoil.org/2007/12/06/aiding-oil-harming-the-climate/.  
The $15.6 billion in “oil aid” is in addition to domestic subsidies 
 75. Id. 
 76. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 56, at 70-72.  The authors note the 
similarities in energy policies from Reagan and Clinton through to Bush 
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On the other side of the production equation, the modern 
state that facilitates production profits directly from it.  
According to the Tax Foundation, between 1981 and 2008, oil 
producers paid an average of $14.37 billion per year to federal 
and state governments in corporate income taxes and almost 
double the amount to foreign governments.77  Over the same 27-
year period, the industry paid a total of $1.1 trillion in excise and 
sales taxes.78  In the never-ending circle that is the modern 
capitalist economy, these excise taxes go directly to support 
highway maintenance that, in turn, subsidize automobile 
purchases and use.79  For governments, the promise of incoming 
investments, taxes, and/or export dollars drives all governments 
to support the outgoing costs of developing the energy industry 
with incentives and subsidies.  In Canada, for example, energy 
exports reached $133 billion in 2008, the highest value ever, and 
a record of 28% of all merchandise trade.80  Canada surpassed 
Saudi Arabia as the largest single exporter of oil to the U.S. in 
2001.  The vast “tar sands” in northern Alberta receive strong 
government support for growth in production despite their low 
net energy returns and high environmental costs.81  As the 
 
illustrating that despite differences in rhetoric, all adhere to the basic fossil fuel 
production model. Id. at 30. 
 77. Scott Hodge, IEA Study Ranks Nations’ Subsidies to Fossil Fuel 
Consumption, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2010), http://taxfoundation.org/article/iea-
study-ranks-nations-subsidies-fossil-fuel-consumption. 
 78. Id. 
 79. More recently, approximately 15% goes to fund mass transit. See 
METCALF, supra note 64, at 5; PAMELA JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL30304, THE FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON GASOLINE AND THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND–
A SHORT HISTORY (2006). 
 80. See STATISTICS CANADA, CANADA YEAR BOOK 2009 137 (2009).  This 
includes exports of crude petroleum, natural gas, coal, petroleum and natural 
gas products, and electricity (hydro and nuclear).  However, crude oil alone 
accounted for $41.8 billion.  As parts of Canada also import energy, the net 
energy exports for 2008 were $73 billion.  Note that energy exports decreased to 
$79.9 billion in 2009 due to the recession and the fall in prices, with a 
corresponding decline in net exports to $46 billion. See STATISTICS CANADA, 
CANADA YEAR BOOK 2010 143 (2010). 
 81. One barrel of bitumen oil from the tar sands emits three times as much 
greenhouse gas as one barrel of conventional oil.  To extract each barrel of tar 
sand oil also requires three barrels of water, 90% of which ends up in toxic 
tailing ponds.  This has led to groundwater contamination and high rates of a 
rare cancer in a downstream community.  Each day, the industry also uses the 
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world’s largest energy project, investments in the tar sands now 
total approximately $200 billion, attracting nearly 60% of all 
global oil investments.82  Yet no comprehensive assessment has 
been conducted of the environmental, economic, or social 
impacts.83  This kind of pattern applies in spades in developing 
nations that receive critical foreign investment and trade dollars 
from their oil and gas sales.  In Nigeria, for example, petroleum 
revenues constitute 90-95% of the state’s total budget revenues.84  
For that reason, the Nigerian government has been willing to 
take extreme measures to protect the interests of the oil industry 
in their country.85 
From a GLT perspective, one can assess the environmental 
problematic and its attendant processes in new ways.  For one 
thing, of concern here are not specific “legal” laws but complex 
regimes of power and law.  In this light, specific regulatory 
initiatives that might restrain production confront an established 
and successful economic (and political) “dynamic” that limits 
what can be done.  This dynamic and the underlying logic that 
gives effect to it constitutes a “deeper” level of “regulation” that 
must be understood in new ways, with new tools, and with very 
different approaches not to “legal reform” but to “systemic re-
formation.”  Here we can see how production is controlled by 
large, capital-intensive, integrated and centralized private firms, 
 
equivalent amount of natural gas required to heat four million homes.  If 
development proceeds as projected, it will “destroy or industrialize a forest the 
size of Florida.” See ANDREW NIKIFORUK, TAR SANDS: DIRTY OIL AND THE FUTURE 
OF A CONTINENT 1-4 (2d ed., 2010).  A report by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development estimated that the tar sands receive $1.59 billion 
annually in subsidies from the federal (Canada) and provincial (Alberta) 
governments.  Production in 2008 was 442 million barrels, or about 42% of all oil 
production in Canada, with an export value of $37 billion.  This production is 
expected to double by 2018. See DAVE SAWYER & SETON STIEBERT, 
ENVIROECONOMICS, INC., FOSSIL FUELS – AT WHAT COST? 22 (2010), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/ffs_awc_3canprovinces.pdf. 
 82. NIKIFORUK, supra note 81, at 2. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Abiola Morgan-Anyakwo & Craig Withers, B2B Opportunities in Nigeria’s 
Oil and Gas Industry, AFRICA J., Winter 2006, at 14. 
 85. One tragic case is that of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists 
who led a non-violent campaign against the extreme environmental damage in 
the Niger Delta caused by the multinational petroleum industry, especially 
Shell.  All were hanged in 1995 by the military government. 
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all of which are publicly regulated by large government agencies 
such as the Department of Energy in the United States, with the 
activities of both fuelling the macro-economy.  This model dates 
from a time when constraints to production could be overcome 
with technology and capital, and the goal of government was to 
ensure that these were available.  Environmental concerns 
arrived later on the government agenda, emanating from 
separate legislation situated in specialized (and different) 
agencies, and provoking limited bureaucratic movement.  The 
dominant goal of policy was, and continues to be, overcoming 
constraints to production in order to support on-going economic 
growth.  Despite recent developments like global warming, 
regulatory authorities do not take seriously those who call for a 
“new economy” designed to work within energy and 
environmental constraints rather than overcome them.  For a 
green legal theorist, this conundrum points beyond the formal 
law the true sources of social regulation (and ‘re-form’). 
In contrast, the task of environmental law has and remains 
that of mitigating the impacts of production.  And mitigation is a 
big and complex job—from setting standards for exploitation and 
development, to protecting sensitive areas from development, to 
limiting the impacts of production on air and water quality.86  
 
 86. For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act addresses the injection of 
fluids for oil and gas extraction under its Underground Injected Control 
Program while the Clean Water Act addresses discharges of surface water by 
exploration and production activities.  The Clean Air Act sets concentration 
limits for specific airborne pollutants as well as seven hazardous pollutants.  
Interestingly, however, none of the National Emissions Standards for 
Hazardous Airborne Pollutants apply to oil and gas exploration and production. 
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EXEMPTION OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION WASTES FROM FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATIONS (2002), 
available at http://epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/special/oil/oil-gas.pdf.  In 
addition, a wide range of laws are administered by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency that address energy production including the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, and 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.  Prior to 2008, there was a congressional 
moratorium on drilling on much of the outer continental shelf of the U.S., 
though this ban was allowed to expire in 2008.  Contrary to his position during 
the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama began to open these waters to drilling 
in April 2010 before largely reversing his decision following the oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico.  The Arctic National Refuge has also been protected from oil and 
gas extraction, though this status is an ongoing political controversy.  Its 
continuing protection from development is far from assured particularly under a 
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The regulatory goal is not to change social patterns in order that 
we might leave oil and coal in the ground, and rivers undammed, 
but to make their development less harmful to an implicit, and 
unchallengeable, social trajectory.  This is why policy is usually 
justified in terms of greater ‘efficiency’ in use rather than re-
structured reductions in ‘demand’.  Cars were not banned from 
the city, and massive conversions not made to public transit and 
bicycles.  Energy users were not penalized with fines for above 
average consumption.  Consumer culture was not challenged with 
the purchase of larger appliances and profligate energy use 
penalized.  Quite the opposite.  The 1980s and 90s (when 
conservation was a public priority) saw the greatest boom in 
consumerism and energy use in planetary history.  Of course, 
many environmentalists and environmental lawyers would like 
nothing better than to see the pace of energy development slowed 
or even stopped.  But that is not possible within the structure in 
which environmental law is embedded—and there is nothing in 
the lexicon of this field of regulation to help one think outside, let 
alone get outside, that structure that puts production as the 
priority, with environmental regulation pulling up the rear. 
Thus, beyond greater efficiency, the orientation of energy and 
environmental law and policy is toward making new, and risky, 
forms of supply workable. For example, exploiting remote and 
hard-to-access oil deposits in sensitive ecosystems like the Arctic 
or under the deep ocean, manufacturing dirty oil from the tar 
sands, creating hydrogen fuels and expanding existing sources of 
electricity to produce them (including nuclear energy), developing 
problematic new technologies to create “clean coal” and sequester 
their greenhouse gases underground and—despite its claims of 
being something new—bringing on stream so-called “alternative” 
or “green” renewable energy. 
 
Republican majority in the House of Representatives.  In terms of international 
standards, the American Petroleum Industry maintains about 400 voluntary 
standards which are widely used in the U.S. and globally, and were historically 
seen as the industry standard. 
25
 1030 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
b.   Biofuels 
This GLT approach directs attention to the problematic (in 
both senses of the word) promise of “alternative” energy, such as 
biofuels.  Facing rising scarcity and higher costs for 
hydrocarbons, the use of biofuels has increased dramatically over 
the past two decades.  In 2009, the U.S. alone produced 10.75 
billion gallons of ethanol, more than double the 5.6 billion gallons 
it produced in 2006.87  The U.S. Energy Security and 
Independence Act of 2007 created federal renewable fuel 
mandates of 36 billion gallons by 2022.88  To meet this, the 
government estimates that 527 new biorefineries requiring $168 
billion in investment will be needed.89  The EU’s Renewable 
Energy Directive sets binding targets for 20% of all energy and 
10% of transport fuels to come from renewable sources by 2020.90  
The same kind of trend can be seen worldwide.91  Yet, to replace 
10% of the gasoline in the U.S. with ethanol and biodiesel would 
require 43% of current U.S. cropland to be allocated to biofuel 
production.92  To meet a substitution rate of 10% liquid biofuels 
 
 87. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., USDA REGIONAL BIOFUELS ROADMAP TO MEETING 
THE BIOFUELS GOALS OF THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD BY 2022 AS SET OUT IN 
THE ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/documents/USDA_Biofuels_Report_ 6232010.pdf; ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008, WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2030 8 
(2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2008).pdf. 
 88. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 87, at 18. 
 89. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 87, at 7. 
 90. Directive 2009/28/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy From Renewable Sources 
and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC. 
 91. Canada requires all gasoline to have a 5% average renewable fuel content 
and, since July 1, 2010, has mandated a 2% biofuel content for diesel fuel and 
heating oil.  India aims for 20% of its fuels to derive from ethanol by 2017, 
Brazil has a minimum ethanol mandate of 18-20% (reduced from 25% in 2010), 
and China is aiming for a 10% biofuel mandate for 2020.  For a listing of biofuel 
mandates in fifty-two countries, see Jim Lane, Biofuels Mandates Around the 
World, BIOFUELS DIGEST (July 21, 2011), http://biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/ 
2011/07/21/biofuels-mandates-around-the-world/; see also Ethanol from Around 
the World, BIOFUELS ASS’N OF AUSTL., http://www.biofuelsassociation.com. 
au/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=69&Itemid=86 (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2013).  
 92. C. Ford Runge, The Case Against Biofuels: Probing Ethanol’s Hidden 
Costs, YALE ENV’T 360 (Mar. 11, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_case_ 
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globally could require an area equivalent to 36% of the world’s 
arable land.93  These statistics point to the challenge and 
potential conflicts implicated in meeting current targets for 
biofuel production. 
Despite such findings, the biofuel boom continues to be 
generously sponsored by government subsidies.  Canada, the 
U.S., and the EU spent $11 billion on biofuel subsidies in 2006 
alone, with such spending predicted to rise to $25 billion per year 
by 2015.94  Subsidies include tax concessions and direct support 
such as exemptions from fuel excise taxes, loans, and grants for 
investment in productive capacity.95  The U.S. spent $16.8 billion 
subsidizing corn-based ethanol between 2002-2008, totaling more 
than half of all subsidies to renewable energy.96  As of 2011, 
 
against_biofuels_probing_ethanols_hidden_costs/2251/.  Twenty-four percent of 
the corn harvest in the U.S. was used for ethanol production in 2007, yet 
contributed only 1.3% toward national liquid fuel use. See Robert Howarth et 
al., Rapid Assessment on Biofuels and Environment: Overview and Key 
Findings, in BIOFUELS ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES AND INTERACTIONS WITH 
CHANGING LAND USE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT (SCOPE) INTERNATIONAL BIOFUELS PROJECT RAPID 
ASSESSMENT 1, 2 (Robert Warren Howarth & S. Bringezu eds., 2009), available 
at http://cip.cornell.edu/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?view=body&id=pdf 
_1&handle=scope/1245782000. 
 93. See Howarth et al., supra note 92.  Estimates of required agricultural 
land range from 118-508 million hectares depending on the crop used and 
assumed level of productivity.  If a combination of jatropha and sugar cane, (the 
two preferred crops in terms of greenhouse gas benefits) were used, the total 
land required to meet a 10% biofuel substitution target globally would be an 
estimated 243 million hectares or 17% of the current 1,400 million hectares of 
arable land globally. See N.H. Ravindranath et al., Greenhouse Gas Implications 
of Land Use and Land Conversion to Biofuel Crops, in BIOFUELS 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES AND INTERACTIONS WITH CHANGING LAND USE, 
supra note 92, at 117. 
 94. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., BIOFUEL SUPPORT POLICIES: AN 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 111, 147 (2008), available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/5108121e.pdf?expires=1337981432&id=i
d&accname=ocid177125&checksum=D9299B33850EEE0A3D1B187D29B1E4A9. 
 95. See RONALD STEENBLIK, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE, BIOFUELS-AT WHAT 
COST? GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ETHANOL AND BIODIESEL IN SELECTED OECD 
COUNTRIES: A SYNTHESIS OF REPORTS ADDRESSING SUBSIDIES FOR BIOFUELS IN 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 
2 (2007), available at http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/oecdbiofuels 
.pdf. 
 96. ENVTL. LAW INST., ENERGY SUBSIDIES BLACK, NOT GREEN (2009), available 
at http://www.eli.org/pdf/Energy_Subsidies_Black_Not_Green.pdf.  Biofuel 
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blenders in the U.S. received a tax credit of $.45 per gallon of 
ethanol blended into conventional gasoline and $1 per gallon of 
biodiesel blended into fossil diesel.97  In 2009, these biofuel tax 
credits in the U.S. amounted to $6 billion.98  There are also a 
variety of agricultural schemes such as the EU’s Energy Crop Aid 
which pays 45 Euros per hectare for non-food crops.  Government 
funding for research and development (R&D) has also poured into 
the commercialization of biofuel technologies.  The U.S. spent 
$800 million on R&D related to biofuels from 1993-2004.99  The 
EU allocated around 139 million Euros for biofuels and 
biorefinery research in 2007 and 2008.100  Canada has invested 
$145 million (Cdn) into its Agricultural Bioproducts Innovation 
Program to support R&D to advance its bio-based economy,101 a 
small portion of the $2.2 billion allocated to programs to boost 
domestic production.102  Energy security remains a strong 
justification for such government spending, but the USDA’s 
involvement underlines the push for new market outlets and 
additional demand for American agricultural products to raise 
farm incomes and stimulate economic growth.103 
While biofuels are often promoted as eco-friendly and a 
weapon against climate change, evidence to the contrary is 
growing.104  Studies are showing some biofuel production systems 
 
Watch reported that biofuels comprised 80% of all “renewable energy” subsidies 
in the U.S. and add up to $5.5 to $7.3 billion per year. Almuth Ernsting, From 
Agrofuels to Biochar, BIOFUEL WATCH (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.biofuelwatch. 
org.uk/docs/agrofuels_and_biochar_article.pdf. 
 97. This is down from $0.51 cents ethanol tax credit set in the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005. See STEENBLIK, supra note 95, at 33.  Both the ethanol and biodiesel 
tax credits were due to expire at the end of 2011.  While the biodiesel tax credit 
was extended, the ethanol tax credit was allowed to expire. 
 98. RONALD WILLIAM GECAN ET AL., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, USING BIOFUEL 
TAX CREDITS TO ACHIEVE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GOALS vii (2010), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/114xx/doc11477/07-14-Biofuels.pdf. 
 99. Id. at 36. 
 100. Id. at 34. 
 101. Id. at 36. 
 102. Id. at 34. 
 103. This is underlined by the involvement of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture in biofuel policy. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra 
note 94, at 27. 
 104. See G. Phillip Robertson et al., Agriculture - Sustainable Biofuels Redux, 
322 SCI. 49 (2008) (discussing the sustainability of biofuel production). 
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to result in a net increase in greenhouse gas emissions, 
particularly when nitrous oxide emissions from the use of 
nitrogen fertilizer are taken into account.105  Even more 
concerning are the greenhouse gas emissions that result from 
conversion of native ecosystems, particularly forests and peat 
lands, to biofuel crops.106  One study using a world-wide 
agricultural model to estimate emissions from land-use change 
found that corn-based ethanol nearly doubled greenhouse gas 
emissions over 30 years, with emissions continuing to increase for 
the next 167 years.107  Another study found that conversion of 
rainforests with peat soils to palm plantations could increase net 
emissions of greenhouse gas emissions by a factor of twenty 
relative to the use of fossil fuels.108  This is particularly 
concerning as the biofuel boom has lifted palm oil prices by nearly 
half, contributing to the state-supported expansion of plantations 
in both Indonesia and Malaysia at the expense of carbon-rich peat 
swamps and tropical rainforest.109 
Expansion of biofuel production also comes up against the 
growing demand for food.  According to David Mitchell, a lead 
economist with the Development Prospects Group of the World 
Bank, the 53% rise in food prices between March 2007 and March 
2008,110 and 140% increase in food prices between January 2002 
 
 105. Nitrous oxide is 300 times more potent in its global warming effect than 
carbon dioxide. See Howarth et al., supra note 92, at 3-4. 
 106. Id. at 4. 
 107. Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases 
Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-use Change, 319 SCI. 1238 
(2008). 
 108. Life cycle analyses that do not take into consideration the emissions from 
land-use changes misleadingly report an 80% saving in greenhouse gases for 
palm oil in comparison to fossil fuels. See Howarth et al., supra note 92, at 5; E. 
Minichetti & M. Otto, Energy Balance and Greenhouse Gas Emissions of 
Biofuels from a Life-Cycle Perspective, in BIOFUELS ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSEQUENCES AND INTERACTIONS WITH CHANGING LAND USE, supra note 92. 
 109. E.B Fitzherbert et al., How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?, 
23 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 538, 539 (2008); ASBJØRNE EIDE, THE RIGHT 
TO FOOD AND THE IMPACT OF LIQUID BIOFUELS (AGROFUELS) 22 (2009), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap550e/ap550e.pdf. 
 110. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SOARING FOOD PRICES AND 
FOOD SECURITY (2008), available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/15371-
0ec68d2068ad0a8d29a1e2bd6630fce96.pdf; see EIDE, supra, note 109, at 14; 
Steven Sexton et al., Food Versus Fuel: How Biofuels Make Food More Costly 
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and February 2008 was due, in large part, to biofuels 
production.111  In addition to increasing food prices, biofuel 
production weakens access to food for vulnerable populations by 
concentrating land for plantation-type production resulting in 
evictions or the marginalization of vulnerable inhabitants and 
increasing competition for water.112  Water for irrigation is 
already in short supply and may soon be inadequate to meet the 
demand for food in many regions.113  The perverse impact of 
biofuel production is, thus, to pit the world’s 800 million wealthy 
car owners against the world’s 2 billion poorest people.114 
It is, as one commentator noted, “a sad irony of the biofuels 
experience that resource alternatives that seemed farmer-friendly 
and green have turned out so badly.”115  At the same time, 
however, the policies surrounding biofuel production are framed 
not by environmental and social concerns, but by the same 
overriding commitment of energy policy more generally: to ensure 
access to stable and as-cheap-as-possible energy in order to keep 
the economy growing.  While conservation measures and 
environmental regulations might mitigate some of the worst 
impacts of energy production, whether biofuels or oil and gas, 
they do nothing to challenge the environmentally harmful goals 
of expanded production and increased consumption.  This is the 
real, yet hugely neglected, systemic locus of social “regulation” 
that drives specific legal laws, from land tenures and subsidy 
programs to fuel content rules. 
c.  Forestry 
Just as the primary goal of energy policy has been to 
maintain access to affordable supplies, so too is forestry policy 
driven by the need to maintain a steady level of supplies, and at 
the right price.  And as with energy, timber subsidies abound.  
 
and Gasoline Cheaper, 12 AGRIC. & RES. ECON. UPDATE 1, 2 (Sept./Oct. 2008), 
available at www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/extension/update/articles/v12n1_1.pdf. 
 111. Mitchell calculated that three-quarters of the 140% price rise was due to 
biofuel production. See EIDE, supra note 109, at 14. 
 112. Id. at 4. 
 113. Howarth et al., supra note 92, at 8. 
 114. EIDE, supra note 109, at 12. 
 115. Runge, supra note 92, at 3. 
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With 84% of the world’s forests publicly owned,116 governments 
have enormous constitutional power to facilitate industry growth 
through grants of land tenure, land use regulations, operating 
licenses, financial subsidies, enforcement practices, procurement 
policies, and so on.  At every step of the way, governments 
oversee forest conversion. 
The original subsidy to the logging industry was the granting 
of inexpensive and even free rights to cut timber.  In the U.S., 
public forestlands were sold or given away through railroad land 
grants.117  In the nineteenth century, Congress granted huge 
tracts of land to many railroad companies in what is now 
considered to be one of the biggest public land giveaways in U.S. 
history.  The justification for it was to provide railroad companies 
a base on which to raise the capital needed to build a 
transnational railway system needed to open up the frontier, 
connect new towns and cities, transport commodities and 
consumer goods, and spawn economic growth.118  The Northern 
Pacific railroad land grant, signed into law in 1864, gave some 40 
million acres of public lands to Northern Pacific on the condition 
that all lands would be opened for homesteaders within five years 
of completion of the railroad.119  In the case of financial failure, 
all remaining grant lands were to be sold at local auction.120  
Northern Pacific did fail twice in 1873 and 1893, but the grant 
lands were never legitimately sold at local markets.121  Neither 
 
 116. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES 
ASSESSMENT 5 (2005), available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/fra2005/en/. 
 117. See Janel M. Curry-Roper, The Impact of the Timber and Stone Act on 
Public Land Ownership in Northern Minnesota, 33 J. FOREST HIST. 70 (1989). 
 118. See DERRICK JENSEN ET AL., RAILROADS AND CLEARCUTS: LEGACY OF 
CONGRESS’S 1864 NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD LAND GRANT 8 (1995) (describing 
the nature of the land grant). 
 119. United States v. Northern P.R. Co., 311 U.S. 311, 336 (1940) (discussing 
the congressional mandate and its conditions). 
 120. A Resolution authorizing the Northern Pacific Railroad Company to Issue 
its Bonds for the Construction of its Road and to secure the same by Mortgage, 
and for other Purposes, 16 Stat. 378 (1870) (describing the consequences of 
financial failure). 
 121. After the first financial failure, Northern Pacific reorganized such that 
“the existing mortgage was foreclosed, stock was substituted for outstanding 
bonds [on the grant lands], and assets, including the [land] grant, were bought 
by a committee of interested bond holders.” JENSEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 12.  
After the second financial failure, the grant lands were sold, as required, at a 
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were they opened to settlement.  Instead, millions of acres went 
cheap to large corporations.122 
These “private lands” were the primary source of early 
industry development.  Only after these lands were depleted, did 
logging begin to pick up on public forest lands.  The National 
Forest System was created in 1905 to manage the use of public 
forestlands,123 but until the mid-1940s only 5% of the timber 
supply came from them.124  This all changed with the increase in 
demand during World War II and the post-war building boom, a 
demand that was managed by a Forest Service that evolved from 
a custodian of the public forest to a “production agency.”125  
 
public sale to the highest bidder.  However, J.P. Morgan, controller of Northern 
Pacific, and James J. Hill, owner of the Great Northern railroad, consolidated 
the two lines.  The new Northern Pacific railway company was consistently the 
highest bidder. Id. at 12-14.  The Supreme Court later held that the 
consolidation was an illegal restraint of trade in Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. 
Co., 161 U.S. 646 (1896).  However, by making individuals rather than a 
corporation the owners of the new company, the ruling was subsequently 
bypassed. See JENSEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 13-14. 
 122. The land holdings of Plum Creek (the logging arm of Northern Pacific) 
and the interlinked companies of Weyerhaeuser, Potlatch, and Boise Cascade all 
came from the Northern Pacific land grant.  Weyerhaeuser, for example, 
purchased 900,000 acres of Northern Pacific grant lands in Washington State in 
1899.  The current holdings of Plum Creek, Potlatch, and Boise Cascade are all 
based on the railroad grant lands. See JENSEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 3-4. 
 123. All public lands managed by the Forest Service are collectively known as 
the National Forest System.  The beginnings of the National Forest System can 
be traced back to the Forest Reserve Act of 1891.  In 1897 the Forest 
Management Act or Organic Act was enacted, defining the purposes of National 
Forests to be forest protection, predictable water supplies, and timber 
production.  In 1905, 63 million acres of federal forest land were transferred 
from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau 
of Forestry.  The Bureau was subsequently renamed the Forest Service.  Gifford 
Pinchot became the first chief forester who is renowned for instilling a culture of 
“wise use” into the agency and “conservation” rather than “preservation.”  By 
1910, the National Forests System had grown to 168 million acres.  Today it 
stands at 191 million acres. See GERALD WILLIAMS, THE FOREST SERVICE: 
FIGHTING FOR PUBLIC LANDS 2-11 (2007); George A. Gonzalez, The Conservation 
Policy Network, 1890-1910: The Development and Implementation of “Practical” 
Forestry, 31 POLITY 269 (1998); Douglas MacCleery, The National Forest System: 
Then and Now, EVERGREEN (Winter 2000), available at http://evergreen 
magazine.com/magazine/issue/Winter_2000.html. 
 124. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 141 (1992). 
 125. As stated by the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Monongahela National 
Forest case, W. Va. Div. of Izaac Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 
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Between 1945 and 1966 the annual cut in National Forests 
increased from 1 billion to 12.1 billion board feet.126  In response 
to this rapid acceleration of logging, the Multiple Use Sustained 
Yield Act was passed in 1960 with a mandate to consider a wider 
range of values for the forests including recreation, fish and 
wildlife habitat, and watershed protection.127  How these values 
were to be reconciled, however, was left to the Forest Service and 
its productionist organizational culture.  With ongoing erosion of 
forest lands, public environmental pressures led to the passage of 
the Wilderness Act (1964), and the setting aside of 9.1 million 
acres of wilderness under the National Wilderness Preservation 
System.  This was the “first time in history that any national 
legislature in the world had mandated that land must be 
maintained in a pristine state.”128  This public policy milestone 
was, however, compromised with most wilderness selections 
situated in rock and ice above the timberline, or in areas that 
were difficult for resource industries to access.129 
A decade later, with the environmental movement in high 
gear, the National Forest Management Act (1976) was passed 
following two high profile legal challenges to clear-cut logging 
practices in the Bitterroot and Monongahela National Forests.130  
 
F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975). See WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 143.  Gonzalez notes 
that the National Forests were always managed according to “practical forestry” 
principles that emphasized the profitable harvesting but that, prior to the 
Second World War, the timber industry itself supported limited harvesting from 
National Forests to avoid depressing timber prices and destabilize the industry.  
In the process, restricting access and production in National Forests excluded 
small operators (who were dependent on public lands), leaving them available to 
the timber industry in the postwar period. See Gonzalez, supra note 123, at 269, 
290-91. 
 126. WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 135-37. 
 127. The principle of sustained yield itself mandates the liquidation of 
(ostensibly slow growing, “decadent”) old growth forests so that they could be 
replaced by so-called “normal forests” of fast-growing, even-aged stands that 
could maintain the level of timber harvest in perpetuity.  In its single-minded 
pursuit of steady volumes of forest “fibre,” the forest science to support this 
supply was, by today’s standards, primitive in its lack of understanding of the 
costs (in terms of loss of biodiversity, pests, fire, wood quality, etc.) of eroding 
ecosystem complexity and function. 
 128. WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 139. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Charles F. Wilkinson, National Forest Management Act: The Twenty 
Years Behind, the Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 659, 665 (1997).  
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The new Act amended the Forest Rangeland Renewable 
Resources Planning Act of 1974 and the Organic Act of 1897 in 
order to “improve the quality of multiple-use management 
planning on the national forests and to achieve better integration 
of management needs with funding.”131  Clear-cutting was to be 
used only where it was the “optimum” method of harvesting, and 
had to be protective of other resource values such as soil, water, 
fish wildlife, biodiversity, recreation, and aesthetics.  Timber 
production, nevertheless, remained the general policy thrust with 
congressionally mandated harvest levels for each national 
forest.132  Arguments for increasing harvest levels were put 
forward on the grounds of economic efficiency, even though 
accelerated cutting was shown in many cases to result in below-
cost sales.  A 1994 Congressional report concluded that timber 
sales from 77 of the 120 national forests had lost money over a 
five year period with half of them losing money every year.133  
 
Decades of high-yield logging in the Bitterroot National Forest resulted in a 
range of environmental problems.  In 1970, a report was commissioned to 
analyze logging in the area.  The “Bolle Report” was critical of logging practices 
and concluded that “the basic principle of sustained-yield management was 
being violated.” Id. at 663.  Congressional hearings on clearcutting ensued.  This 
was followed in 1975 by the Court of Appeals decision in Monongahela, W. Va. 
Div. of Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1975), 
which found that clearcutting violated the 1897 Organic Act.  Both events acted 
as catalysts for the enactment of the National Forest Management Act. 
 131. Charles Davis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: National Forest 
Management Planning under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 25 
REV. POL'Y RES. 37, 38 (2008) (quoting PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: 
MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS SINCE WORLD WAR TWO (1996)). 
 132. Some argue that the real intention of the Act was to get around the 
Monongahela National Forest ruling that banned clear-cut logging on 
significant portions of national forest land. See Miles Burnett & Charles Davis, 
Getting out the Cut: Politics and National Forest Timber Harvests,1960-1995, 34 
ADMIN. & SOC'Y 202, 209 (2002). 
 133. ROSS W. GORTE, BELOW-COST TIMBER SALES OVERVIEW 39 (1994), available 
at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/forests/for-1.cfm.  In an updated version of 
the report, the author points to a variety of reasons for selling timber including 
maintaining supplies of timber for local mills that maintain employment, 
reducing fuel loading on the forest floor, and altering the mix of tree species.  
ROSS W. GORTE, BELOW-COST TIMBER SALES OVERVIEW (2004), available at 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32485.pdf. See generally 
THOMAS J BARLOW & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, GIVING AWAY THE NATIONAL 
FORESTS: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREST SERVICE TIMBER SALES BELOW COST 
(1980). 
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Subsidies for road access were a key reason for the losses, with 
the Forest Service subsidizing the engineering, design, and 
construction of literally hundreds of thousands of miles of logging 
roads.134 
Despite the introduction of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield 
Act, the National Forest Management Act, and an array of 
protective environmental laws,135 the timber harvest remained 
relatively steady into the 1990s at around 11 billion board feet.136  
William Robbins notes, “in almost every legislative and 
regulatory ‘conservation’ measure adopted at the federal level, 
the needs of America’s expanding industrial economy is 
apparent.”137  Reflecting on the situation, Wilkinson concluded: 
The Forest Service will ensure amenity values, first-rate timber-
harvesting practices, unroaded backcountry, fish and wildlife 
protection, economically justifiable sales and even protection for 
the spotted owl . . . to the extent permitted by an allowable cut of 
11 billion board feet. The quality of all Forest Service programs is 
limited by the cut.138 
A parallel situation can be seen in Canada with the early 
land giveaways and unregulated exploitation followed by a 
multiple-use sustained yield paradigm.  And just as in the 
American situation, the goal of sustained yield maximization 
dominates throughout.139  With 94% of the forests in Canada 
publicly owned, the same state-corporation, management-
 
 134. In 2004, this subsidy was represented by a presidential budget request to 
Congress of nearly $34 million. NAVIN NAYAK ET AL. & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 
GREEN SCISSORS REPORT 2004 16 (2004). 
 135. For example, the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act both have 
significant impacts on forestry practices. 
 136. WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 146. 
 137. WILLIAM G. ROBBINS, LUMBERJACKS AND LEGISLATORS: POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF THE US LUMBER INDUSTRY, 1890-1941 11 (1982). 
 138. WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 158.  With declining levels of old growth 
forests and increasing public environmental consciousness, the National Forest 
timber supply dropped to less than 4 billion board feet in the latter 1990s and 
continued to decline to 2.6 billion board feet by 2010. FED. FOREST RES. COAL., IS 
FEDERAL TIMBER STILL IN DEMAND? 5 (2011), available at http://www. 
foresthealth.org/pdf/Federal%20Timber%20Demand%20Feb%202011.pdf. 
 139. See Chris Tollefson, Introduction to THE WEALTH OF FORESTS 5-10 (Chris 
Tollefson ed., 1998). 
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production linkages are apparent.  One of Canada’s largest 
industries, forestry, provides a major source of employment and 
wages and an important source of foreign exchange earnings.140  
Royalties from timber sales have historically been the largest 
source of revenue for several provincial governments.141  This 
state-production linkage is most clearly demonstrated in the 
province of British Columbia (BC) where forestry was long the 
main driver of the provincial economy.142  With the highest rate 
of logging in Canada, BC companies cut over 90 million cubic 
meters of timber in 2005-2006, and accounted for 7% of 
employment and 15% of all economic activity in 2006.143  
Government revenues from the BC forest industry in the form of 
royalties,144 rents, and taxes amount to several billion dollars 
annually.  Between 2000-2002, timber-based industries 
contributed an average of $8.4 billion annually in GDP to the 
provincial economy.145 
 
 140. The forest industry accounted for nearly 75% of Canada’s entire surplus 
on merchandise trade well into the 1990s. See MELODY HESSING ET AL., 
CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 166 (1997). 
 141. Id. at 49.  In Canada, most matters pertaining to land and resources fall 
under provincial rather than federal jurisdiction. 
 142. BRITISH COLUMBIA (MINISTRY OF FORESTS), THE STATE OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA’S FORESTS 7 (2006). 
 143. Id. at 8, 70.  Figures include indirect and induced economic activity.  By 
comparison, in 1996, approximately 20% of all jobs in the province and 25% of 
the provincial GDP were dependent on the forest sector. British Columbia (BC 
Stats), Business Indicators December 2001, at 4, available at http://www.bcstats. 
gov.bc.ca/Publications/PeriodicalsReleases/BusinessIndicators.aspx (follow the 
links to 2001 and Dec.). 
 144. Public revenues are generated through stumpage.  Often priced at only a 
few cents on the cubic meter to keep logging costs low and amounting to only a 
small part of forestry’s total contribution to government coffers, the total 
typically hit around $1 billion a year up to 2008.  However, revenues declined 
considerably following the economic downturn of 2008. See The Council of Forest 
Industries, BC Forest Product Industry at a Glance (2012), http://www. 
cofi.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Copy-of-COFI-BC-Ind-At-A-Glance-2011-
March-31-20122.pdf (last visited May 21, 2012). 
 145. BRITISH COLUMBIA (MINISTRY OF FORESTS), supra note 142, at 134-35. 
Timber-based industries include forestry and logging, wood product 
manufacturing, and pulp and paper production. Id.  The role of forestry and 
logging in BC’s economy has declined significantly in recent years due to a 
number of factors including the downturn in the U.S. housing market, a 
protracted softwood lumber dispute with the U.S., the mountain pine beetle 
epidemic, and decades of over logging. Id. 
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The driving force of forest policy has always been the need for 
corporate-based economic growth.146  The tenure system, the 
province’s major policy instrument, was conceived as a broad 
state-directed strategy of economic development which gave large 
discretionary power to a handful of powerful corporate actors.147  
There was minimal need to resort to coercive regulatory actions 
since the government’s primary concerns were to facilitate the 
province’s economic development and maintain the stability of 
hinterland communities.148  For the same reason, stumpage rates 
were kept low while annual harvest rates were set well above the 
so-called sustained yield.  However, as old growth forests 
disappeared, forestry conflicts began to erupt.149  Rising pressure 
from First Nations and environmentalists in the 1990s combined 
with the critique of the inability of existing forestry policy to 
promote long-term prosperity in forestry-based communities, led 
to demands for policy and tenure reform.150  Nevertheless, the 
election of the left-leaning New Democratic Party in the early 
1990s led to limited structural reform (for example, the corporate 
tenure system was left untouched) because of the power of large 
forest corporations. 
 
 146. See, e.g., R. Michael M’Gonigle, Structural Instruments and Sustainable 
Forests: A Political Ecology Approach, in THE WEALTH OF FORESTS, supra note 
139; see also PATRICIA MARCHAK ET AL., FALLDOWN: FOREST POLICY IN BRITISH 
COLUMBIA (1999). 
 147. The tenure system is a set of contractual property rights whereby the 
government retains ownership of the land while licensees get ownership of the 
timber subject to a royalty fee or payment of stumpage upon cutting. 
 148. Requirements to facilitate these goals included the “use it or lose it” rule, 
which required a licensee to use its assigned quota or forfeit it, and the 
“appurtenance” clause, which generally required a tenure holder to build and 
maintain a mill as a condition of receiving a tenure. 
 149. Among the most well-known is the 1993 battle at Clayoquot Sound, the 
site of the largest mass arrest in Canadian history at the time with 800 people 
charged. See A POLITICAL SPACE: READING THE GLOBAL THROUGH CLAYOQUOT 
SOUND 42 (Warren Magnusson & Karena Shaw eds.,  2003). 
 150. See TREVOR BARNES & ROGER HAYTER, TROUBLES IN THE RAIN FOREST 
(1997); R. MICHAEL M’GONIGLE ET AL., WHEN THERE’S A WAY, THERE’S A WILL – 
DEVELOPING SUSTAINABILITY THROUGH THE COMMUNITY ECOSYSTEM TRUST (2001); 
MARCHAK ET AL., supra note 146.  For a study on the economic benefits of 
community-based sustainable forestry, see PACIFIC ANALYTICS INC., & DON 
HARRISON, REVITALIZING BRITISH COLUMBIA’S COASTAL ECONOMY: A NEW 
ECONOMIC VISION FOR THE NORTH AND CENTRAL COAST AND HAIDA GWAII (2002), 
available at www.pacificanalytics.ca. 
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The situation in the forests globally is even more extreme.  
On the Indonesian island of Borneo, over 30% of the forest cover 
has been removed in the past two decades for timber exports and 
the development of agricultural plantations.151  While nominally 
“private” companies have done the cutting, local and national 
governments have facilitated forest liquidation through granting 
and renewing licenses that largely determine the rate of 
deforestation.152  Here, too, government provides generous 
subsidies to implement its official policy of opening up 90% of its 
landmass for commercial logging and conversion to agriculture 
and settlement.153  The Malaysian government has recently 
licensed nearly a quarter of the state’s land mass to a dozen 
logging companies to convert natural tropical forest into 
plantations for the export of palm oil, one of the little known but 
most destructive of agricultural commodities.154 
Profits here accrue both to large corporations and the state.  
The timber industry has been the economic backbone of economic 
development across the region, and royalties have been an 
important source of income for state governments.  The revenue 
generated by tenures, licenses, and taxes has been enormous, 
 
 151. In the mid-1980s, forest covered nearly three-quarters of Borneo, but at 
the rate of harvest over the last twenty years, less than one-third of the island 
would remain forested in 2020. MARIO RAUTNER ET AL. & WWF, BORNEO: 
TREASURE ISLAND AT RISK 73 (2005). 
 152. Id. at 40 (6:6:1 policy).  In Sarawak, concessions are usually awarded by 
the ruling elite to political allies, relatives, and business partners, and then sub-
leased to contractors (usually Chinese) who put them into operations.  Thus, the 
forests are a locus of not only economic but political power, giving political elites 
the economic resources to maintain their grip on state power. See Amarjit Kaur, 
A History of Forestry in Sarawak, 32 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 117, 140 (1998). 
 153. RAUTNER ET AL, supra note 151, at 46; see also CHARLES BARBER ET AL., 
THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA (2002). 
 154. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, MALAYSIAN PALM OIL - GREEN GOLD OR GREEN 
WASH? 5 (2008), available at http://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/malaysian-palm-oil-report_0.pdf.  Global palm oil production is 
increasing by 9% every year, prompted largely by expanding biofuel markets in 
the EU and by food demand in Indonesia, India, and China. Fitzherbert et al., 
supra note 109, at 538-45.  The conversion of forests to palm oil plantations has 
been dramatic.  In Malaysian Borneo, the average annual growth rate of oil 
palm areas was nearly 8% between 1998 and 2003.  Over 1.6 million ha of oil 
palms now exist in Sabah and Sarawak.  In Kalimantan, the areas used by palm 
plantations grew by 11.5% to nearly a million ha in 2003. RAUTNER ET AL, supra 
note 151, at 7. 
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with a number of state-owned forestry corporations profiting 
directly from timber sales.155  In the Malaysian state of Sabah, on 
the island of Borneo, the industry has at times generated more 
than half of the state’s total revenue, while employing some 
65,000 people.156  In neighboring Sarawak, the forest industry 
sector is the largest source of revenue for the state producing 21% 
of total external earnings.157  In Kalimantan, exports of wood-
related products accounted for $7.6 billion in 2002 alone.158 
From the North to South, developing to industrialized 
countries, an inherent conflict-of-interest arises with the 
management of public forests.  The responsibility for protecting 
values that do not generate economic returns lies with 
governments that also depend on the economic royalties, 
revenues, and export dollars that arise from forest liquidation.  
The inevitable conundrum is how the state, as the major 
landowner and rent-collector, might also fulfill the duties of a 
regulator where sustainable management might necessitate 
reductions in jobs, corporate profits, and/or government revenues. 
d.   Agriculture 
Agriculture provides another instance where government 
policies have played a major role in the development of an 
economically “efficient” industrialized production system despite 
its environmental and social costs.  Just as industrial forestry 
policy has emphasized maximum sustained yield of timber, so too 
has the primary goal of industrial agriculture been maximum 
sustained yield of single commodity crops.  The past century has 
seen the agricultural system in most northern countries become 
increasingly concentrated, specialized, and industrialized.  This is 
particularly the case in the U.S., where 98% of the food supply 
now comes from agribusiness-run, industrial farms specializing in 
high-yielding monocultures using chemically-intensive farming 
 
 155. In Sarawak, the Sarawak Forestry Corporation was set up as a private 
company, wholly owned by the Sarawak State Government. RAUTNER ET AL., 
supra note 151, at 40. 
 156. Id. at 58.  Figure is for employment in the year 2000. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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methods.159  Downstream, corporate agriculture and food 
processing has been linked to growing levels of obesity, heart 
disease, and diabetes in Northern countries, and malnutrition 
and hunger in the South.160 
Agricultural policy in the U.S. has long emphasized 
agricultural exports as a means of generating income.  As the 
push for commercial agriculture strengthened in the mid-
nineteenth century, scientific methods were turned to as a means 
of increasing production.  In 1862, the newly formed U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) passed the Morrill Land 
Grant College Act, which established agricultural colleges and 
supported research into industrialized farming methods.161 
When the depression-era farm crisis hit in the 1930s, the 
first agricultural bill was enacted as a temporary measure to 
protect small farms.162  The goal of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933 was to increase and stabilize farm incomes which it 
tackled in large part through price supports for over 100 crops.163  
In the following three years, these measures pushed gross farm 
incomes up by some 50%, much of this increase resulting from 
 
 159. Kathryn Peters, Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution,  
25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 203, 207 (2010). 
 160. William Eubanks II, Paying the Farm Bill: How One Statute Has 
Radically Degraded the Natural Environment and How a Newfound Emphasis 
on Sustainability is the Key to Reviving the Ecosystem, 27 ENVTL. F. 55, 56 
(2010); see also DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT: THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO A FOOD AND 
FARM BILL (2007); RAJ PATEL, STUFFED AND STARVED (2007). 
 161. New agricultural developments were disseminated to farmers through 
the “Cooperative Extension Services,” a non-formal educational program 
established by the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 with farmers expected to follow 
recommendations for industrialized farming put forward by government-
sponsored researchers.  As this report notes, tensions arose that continue to this 
day since “public universities are often seen as promoting corporate priorities 
instead of an unbiased form for debate on what research is in the public 
interest.” DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 6 (2003). 
 162. This farm crisis in part arose from an overproduction of crops in the 
1920s leading to a steep drop in crop prices. See IMHOFF, supra note 160, at 33-
34. 
 163. Such commodity programs continue to be the most significant provision 
in U.S. farm bills in terms of budget expenditure and political importance. Larry 
Burmeister, Resilience and Vulnerability in US Farm Policy: Parsing the 
Payment Limitation Debate, 25 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 183, 183 (2008). 
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government subsidies.164  Over time, however, the commodity 
programs produced increasing concentration and specialization as 
subsidy payments were based on the production histories of each 
farm and, as a result, “were scale-biased toward larger farming 
operations and provided incentives for farmers to expand base 
acreage in program crops.”165  Under the influence of a growing 
farm lobby, the number of crops supported by commodity 
subsidies gradually declined to only a handful that provided most 
of their benefit to the big players.  As the world market in basic 
agricultural commodities expanded in the post-war period, 
individual farmers were required to “aggressively optimize their 
agricultural operations” in order to compete in an increasingly 
competitive global market.166  This was achieved through large-
scale specialization and monoculture cultivation, made possible 
by the widespread use of external chemical fertilizers, pesticides, 
and enormous amounts of water.  Public research again played a 
large role in developing and promoting the use of these external 
inputs, together with high-yielding hybrid seeds and 
mechanization.167 
By the 1970s, agricultural progress began to be measured 
almost solely in terms of increases in commodity crop yields.  The 
drive for mega-farms and maximum production was promoted by 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, whose vision of 
maximum production was summed up by his motto: “Get big or 
get out.”168  At the same time, supply management programs, 
which had been an important part of preceding farm bills, were 
replaced by direct subsidy payments to farmers.  The result was a 
seemingly limitless supply of U.S. farm products that could be 
sold at lower prices on the world market.169  These policies were 
justified in terms of helping farmers remain economically viable, 
 
 164. Eubanks, supra note 160, at 58. 
 165. Burmeister, supra note 163, at 184. 
 166. Frederick Buttel, Sustaining the Unsustainable: Agro-food Systems and 
Environment in the Modern World in HANDBOOK OF RURAL STUDIES 216 (Paul J. 
Cloke et al. eds., 2006). 
 167. Id. at 216. 
 168. Tom Philpott, The Butz Stops Here: A Reflection on the Lasting Legacy of 
1970’s USDA Secretary Earl Butz, GRIST (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.grist.org 
/article/the-butz-stops-here/. 
 169. Burmeister, supra note 163, at 184. 
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but the major beneficiaries were multinational agribusinesses, 
such as Cargill, ADM, Monsanto, and John Deere.170  By the 
1980s, the policy of maximum production led to overproduction 
and falling commodity prices which combined with skyrocketing 
interest rates to produce “the deepest rural crisis since the 
Depression.”171  Many farms went bankrupt, leading to further 
consolidation in fewer and larger farms.172  Under the influence 
of a powerful agribusiness lobby, the number of crops receiving 
price supports fell drastically to the point where only five crops—
corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, and wheat—now receive 84% of the 
commodity subsidies.173  Rather than providing a safety net for 
working farmers as originally intended, commodity programs 
have become “a far flung infrastructure of entitlements.”174 
The farm subsidy program has also benefited industrial 
livestock operations.  Since the Federal Agriculture Improvement 
and Reform Act of 1996, the market price of soybeans and corn 
has dropped below the cost of producing them.175  Between 1997 
 
 170. Burmeister notes that “firms are subsidized by commodity programs 
through the indirect route of lower world market prices and higher aggregate 
production levels than would occur in the absence of commodity programs, 
increasing the profitability of their input supply, marketing, and processing 
businesses.” Id. at 184. 
 171. Philpott, supra note 168, at 1. 
 172. Between 1950 and 1997, the number of farms in the U.S. declined from 
5.4 million to 1.9 million.  Whereas one farm supported the food needs of 15.5 
people in 1950, one farm could support 140 people by 1997. USDA, About Us, at 
¶14, available at http://www.csrees.usda.gov/qlinks/extension.html#yesterday 
(last visited May 22, 2012). 
 173. Eubanks, supra note 160, at 60. 
 174. Id. (internal punctuation omitted).  Eubanks notes that $25 billion were 
paid out in farm subsidies in 2005, “almost 50% more than the amount [the 
federal government] pays to families receiving welfare.” Id. at 61.  At the same 
time, approximately 67% of these subsidies went to the wealthiest 10% of 
recipients, “namely large corporations, non-farming homeowners, and absentee 
landowners.” Id.  While three out of five farms receive no subsidies, the richest 
5% receive $470,000 per year on average. Id. 
 175. ELANOR STARMER ET AL., FEEDING THE FACTORY FARM: IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES 
TO THE BROILER CHICKEN INDUSTRY 11 (2006).  The 1996 Farm Bill based 
payments to farmers primarily on the quantity of the commodity grown 
decoupled from supply management provisions.  The Government based this 
policy on the projection that the Uruguay Round trade talks would lead to an 
increase in commodity exports.  Instead, the policy stimulated overproduction 
and a collapse in commodity prices.  The policies continued in the 2002 Farm 
Bill (i.e., the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, P.L. 107-171) as 
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and 2005, corn was sold at 23% below production cost while 
soybeans were sold at 15% below production cost.176  This 
converts into big gains for those industries that use these 
commodities as raw material inputs, such as factory farms and 
the food processing industry.  Olson reports that between 2000 
and 2004, commodity subsidies totaled an average of $4.5 billion 
per year for corn and $2 billion per year for soy.177  As 60% of 
corn and 47% of soy produced in the U.S. is used as animal feed, 
the embedded subsidy to factory livestock production works out to 
$3.6 billion per year, or $18 billion over five years.178  Such 
figures suggest that “[c]urrent U.S. farm policies may be driving 
industrialization in the livestock production system if they give 
factory operations the appearance of being more cost efficient 
than diversified, independent operations that grow their own 
feed.”179 
 
prices continued to plummet. See Burmeister, supra note 163, at 184; Matthew 
Porterfield, U.S. Farm Subsidies and the Expiration of the WTO’s Peace Clause, 
27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 999, 1002-04 (2006). 
 176. STARMER ET AL., supra note 175, at 3. 
 177. INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, Below-cost Feed Crops: An Indirect 
Subsidy for Industrial Animal Factories (June 2006), available at http://www. 
iatp.org/files/258_2_88122_0.pdf. 
 178. Id.  These figures are supported by STARMER ET AL., supra note 175, at 3-
4, who calculate that between 1997-2005, the broiler chicken industry gained an 
average of $1.25 billion in indirect subsidies each year, and suggest that similar 
cost reductions were reaped by factory hog feeding operations. 
 179. STARMER ET AL., supra note 175, at 1.  Vertical integration, consolidation, 
and industrialization of the U.S. livestock sector have been facilitated by U.S. 
agricultural market deregulation.  The result is heavy concentration in the agri-
food industry.  The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy notes that “[only] 
[f]our companies – Cargill, ConAgra, Tyson and Smithfield – control the vast 
share of livestock markets at all stages of production – from milling the feed, to 
breeding and raising animals, to slaughtering, packing, and marketing.” INST. 
FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, supra note 177, at 2; see also PHILIP MATTERA, 
USDA INC.: HOW AGRIBUSINESS HAS HIJACKED REGULATORY POLICY AT THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/USDAInc.pdf.  He notes that when the top four firms control 40% or 
more of the market there is a strong potential for market distortion.  According 
to his research, “the top four firms typically control 60-80 percent or more of the 
market in sectors such as beef packing, pork packing, broiler production, flour 
milling and soybean crushing.” Id. at 12; see also MARY HENDRICKSON & WILLIAM 
HEFFERNAN, CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS (2007), available at 
http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/ 07contable.pdf. 
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In addition to these production effects are the environmental 
impacts.  Agriculture accounts for one fifth of all fossil fuels usage 
in the U.S.,180 as well as a massive reliance on chemical 
fertilizers, toxic biocides, and large-scale irrigation that has 
resulted in a serious decline in water quality and quantity.  Much 
of the nitrogen and phosphorous rich fertilizers applied to fields 
end up in streams and rivers, creating threats to public health as 
well as harm to aquatic species.  Their impacts can reach far 
beyond the farm as nutrients travel toward the ocean leading to 
eutrophication and expansive dead zones.181  One of the worst 
examples of this is the Gulf of Mexico, which has a “dead zone” 
that reaches up to 8,000 square miles.182  Further, with their use 
nearly tripling since 1964, pesticides were found in 60% of 
shallow wells in agricultural areas.183  Large quantities of 
manure are yet another source of water contamination.  As a 
result of “concentrated animal feeding operations” (CAFOs), 
livestock in the U.S. now produce 200 times more waste than 
humans.184  Manure applied to fields as fertilizer eventually runs 
off into surface waters, in many cases at high enough levels to kill 
 
 180. IMHOFF, supra note 160, at 102.  This figure includes the fossil fuel usage 
for growing, processing, and distributing the food. 
 181. Nitrogen and phosphate are superfood for plankton, causing them to 
quickly reproduce before dying and falling to the bottom of the ocean.  There, 
bacteria decompose them, consuming oxygen in the process.  When oxygen 
concentrations decrease to a certain level, the water takes on the effects of 
hypoxia or oxygen shortage and aquatic life either leaves the area or dies. See 
ALANNA MITCHELL, SEASICK: OCEAN CHANGE AND THE EXTINCTION OF LIFE ON 
EARTH 16-33 (2009). 
 182. In 2011, the dead zone reached 6,765 square miles.  The largest dead 
zone was recorded in 2002, at 8,484 square miles. See Buskey & Nikki, Experts 
Say More is Needed to Stop Dead Zone, HOUMA COURIER (Aug. 7, 2011), 
available at http://www.gulfhypoxia.net/news/default.asp?XMLFilename= 
201108230835.xml; Hypoxia in the News, MISS. RIVER GULF OF MEX. WATERSHED 
NUTRIENT TASKFORCE, http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/named/msbasin/ 
gulfnews.cfm (last visited May 22, 2012). 
 183. However, only 1% of wells tested were deemed to have “unsafe” levels of 
pesticides. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT DATABASE 
12 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ncea/roe/docs/roe_hd/roe-hd-final-09-
2008-ground_water.pdf. 
 184. J.B Ruhl, Farms, their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 
27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 285 (2000). 
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fish.185  Although farms are the major source of non-point source 
water pollution in the U.S., they enjoy a range of exemptions 
under the Clean Water Act.186  Buttel notes that “if 
environmental regulatory authorities were to apply to agriculture 
the same standards and penalties employed in regulation of 
industrial pollutants, the penalties for noncompliance with 
regulations would render monocultural and CAFO production 
very expensive.”187 
Meanwhile, agriculture continues to be the largest consumer 
of water, accounting for around two-thirds of all freshwater usage 
in the U.S.188  Despite the increasing frequency of water 
shortages in the U.S., agricultural policy continues to favor 
commodity crop farming over low-water farming strategies.  
However, as the next section shows, it is not only agriculture but 
the entire industrial economy that is dependent on a readily 
available source of cheap and abundant water.  And, once again, 
government policy has worked to make it happen. 
e.  Water 
The phrase “water conservation” commonly brings to mind 
low-flow plumbing fixtures, short showers, drought resistant 
urban gardens, and so forth.  Yet, in the U.S., nearly 90% of all 
freshwater is consumed by agriculture and industry.189  
Moreover, the U.S. is the highest per capita consumer of water in 
the world.190  Excluding thermoelectric power,191 irrigation 
 
 185. Id. at 285-86.  Ruhl notes that the concentration of ammonia in creeks in 
California’s Central Valley is often 200 times the level that is toxic to fish. 
Eubanks, supra note 160, at 65 (recalling the bursting of a waste lagoon in 
North Carolina in 1995 that resulted in the release of thirty-five million gallons 
of hog sewage into the New River and the death of nearly ten million fish). 
 186. The Clean Water Act focuses on “point sources” of pollution for the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program, failing to regulate 
nonpoint sources of water pollution deriving from industrial agriculture. See 
Ruhl, supra note 184, at 295-303. 
 187. Buttel, supra note 166, at 223. 
 188. This does not include thermoelectric power use. See SUSAN HUTSON ET AL., 
ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000 (U.S. Geological Survey 
Circular 1268) 35 (2004), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/circ1268/ 
pdf/circular1268.pdf. 
 189. CAHN, supra note 59, at 65. 
 190. Id. 
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accounted for 65% of freshwater withdrawals in 2000, with 86% 
of this occurring in 17 western states.192  To meet this demand, 
rivers and streams have been diverted and dammed while 
industrial wastewater has been allowed to pollute groundwater, 
leaving many major rivers in the Western U.S. badly depleted.  A 
key to understanding the unsustainable use of water lies in a long 
history of water law that shifts water from a public resource to 
private property.  This history was long based on riparian rights, 
which gave use rights to water based on ownership of land 
adjacent to a shoreline.  At the same time, water was viewed as 
common property and beyond ownership, giving those 
downstream equal rights to use the water as those upstream.193  
Central to this water allocation regime was the concept of “no 
harm,” which dictated that “riparian landowners could use water 
so long as they did not substantially impair either the quantity or 
quality of water for downstream users.”194  While the intention of 
the regime was to protect the water rights of downstream users, 
it also indirectly provided protection for aquatic ecosystems by 
ensuring a minimum flow of water.195  This system was adopted 
by and continues to be used in the Eastern U.S. where water is 
relatively abundant. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the riparian rights 
system was inadequate to meet the water demands of emerging 
industrialism in the arid west.  In its place, the doctrine of “prior 
appropriation” arose, replacing the communal right to water with 
 
 191. Thermoelectric power is often excluded from water use calculations since 
most of the water at power plants is used for once-through cooling, and is 
returned to the surface water source once it has circulated through the system. 
See HUTSON ET AL., supra note 188, at 35. 
 192. See id. at 7.  The breakdown of total water withdrawals (both surface and 
groundwater) as reported by Hutson et al. are: thermoelectric 48%, irrigation 
34%, public supply 11%, self-supplied industrial 5%, and combination of self-
supplied domestic, livestock, aquaculture, and mining 2%. Id. 
 193. Chad A. West, For Body, Soul, or Wealth: the Distinction, Evolution, and 
Policy Implications of Water Ethic, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J., 201, 219-20 (2007). 
 194. This was later modified to the “reasonable use doctrine,” which allowed 
for more significant water withdrawals to promote large-scale agriculture and 
industry if they were “reasonable relative to the equivalent right of other 
riparian landowners.” Robert Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State 
Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 18-19 (2010). 
 195. Id. at 18. 
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individual property rights.196  To obtain a water right under 
traditional prior appropriation principles, the water first had to 
be diverted from its natural course for a “beneficial use.”  
However, “beneficial use” was defined strictly in terms of 
economic benefit,197 putting aquatic ecosystems, as well as those 
who depended on the naturally flowing river for their livelihoods, 
at a real disadvantage.198  Water-right holders obtained property 
rights to a defined “amount, time, location, purpose and temporal 
priority of use.”199  This assurance of continued access to water 
was seen as necessary in order for investors to put money into 
expensive diversion projects.  But with its heavy emphasis on 
water extraction and guarantee to senior users for a specified 
quantity of water, there was no incentive for conserving water.  
On the contrary, the “use it or lose it” tenet of prior appropriation 
provided a strong incentive for users to fully exercise their water 
rights even if use exceeded their needs.200 
By the 1880s, it became increasingly difficult to meet the 
escalating demands of irrigators.  As a result, the water needs of 
junior water rights holders suffered during dry seasons.  At the 
same time, without a guaranteed supply of water, homesteading 
in the west slowed.  This was a major setback for the 
 
 196. The origins of the law can be traced back to the California gold rush and 
a dispute over water between two miners which went to the Supreme Court of 
California in 1855. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).  In its decision, the court 
essentially recognized the “first in time, first in right” rule governing the mining 
camps.  Thus, “a legal system that arose from the relatively lawless mining 
camps of the Wild West would come to be viewed as though it had been handed 
down directly from God.” Reed Benson, A Few Ironies of Western Water Law, 6 
WYO. L. REV. 331, 333 (2006). 
 197. Benson, supra note 196, at 332.  Until recently, beneficial uses were 
defined only in terms of “human economic purposes at the expense of instream 
users and other environmental uses.” Adler, supra note 194, at 22. 
 198. Those most notably impacted by this requirement were the Native 
Americans who were commonly left without the water resources they had relied 
on for millennia. Benson, supra note 196, at 332. 
 199. Joseph Dellapenna, United States: The Allocation of Surface Waters, in 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 196 (J.W. Dellapenna & J. 
Gupta eds., 2009).  These water rights typically last forever, assuming the 
right’s holder fully exercises his or her right. Benson, supra note 196, at 34-35. 
 200. The purported reason for this is to ensure water is not being “wasted” by 
preventing water rights from being held for speculative purposes only. Adler, 
supra note 194, at 22. 
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government’s aspiration of western expansion and development.  
Consequently, the government stepped in with the Reclamation 
Act of 1902, “one of the most influential statutes in the history of 
the American West.”201  The Act provided federal funding for 
large-scale water projects in the west, including dams, reservoirs, 
and canals.  It respected all existing prior appropriation rights 
while creating vast new reservoirs that could provide secure 
water rights for new users.  The Act was itself a metaphor for 
growth solving all the problems of conflict and inequity, and 
doing so at the expense of the natural environment.  As a result, 
“[l]and entries spiked to their highest levels ever in the early 
twentieth century.”202  At the same time, the landscape and 
ecology of the west was radically changed, with several dams 
sited on almost every major river.203  Robert Glennon remarks: 
By the time the frenzy of dam building came to an end in the 
1960s, most of the great rivers in the American West had been 
transformed into quiet millponds – storage reservoirs that served 
the needs of Western farms. None of these projects would have 
been undertaken by the private sector because they made 
absolutely no economic sense. But the federal government was 
less interested in cost-benefit ratios than in encouraging the 
development of agricultural communities throughout the 
West.204 
 
 201. Charles Wilkinson, Introduction to the Culture of Water Symposium, 6 
WYO. L. REV. 287, 289 (2006). 
 202. Id.  Such water developments led to notorious cases of deception and 
corruption.  One of the more extreme cases occurred with California’s Central 
Valley Project, a massive project to divert the Owens River to provide water to 
Los Angeles.  However, four times the amount of water actually required for Los 
Angeles was pumped out of Owens Valley, with the excess water diverted to the 
San Fernando Valley which it transformed from arid desert into fertile 
agricultural land.  Insiders who had bought up cheap land reaped a windfall as 
the Owens River was virtually drained. For a rich account, see MARC REISNER, 
CADILLAC DESERT: WATER AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE 2 (1993). 
 203. There were nearly 10,000 reservoirs with a storage capacity of at least 
100 acre-feet, while another 20,000 smaller reservoirs and stockponds brought 
the grand total to over 30,000 dams. See DAVID GILLIAN & THOMAS BROWN, 
INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 40 
(1997). 
 204. Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1873, 1898-99 (2005). 
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By the time legal protection for instream flows was 
recognized in the 1970s, many of the major western rivers were 
depleted and running almost dry in the summer.205  Even with 
their introduction, instream flow protection policies are generally 
limited to protecting what is left of a river by setting aside 
unappropriated water or bringing in environmental concerns 
under new water rights.206  With most western streams already 
fully appropriated and the recognition of permanent property 
rights to water under prior appropriation, the acquisition and 
transfer of existing water rights to instream flows is difficult and 
costly.207  Some recourse for instream flow protection has been 
provided through the Endangered Species Act, which accords 
protection of endangered species priority over water use.208  At 
the same time, the Act prohibits any water user from causing a 
“take” of an endangered species, but it has yet to have much 
impact on water use.  Reinforcing such inaction, the court in 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States found 
for the first time that “restrictions imposed under the ESA 
amounted to a taking of private property.”209  Once again, the 
 
 205. These include the Snake River in Idaho, Salt River in Arizona, the Rio 
Grande in New Mexico, the Arkansas River in Colorado, and the San Joaquin 
River in California, several of them located below a major dam. See GILLIAN & 
BROWN, supra note 203, at 40. 
 206. See Reed Benson, Adequate Progress or Rivers Left Behind? Developments 
in Colorado and Wyoming Instream Flow Laws Since 2000, 36 ENVTL. L. 1283, 
1301-02 (2006). 
 207. See id. at 1302 (comparing instream flow protection in Colorado, one of 
the most active state in protecting flows, and Wyoming where such protection “is 
at best a low priority.”).  Benson concludes that even in Colorado, where the 
legislative toolbox has greatly expanded, practical progress to date has been 
inadequate. Id.  For a general overview of environmental flow policy, see 
Lawrence MacDonnell, Return to the River: Environmental Flow Policy in the 
United States and Canada, 45 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASSOC., 1087 (2009). 
 208. Landmark cases such as Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 
(1978), which stopped the completion of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee 
River in order to protect the endangered Snail darter, or the threat of 
enforcement of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act against irrigators in the 
Walla Walla River Basin appear to hold out promise for inflow water protection.  
See Reed Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Considering the 
Similarities Between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 44-45 (2004). 
 209. Benson, supra note 206, at 45; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. 
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001). 
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allocation of property rights to water use under prior 
appropriations stands in the way of effective environmental 
action.  Nevertheless, despite much criticism over the past 
several decades, prior appropriation continues to be the 
foundation of western water law. 
C.   Patterns that Pervade 
The list of resource sectors that could be covered in a similar 
fashion is nearly endless, from coal bed methane, shale gas, and 
mountain-top mining to fisheries, groundwater extraction, and 
hydroelectric power.  We have reviewed a few industries not 
because (with the exception of energy) they are more important, 
but simply as illustrations of patterns that are not incidental or 
isolated but foundational.  In short, the state has long been, and 
continues to be, the biggest developer around.  One might even 
argue that, from the state’s perspective,210 environmental law is 
essentially self-regulation, providing environmental protection 
only to the extent that, like any industry, it does not seriously 
interfere with its economic priorities.  If so, this sheds light on the 
conundrum facing environmental law today that, despite the best 
efforts of environmental lawyers over several decades to halt 
environmentally destructive activities, the environment at all 
levels and in all parts of the world is spiraling downhill. 
This general eco-crisis is now widely understood.  It is 
perhaps most clearly illustrated by a startling set of graphs of the 
historic trends in resource use and environmental impacts found 
in Gus Speth’s 2008 book, A Bridge at the Edge of the World.211  
 
 210. Some will understandably criticize this as a modernist formulation that 
“reifies” the sovereign state as some fixed identifiable thing (the proverbial 
billiard ball image of a solid core with fixed boundaries), rather than treating it 
in a more post-structuralist fashion as a fluid, multi-faceted, porous process.  
From the perspective of green legal theory, however, the concern is to uncover a 
diverse, but more or less coherent, set of power logics that are inherent to this 
form of governance that follows from its formally constituted character.  For an 
interesting treatment of the state’s inherent (bureaucratic and centralist) logic 
that leads to the simplification of territorial diversity and the homogenization of 
social structures, see JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN 
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998). 
 211. JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD xx-xxi 
(2008).  Gus Speth, a former head of the Council of Environmental Quality in 
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One graph that charts temperature changes is reminiscent of 
Michael Mann’s controversial “hockey stick” graph which showed 
temperatures rising only slightly over two centuries, then 
shooting almost straight up over the last few decades.212  Climate 
change deniers vehemently challenged the accuracy of Mann’s 
graph.  However, Speth presented not just one graph but sixteen 
graphs, not just one hockey stick, but a locker room full of them!  
From water, fertilizer, and paper consumption, to dam 
construction, motor vehicles use, species extinctions, and loss of 
tropical rainforest the story is the same: after increasing only 
slightly over the preceding two centuries, the numbers suddenly 
shoot up around the middle of the twentieth century.  This 
exponential increase translates, in the United States, to a level of 
mineral and fossil fuel use over the last half-century that 
surpasses the amount used by the rest of the world throughout all 
of human history.213  The conclusion is clear: democratic states 
have not only failed to stem this tsunami—they have created it. 
These trends and what they say about the state of 
environmental law alarms Mary Wood.  The Philip H. Knight 
Professor of Law at the University of Oregon, Wood begins the 
abstract for a recent law review paper thus: “Modern 
environmental law has proved a colossal failure, despite the good 
intentions and the hard work of many citizens, lawyers, and 
government officials.”214  She notes that, in the United States, 
“[n]early every natural resource—including the atmosphere, 
water, air, wetlands, wildlife, fisheries, soils, marine systems, 
grasslands, and forests—is seriously degraded, and many are at 
the brink of collapse.”215  She uses sub-headings with titles like 
 
Washington and recent dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental 
Studies, is one of the leading American environmentalists and environmental 
lawyers of the modern environmental era. Faculty Directory: James Gustave 
Speth, VT. LAW SCH., http://www.vermontlaw.edu/our_faculty/faculty_ 
directory/james_gustave_speth.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
 212. Michael E. Mann et al., Global-Scale Temperature Patterns and Climate 
Forcing Over the Past Six Centuries, 392 NATURE 779 (1998); see also MICHAEL 
E. MANN, THE HOCKEY STICK AND THE CLIMATE WARS: DISPATCHES FROM THE 
FRONT LINES (2012) (recalling the controversy triggered by the graph and the 
science and politics that fueled it). 
 213. ANDREW DOBSON, GREEN POLITICAL THOUGHT 58 (2007). 
 214. Wood, supra note 23, at 43. 
 215. Id. at 44-45. 
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“ecological bankruptcy” (where she details a dizzying array of 
statistics of declining fisheries, water quality, forests, and so on), 
“climate emergency,” “realism,” and “the inevitability of 
transformational change.”  This dire assessment applies directly 
to the United States, the jurisdiction with the world’s earliest, 
most sophisticated, and farthest-reaching regulatory regimes. 
Professor Wood highlights many of the specific problems in 
overcoming the conundrum.  Environmental law, she argues, is a 
massive bureaucratic mess with “hundreds of thousands of pages” 
of statutes that create a “disjointed and complex set of mandates” 
for agencies whose “accumulated power . . . has stretched the 
seams of democracy.”216  Trying to get a handle on the regulatory 
complexity and “legal baklava” is impossible, so agencies succumb 
to political pressure despite the “myth that the agencies operate 
in good faith.”217  The result is that “the public has become 
disenfranchised” while courts defer to the administrative 
“discretion” of the agencies even where their decisions may be 
“infected with political influence and bias.”218  The problem is 
endemic; “something close to an administrative tyranny now 
presides over Nature.”219 
These problems with the bureaucratic context of 
environmental law point to even bigger problems.  In his 
appropriately titled book, Unnatural Law, Canadian 
environmental lawyer, David Boyd, identifies a number of what 
he calls “systemic weaknesses” in Canada that range from the 
usual factors (missing laws, excessive regulatory discretion, 
inadequate implementation and enforcement, low agency 
budgets) to more political problems such as the influence of 
industry and labor, bureaucratic inertia, trade restraints, judicial 
obstacles, and political caution.220  Boyd’s list of criticisms deepen 
further, moving from institutional weaknesses to “root causes” 
 
 216. Id. at 54-55. 
 217. Id. at 57, 59. 
 218. Id. at 59-60. 
 219. Id. at 61. 
 220. DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND POLICY 228-72 (2003). 
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including economic growth, excessive consumption, and 
population growth.221 
In response to the system-wide dysfunction that Wood 
identifies, she suggests the implementation of a “public trust 
doctrine” that would see government acting as the people’s 
designated trustee of natural resources for public benefit rather 
than private exploitation.  Boyd proposes reforms such as a 
constitutional right of every citizen to a healthy environment.222  
These are certainly useful proposals at the cutting edge of 
environmental law.  Ultimately, however, the question becomes 
about what is possible through the legal route itself insofar as it 
forces us back inside the box, back inside the same regulatory 
state that implements it—and that remains embedded in all the 
problems discussed above.223  At stake, says Wood, is the 
“paradigm of environmental law” itself, and the institutions that 
embody it.224 
The choice of the word “paradigm” is instructive.  Developed 
by Thomas Kuhn in the 1960s to explain changes in scientific 
thinking,225 paradigms were seen to evolve through contradiction 
and revolution.  Whether they be chemists or biologists, doctors 
or lawyers, Kuhn describes how scientific practitioners work 
within a set of implicit rules (a paradigm) and way of 
seeing/experiencing the world (a gestalt) of which they were not 
fully aware but to which they were firmly attached.226  They 
cannot see the paradigm precisely because they are so much a 
part of it.  It defined their world as they did their “normal 
science,” extending the paradigm by tackling new problems—
 
 221. Id. at 273-88. 
 222. See also DAVID BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAW, 
ENVIRONMENT, POLITICS (2012). 
 223. For a fuller list of such proposals, see BURNS WESTON & TRACY BACH, 
RECALIBRATING THE LAW OF HUMANS WITH THE LAWS OF NATURE: CLIMATE 
CHANGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE (2009).  It addresses 
innovative initiatives such as a “law of the ecological commons,” model 
provisions for state constitutions, model legislation, cap and trade strategies, 
the sovereign trust, common law reforms, special court-appointed officials, draft 
UN General Assembly resolutions, proposals to improve the Kyoto Protocol, new 
WTO rules, and compulsory jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice. 
 224. Wood, supra note 23, at 54. 
 225. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962). 
 226. Id. 
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“puzzle solving.”  Then someone confronts an “anomaly” that 
cannot be resolved within the paradigm.  If that person is 
persistent (and clever) enough, she uncovers the hidden premises 
on which the paradigm depends, and that no longer work, and 
she thus sets out to create a new paradigm that does.  Not 
surprisingly, this is not welcome news to the puzzle-solvers, 
leading to the suppression of the contrary research and the new 
conversation it inspires, with a new paradigm emerging only 
through an intellectual and institutional revolution.  If ever there 
were anomalies to a paradigm, Speth, Wood, and Boyd have 
identified them. 
But where is the revolution?  Without it, environmental law 
must ask an allegedly benevolent state to regulate against its 
own long history of economic expansion and notions of self-
interest.  It is, thus, an ironic form of self-regulation that, by 
continuing to place its faith in incremental state regulation, is 
necessarily held hostage to a pre-regulatory vision of economic 
growth and political power.  Given the trajectory of the planet, it 
would seem increasingly difficult for the field to avoid a critical 
engagement with such a limiting context.  Perhaps because the 
field has been so integrated into the instrumental knowledge and 
practice of the regulatory state, however, its practitioners seem 
unable to see (and unable to respond to) the problematic in which 
the field is situated.227  Environmental law textbooks continue to 
touch on potentially destabilizing topics like the limits to growth, 
or global and local inequity, but quickly bracket them as side 
issues while they get on with the pragmatics of legal practice.228  
 
 227. Instrumental knowledge, as opposed to critical knowledge, is oriented to 
the means rather than the preset ends and does not question the larger context 
within which knowledge is developed.  As such, it serves an unquestioned value 
system, in this case, an economic system that prioritizes maximization of 
production and consumption and a regulatory system that facilitates it. 
 228. A common pattern can be observed in leading American environmental 
law text books: a brief introduction of five to ten pages of “perspectives” on 
environmental law is followed by 1,000 pages of intra-systemic practice. See, 
e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, 
READINGS (2008); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY (2006); RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY: PROBLEMS, CASES AND READINGS (2008); and NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & 
CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY AND ECONOMICS: RECLAIMING 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA (2008).  Similarly, Richard Lazarus cites many 
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Nowhere is this legal field explicitly situated within any critical, 
let alone systematic, understanding of how diverse underlying 
economic and political forces have created this environmental 
problematic, or, to put this in GLT language, how their de facto 
regulatory “logics” have developed “system dynamics” that 
mandate it.  Thus, GLT seeks to re-orient the attention now 
directed to downstream “legal laws” to develop a new 
understanding of the upstream constitutive “dynamics” of 
material and cultural production that today lie largely 
undisturbed behind the environmental law paradigm.  Those few 
incipient green legal scholars who have looked at this situation 
confront a common challenge: that we must transcend the liberal 
paradigm that bounds environmental law.229 
V.   LIBERALISM AND THE LAW OF MITIGATED 
PRODUCTION 
A.  Reconciling the Two Faces of Liberalism 
Although the character of liberalism has evolved through 
various forms over the centuries,230 one can identify a common 
 
problems with environmental law that could be deemed to be systemic in 
nature, but he concludes that a revolutionary reworking of environmental law is 
not needed, keeping the basic architecture as the basic mix of laws and 
institutions is adjusted. Lazarus, supra note 25, at 225-26.  Michael Kraft also 
sees market mechanisms and command-and-control regulation as maintaining 
their dominance in environmental law well into the future. KRAFT, supra note 
27, at 139.  Finally, Keith Hirokawa, though he recognizes the existence of 
“radical” critiques of environmental law, prefers to “find better environmental 
solutions that both effect a change in the way we treat the environment and are 
practical enough to be adopted by our legal system.” Keith Hirokawa, Some 
Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique in Environmental Law, 21 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 281 (2002). 
 229. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 59; GEOFFREY LEANE, Environmental Law’s 
Liberal Roots: (Not) a Green Paradigm in GREEN PARADIGMS AND THE LAW 1 
(Nicole Rogers ed., 1998); Cynthia Giagnocavo & Harvey Goldstein, Legal 
Reform or World Re-form: The Problem of Environmental Rights, 35 MCGILL L.J. 
345 (1990); and R. Michael M’Gonigle & Paula Ramsay, Greening 
Environmental Law: From Sectoral Reform to Systemic Reformation, 14 J. 
ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 342 (2004). 
 230. These include classical liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries that led to the liberal democracy of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century, and developed into the liberal welfare state from the 1920s and the 
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set of cultural assumptions and values that have taken root in 
Western industrial society and helped to propel its economic and 
political successes.  This philosophical liberalism has also 
facilitated its environmentally destructive behavior231 while 
informing and constraining environmental law and democratic 
processes more generally.  Although it is difficult to summarize 
the tenets of liberalism in a way that does full justice to its 
evolving character, nevertheless we will consider it briefly to see 
why a philosophical re-constitution is necessary for a green re-
formation. 
The foundational concept of liberalism is that of the 
autonomous (rational, self-determining) individual.  It is argued 
that when individuals are free to pursue their own vision of the 
good life and to maximize their own personal “utility,” that 
pursuit can also benefit society generally.232  This is certainly the 
premise of a social reliance on self-directed interactions through 
the marketplace, a marketplace that puts rationality, 
individualism, and free competition at the center of social life.233  
In turn, the state is limited, refraining from intruding upon these 
individual strivings except in carefully constrained ways.  One 
acceptable intrusion is to put in place those conditions that can 
 
neoliberalism of the 1980s. See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1977); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (2006).  For a 
recent critique of the contradictions (or as he puts it, the hypocrisy) of 
liberalism, see DOMENICO LOSURDO, LIBERALISM: A COUNTER-HISTORY (2011). 
 231. See, e.g., Margaret FitzSimmons et al., Environmentalism and the Liberal 
State, in IS CAPITALISM SUSTAINABLE? (Martin O’Connor ed., 1994); ROBYN 
ECKERSELY, THE GREEN STATE: RETHINKING DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
(2004); Val Plumwood, Has Democracy Failed Ecology?, in ECOLOGY AND 
DEMOCRACY (Freya Mathews ed., 1996); and VAL PLUMWOOD, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CULTURE: THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS OF REASON (2002). 
 232. See LEANE, supra note 229, at 6-7; CAHN, supra note 59, at 4-5. 
 233. The concept of bounded rationality, however, points out that full 
rationality is limited by both cognitive and emotional boundaries.  Not only are 
human cognitive capabilities quite limited, particularly in our globalized system 
of production and consumption, emotional impulses may override conclusions 
drawn from rational deliberations. See Richard Selten, What is Bounded 
Rationality?, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY - THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 13-36 (Gerd 
Gigenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2002).  On the process by which the market 
moved from the periphery to the center of social ordering, see KARL POLANYI, 
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).  Polanyi draws attention in this work to the 
destructive effects of this historical move, including its implications for state 
action. 
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facilitate the individuals’ ability to pursue their self-interest 
including, first and foremost, state enforcement of private 
property and contractual relations through both civil and 
criminal laws.  Similarly, an economic role for the state (its 
“social welfare” function) is justified if it can help remedy 
situations where the pursuit of such self-interest leads to 
distortions in the market.  For example, when “externalities” 
(such as climate change) are left out of the market equation, state 
intervention is useful to help “internalize” these omissions so that 
the resulting market values reflect their full costs and benefits.  
At a political level, state legitimacy is derived as well from 
enhancing the individual’s freedom to choose the government 
such individuals collectively desire, including related rights such 
as the freedom of speech, freedom of association, the rule of law, 
freedom to participate in the political process, and so on.  
Citizens, through their participation, consent to be governed by 
those who have been properly elected.  Here, however, a clear 
tension exists between the pursuit of liberalism in its economic 
form (driven by the pursuit of individual self-interest) and in its 
state democratic form (motivated to maintain the equality of each 
citizen). 
Liberal democracy can, therefore, be separated into its 
economic and political aspects.  By examining the tension 
between economic and democratic liberalisms, we can uncover the 
constraints imposed upon the state that attempts to respond to 
the ecological crisis.  Since much of the pursuit of self-interest is 
of an economic nature, free individuals make personal 
consumption choices based on their personal values and desires, 
while producers compete to meet those consumption demands.234  
Decisions are taken on the basis of their existing economic 
endowments.  These are also the central elements of the capitalist 
market economy which, as Matthew Cahn points out, share the 
same central values of “private property, competitive self-
interest, economic liberty, and minimal government.”235  The 
 
 234. See LEANE, supra note 229, at 7. 
 235. CAHN, supra note 59, at 11.  As David Held points out, “while different 
variants of liberalism interpreted [freedom of choice] in different ways they were 
all united around the advocacy of a constitutional state, private property and 
the competitive market economy.”  HELD, supra note 230, at 59. 
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resulting system is characterized by allocative efficiency (as a 
result of well functioning markets), wealth maximization, and 
growth, all of which take on the appearance of value-neutrality 
insofar as they build on the foundational (indeed, “naturalist”) 
reference point of the rational individual.236  If all functions as it 
should, the result, is economic equilibrium, social welfare, and 
democratic stability.237 
In a free and competitive market economy, capital demands a 
return, whether in interest payments or returns on investment.  
Thus, under capitalism, growth has a life of its own; it is inherent 
to it.  That is what capital does automatically, and must do, if it is 
to perform its essential function.  To any mainstream economist, 
this is an obvious and uncontroversial truth.238  An individual 
producer enhances his returns to capital by investing his 
revenues in innovation and technologies that will generate cost-
saving efficiencies.  If other owners of capital are doing likewise, 
anyone who does not keep up with these improvements will see 
their capital diminish in relative value.  Under competitive 
conditions, all producers continuously seek to reduce their costs 
so that they might retain their market share against other 
 
 236. See LEANE, supra note 229, at 7.  This naturalism can be seen, for 
example, in the famous Lockean assertion that there is “a law of nature to 
govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all 
mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions.” John Locke, 
An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, in 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 (1690/1988).  Through this move, what is 
today seen as the “positivist” character of liberal theory (founded in 
individualism, reason, property) is ultimately situated within a “naturalist” 
truth claim.  In opening up today’s positivist ideology to critical re-examination, 
a core task is to re-engage with this long (but falsely) rejected tradition of 
philosophical naturalism (and natural law).  Addressing this controversial and 
difficult topic is beyond the scope of this paper except to note that it leads 
ineluctably to a re-examination of such institutions as capitalism and the 
modern state as assumed (“naturalized”) forms of social organization. 
 237. See CAHN, supra note 59, at 11. 
 238. See Richard Smith, Beyond Growth or Beyond Capitalism, 53 REAL 
WORLD ECON. REV. 28, 31 (2010).  The article highlights the rejection by Tom 
Clougherty, executive director of the right-wing think tank, the Adam Smith 
Institute, of the concept of a no-growth capitalism.  Commenting on a proposal 
for a Steady State Economy by the New Economics Foundation, Clougherty 
asserts that it shows “a complete lack of understanding of economics.” Id. at 28. 
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producers who are doing the same thing.239  This competition 
tends to drive down prices for everyone (to the benefit of 
consumers).  In response, if all producers can expand the size of 
the market as a whole (i.e. its overall growth), this will allow 
them all to benefit by bringing in new consumers who can take up 
the increased flow of products that result from these economies of 
scale.  In such a situation, more producers can survive the 
pressures of competition. 
This production treadmill of growth points, as we have seen, 
to higher level, systemic dynamics that function as a culturally 
constitutive mode of regulation.  Maintaining such growth is a 
core mandate of those business corporations with shareholders 
who invest with the sole intention of maximizing returns on their 
investment.  Indeed, this mandate is legally enshrined in a 
business corporation act.240  With growing new markets a key 
safety valve for capital, economic colonization is another 
“dynamic” of capitalism, as is the corollary drive to break down 
legal barriers to liberal economic freedom so that competitors can 
more easily access new pools of cheaper labor and more 
consumers throughout the world.  This is why the recent bout of 
economic globalization is also termed “neo-liberalism” insofar as 
it repeals state controls in favor of (corporate) economic freedoms.  
These material processes also have culturally constitutive effects 
insofar as ordinary individuals in capitalist economies have 
invested their savings (their capital) in pension funds and 
investment portfolios with the insistent expectation that their 
investment will grow, increase their wealth, and carry them 
through their lives. 
As a neutral ideology rooted in the rational individual, 
economic liberalism takes existing individual endowments as 
given, regardless of how unequally wealth is distributed.  In the 
early years of industrialism, only a minority of the state’s 
population owned the capital that produced goods so that great 
 
 239. Marx discussed this process in light of how it translated into a “tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall.” KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOLUME 3: THE PROCESS OF 
CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AS A WHOLE (1967/1894). 
 240. See Smith, supra note 238, at 34, 31; see generally FRED MADOFF & JOHN 
BELLAMY FOSTER, WHAT EVERY ENVIRONMENTALIST NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT 
CAPITALISM (2011). 
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inequality existed between such owners and those who had to sell 
their labor for wages.  This historical mal-distribution of income, 
wealth, and power again reflects the difference between economic 
liberalism (where individual inequality is inherent) and 
liberalism in democracy (with its formal equality of each voting 
citizen).  The potential for political discord arises if economic 
differences become too great as we have recently seen with the 
Occupy movement.241  Again, economic growth plays an essential 
political role here by helping to mitigate the effects of economic 
inequality not by redistributing social wealth (that is, by slicing 
the existing economic pie differently) but by expanding it overall 
(so that more benefits accrue to everyone from a larger pie).  As 
the neoliberals mantra goes, free trade is good because “a rising 
tide lifts all boats.”242 
The state also has a role to play in addressing problems of 
inequity, for example, through imposing progressive taxes on 
income and providing social services for all, but this function is 
limited.  As it is commonly expressed, the redistribution of 
income (e.g. differential tax rates) is liberal; the redistribution of 
wealth (e.g. nationalization) is radical.  The flip side of the liberal 
response is, however, that a significant re-distribution of wealth 
(and not just of income) would be a pre-requisite for the state that 
hopes to escape its dependence on continuous economic growth 
with all its damaging environmental effects.  As it is, a static or 
shrinking national economy effectively determines the nature of 
state action—stimulus—because, in the absence of radical 
economic equity, all modern democracies must pursue growth as 
the basis upon which its political aspirations for social welfare 
can be met.  In short, the inherent growth dynamic of capitalism 
is foundational to contemporary economic, political, and social life 
such that regulatory economic actions are subsidiary to (deeper) 
constitutive ecological ones.243 
 
 241. See About, OCCUPYWALLSTREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 242. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 64 (2007). 
 243. In this light, advocacy for new forms of the “commons” or for “co-
operative” new forms of economic organization should be appreciated not just as 
another set of “legal reforms” for social justice, but as potentially foundational 
“constitutive re-formations” because they address the underlying logics of 
dominating systems, the underlying system dynamics.  This shift in “legal” 
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
  
2013] LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1065 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that a primary function of the 
modern state (especially from the advent of industrial capitalism 
in the 18th century) has been to provide the conditions for 
capitalist growth—enforcing contracts, protecting property rights, 
providing public infrastructure and public administration, 
backing colonial projects internally and externally to the state, 
and so on.244  These functions today are even more diverse, from 
ensuring access to a well-qualified labor force, to supporting 
improvements in technology, or subsidizing resource-extracting 
activities.  But the liberal democratic state has to be responsive 
not only to the demands of capital but also to those who are 
exploited, marginalized, or in some other way harmed by the 
inequalities embedded in the economic system.  To do this, the 
state relies on tax revenues (themselves a product of the growth 
economy) to fund programs and policies such as social security, 
health care, or public education that can address social and 
economic ills.  A growing economy allows for more social spending 
with lower taxes and leads to high public approval.  As a result, 
democratic state “legitimacy” is dependent on maintaining a high 
level of economic growth.  A capitalist economy without growth 
leads not only to an economic but a political downturn.  
Consequently, the promotion of economic growth, as Gus Speth 
noted, “may be the most widely shared and robust cause in the 
world today.”245 
 
understanding entails as well, of course, the embrace of a new set of 
knowledges, discourses, processes, alliances, and strategies that reaches beyond 
existing environmental legal concerns. 
 244. In England, for example, internal state colonialism was especially 
important in the thousands of “acts of enclosure” that were promulgated by the 
English Parliament to allow for the privatization of communal lands to facilitate 
the wool trade, while external state colonialism involved the assertion of Crown 
title over foreign lands (the basis of the early development of the United States) 
in order to gain access to new resources and lands.  Interestingly, the colonial 
expedition encountered forms of indigenous governance that were so unlike the 
European state that they were not recognized and their lands were conveniently 
treated as “empty” (terra nullius).  Again, these colonial processes can be 
understood as driven not by some ad hoc political choices but by the constitutive 
dynamics by which the dominating systems of social organization inherently 
operate. 
 245. SPETH, supra note 211, at 47.  Or, as historian J. R. McNeil argued, “the 
overarching priority of economic growth was easily the most important idea of 
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To the environmentalist, of course, problems arise with the 
physical consequences of such growth.  In an open (frontier) 
landscape, such problems can be tolerated; in a closed (full) world, 
they cannot.  Clearly, an economy cannot continue to expand 
indefinitely in a bounded environment without profound 
repercussions.  Indeed, signs that we have reached the limits of 
growth are mounting all around us, from collapsed fisheries and 
massive forest loss to ocean dead zones and climate change.  
Nevertheless, the ideology of growth is so entrenched (as a 
constitutive mandate) and so functionally important that to speak 
of the limits of growth is still economic heresy and political 
suicide.246  In this situation, the state inevitably has a double 
role: promoting economic growth and accumulation on the one 
hand, while it cleans up the resulting environmental problems on 
the other.  But if a state were to dramatically seek to reduce or 
eliminate environmentally destructive economic activity, it would 
risk setting off multiple crises from job loss and business 
shutdowns to capital flight.  Thus, no liberal democratic state has 
been willing to advance environmental protection to such an 
extent that it risks economic growth.  As Eckersley writes, “the 
boundaries of successful policies are invariably set by the 
buoyancy of the economy.”247 
In today’s shrinking world, the massive size of the global 
economy and its inequitable character pose unique challenges for 
state management framed by this conundrum.  On the one hand, 
we cannot do without growth.  On the other hand, if the liberal 
democratic state fails to respond to the environmental concerns of 
its citizens, it also risks losing legitimacy.  This tension between 
the “liberal” goal of promoting capital accumulation and the 
“democratic” need to maintain legitimacy is the fundamental 
 
the twentieth century.” J.R. MCNEIL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN 336 
(2000). 
 246. For a recent discussion of how this imperative has even undermined the 
critical field of ecological economics that was intended to challenge the growth 
commitment, see Blake Anderson & R. Michael M’Gonigle, Does Ecological 
Economics Have a Future? Discourse and Contradiction in the Age of Climate 
Change, 84 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 37 (2012). 
 247. ECKERSLEY, supra note 231, at 55.  This fact is obvious in the minimal 
progress made at recent rounds of international climate talks despite 
widespread acknowledgement of the urgent need to address climate change. 
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contradiction embedded in “liberal democracy.”248  To date, the 
answer has been, argues Colin Hay, for the state to “respond at a 
largely tactical or a cosmetic level,” that is, to “respond to 
subjective perceptions of crisis rather than to the contradictions 
and discontinuities that precipitate such threats to legitimacy.”249  
This is the connection that Matthew Cahn also makes between 
tactical or “symbolic” politics and environmental law.250  In a 
manner similar to our discussion above of various regulatory 
fields, Cahn demonstrates how environmental regulations from 
the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and several acts addressing 
solid and hazardous waste have been designed to “satisfy public 
anxiety while maintaining a commitment to traditional liberal 
economic development.”251  Consequently, governments 
encourage (and subsidize) technological developments that make 
deep-water drilling safer and cars more fuel efficient; develop 
complex regulatory schemes that mandate scrubbers on new 
thermal plants and phased-in retrofits on old ones; and subsidize 
“green” windmills—always seeking to balance accumulation with 
legitimation through a regulatory infrastructure “in which people 
are eager for reassurance that they are being protected and 
therefore eager to believe that publicized government actions 
have the effects they are suppose to have.”252 
That we can in fact square the circle of healthy economic 
growth with healthy environmental stability is the underlying 
faith of environmental law and its active mission.  The goal is not 
to challenge the liberal economic order, but to make it work in 
harmony with the environment.  In other words, environmental 
law works as a kind of law of mitigated production, the primary 
 
 248. For a critical analysis of this core dynamic of ensuring “accumulation” 
while maintaining the nexessary “legitimation,” see Margaret FitzSimmons et 
al., Environmentalism and the Liberal State, in IS CAPITALISM SUSTAINABLE? 198 
(Martin O’Connor ed., 1994); Colin Hay, Environmental Security and State 
Legitimacy, in IS CAPITALISM SUSTAINABLE? 217 (Martin O’Connor ed., 1994); 
JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1973); JAMES O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL 
CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973). 
 249. Hay, supra note 248, at 221.  The environmental crisis is therefore 
addressed as “a particular and transient political rationality as opposed to a 
crisis of capitalist accumulation per se.” Id. 
 250. See CAHN, supra note 59, at 18-28. 
 251. Id. at 28. 
 252. Id. at 19. 
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goal of which is to improve existing processes and structures of 
production but without fundamentally challenging the context in 
which they operate.  This was the legal ideology driving President 
Obama as he confronted the BP blowout in the Gulf of Mexico.  
But it infuses virtually every environmental and resource 
management regime on the books, and it does so everywhere in 
the industrialized world. 
B.  Mitigating Production Through Efficiency 
In the 1980s, the ambition to square this circle was given a 
name, “sustainable development.”  Its message was simple: in a 
world divided between developed economies (with strong 
environmental standards and quality environments) and 
underdeveloped economies (with neither), economic growth was 
the pathway to both development and environmental quality.  In 
the 1990s, this formulation was refined through the terminology 
of “ecological modernization” that saw sustainable development 
being achieved even for Western countries by engaging in 
environmentally-beneficial growth through enhanced resource 
efficiencies—doing more with less—so that the negative 
consequences of growth would not arise in the first place.  Within 
this large-scale project of social engineering, environmental law 
has played an essential, supportive role in its constant quest to 
internalize externalities through the market. 
This managerial model builds on well-established economic 
principles of a free, competitive market system that is designed to 
produce outcomes that will be “Pareto optimal.”253  This means 
that the system “inevitably allocates resources, distributes 
income and apportions consumer goods among consumers so that 
no reallocation of resources through changes in consumption, 
exchange, or production could unambiguously augment the value 
of the commodities being produced and exchanged.”254  This 
 
 253. See E.K. HUNT, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 473 (1992). 
 254. Id. at 476.  This is based on a number of assumptions including a large 
number of buyers and sellers, no uncertainty about the future, perfect 
knowledge, and markets that are always in equilibrium.  Once a Pareto optimal 
situation is achieved, the position of one individual cannot be improved without 
harming or worsening the position of another.  This situation takes the existing 
distribution of wealth, income, power “as given,” just as it does the 
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result of “allocative efficiency” can be achieved only if the correct 
price signals are sent to the market.  But negative social and 
environmental “externalities” such as pollution or illnesses 
distort prices.  Welfare economics does not, however, see 
externalities as arising from economic growth per se but as a 
result of specific instances of (correctable) “market failures.”  
From this understanding, environmental “goods” are abused 
because they are free, a situation that could be corrected if they 
were (properly) priced and paid for.  To restore the system to a 
state of Pareto optimality, the government intervenes as an 
impartial arbitrator to enact a tax or provide a subsidy such that 
the unpriced externality is neutralized.  Hence, “the solution to 
any problem faced–from global warming and biodiversity loss to 
terms of trade and income distribution–is a secondary outcome of 
‘getting the prices right.’”255  This understanding of “market 
failure” provided the intellectual justification and procedural 
tools for the wave of environmental regulations that took hold in 
the 1970s and even more so in the 1980s and 90s.  It still drives 
thinking today.256 
This principle of allocative efficiency underlies the field of 
law and economics which eschews substantive (political) concerns 
of distributive justice or environmental health as well as the 
larger concerns about growth that follow from a critical political 
 
accompanying legal system, moral values, and institutions for granted. See id. 
at 478-80. 
 255. John Gowdy & Jon D. Erickson, The Approach of Ecological Economics, 
29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 207, 209 (2005). 
 256. This underlies the burgeoning field of pricing “ecosystem services,” a 
movement that is (ironically) being driven by ecological economists who question 
growth but not the mainstream economic tools (i.e. prices) of the capitalism that 
demands such growth.  For more general discussions of the nature and promise 
of the economic methodology of ecosystem services pricing, see James Boyd & 
Spencer Bazhaf, What are Ecosystem Services? The Need for Standardized 
Environmental Accounting Units, 63 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 616 (2007); Robert 
Constanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997); and Rudolf DeGroot, A Typology for the 
Classification, Description and Valuation of Ecosystem Functions, Goods and 
Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 393 (2002).  For a recent discussion of this 
thinking as it relates to the failure to achieve international targets for 
biodiversity conservation, see Charles Perrings et al., Ecosystem Services, 
Targets, and Indicators for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Biodiversity, 9 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY ENV’T. 512 (2011). 
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economy.  Instead, this school focuses on procedural processes 
and “objective” calculations of the efficient allocation of 
resources.257  For example, in situations where the market breaks 
down (where, for example, a new form of nuisance arises from a 
novel technology), the state may be required to assign legal rights 
to one party.  Such assignments, law and economics scholars 
pointed out, will allow the state to affect ab initio the efficiency of 
resource allocation and so require a guiding principle to 
neutralize the potential redistributive effects of that initial 
allocation.  Richard Posner, one of the field’s central scholars, 
proposed that legal authorities should assign property rights to 
those parties who would have secured them through market 
exchange.258  By doing so, law would be able to promote efficiency 
by “mimicking the market”259 and thus avoid tricky questions of 
the distribution of wealth and power. 
This championing of market forces is not merely some right-
wing conspiracy to avoid the big questions; its logic is pervasive 
within market society.  At the risk of repetition, this logic is, from 
a GLT perspective, presently ignored as having a constitutive (i.e. 
regulatory) effect that operates beyond the “legal law.”  The 
embrace of this regulatory logic led to the adoption of Anthony 
Giddens’ “Third Way” by both the liberal Clinton administration 
in the U.S. and the Blair Labor government in the U.K.260 in 
their attempts to achieve both the social goals of liberal 
democracy and the efficiency goals of liberal economics without 
the distortions that accompany direct state management or 
control.261  As Giddens succinctly put it: “Securing greater social 
justice depends upon a robust economy, not the other way 
around.”262  This, he argued, was because “a competitive economy 
 
 257. See Jules Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the 
Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649 (1984). 
 258. Id. at 662. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY (1998). 
 261. See Anthony Giddens, It’s Time to Give the Third Way a Second Chance, 
THE INDEPENDENT (June 28, 2007), http://www.politicsforum.org/forum/ 
viewtopic.php?f=28&t=79097. 
 262. Id.  He points out, moreover, that all successful left-of-center leaders are 
moving toward the political center.  One can appreciate the ideology in this 
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is the necessary condition of job creation and the goal of 
sustaining full employment.”263  Unlike the more combative focus 
of progressive politics on material inequalities and the 
redistribution of wealth, the Third Way presented the structuring 
imperatives of capitalism and economic globalization as self-
evident, neutral, and even inevitable.  Social problems are to be 
resolved within the existing social order through improved 
economic efficiencies that utilize market forces.264 
Despite the catastrophic recession of 2008-2009, itself 
arguably the product of the failure of neoliberalism, the 
market/managerial lineage continues as strongly as ever, the 
zeitgeist of the still dominant neo-liberal age.  Following along 
are the new, policy-relevant environmentalists who have 
embraced the paradigm of ecological modernization to resolve 
what might be seen as structural problems not with structural 
solutions, but with internal reform technologies based on 
economic efficiency and market forces. 
C.   Neoliberal Environmentalism 
Accompanying the wave of neoliberalism (and de-regulation) 
that swept through Western governments (and international 
agencies) in the 1980s and 90s, ecological modernization became 
the strategy for dealing with environmental problems but not 
through after-the-fact regulatory interventions but in advance of 
their even arising by reshaping economic growth itself.  It 
revolved around the idea that the state can “enhance the 
competitiveness of industry by unilaterally increasing rather 
than decreasing the stringency of environmental regulation.”265  
The basic philosophy is summed up by the motto “pollution 
prevention pays.”  Ecological modernizers argue that “under the 
 
statement by inverting it as follows: “Securing a just society is the prerequisite 
for a robust social economy.” 
 263. ANTHONY GIDDENS, WHERE NOW FOR NEW LABOUR? 78-79 (2002).  This 
evidently ignores the structural or sociological barriers that place actors at 
different levels of power and advantage. 
 264. See Shane Fudge & Stephen Williams, Beyond Left and Right: Can the 
Third Way Deliver a Reinvigorated Social Democracy? 32 CRITICAL SOC. 583 
(2006). 
 265. ECKERSLEY, supra note 231, at 69. 
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proper political, economic, and technological conditions, 
competition among capitalists can be redirected so as to achieve 
pollution-prevention eco-efficiencies within the spheres of 
production and, ultimately, consumption.”266  From this 
understanding, not only are industrialization, technological 
development, and economic growth compatible with 
environmental values, they are the “key drivers of environmental 
reform.”267  Consequently, rather than constraining the economy, 
environmental regulations differently designed and oriented are 
seen to maintain and even enhance economic growth while 
simultaneously improving the environment.268  By allowing 
businesses more flexibility to internalize real environmental 
costs, “[m]ore production and consumption in economic terms 
(GNP, purchase power, employment) do not have to imply more 
environmental devastation (pollution, energy use, loss of 
biodiversity).”269 
A range of approaches exist within ecological modernization 
from the technocratic, cost minimization strategies of “weak” 
ecological modernization to the more critical and potentially 
transformative understandings of “strong” ecological 
modernization.270  Originally, ecological modernization was 
 
 266. Michael Carolan, Ecological Modernization Theory: What About 
Consumption? 17 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 247, 250 (2004).  This is in the same 
spirit as the influential 1987 report, “Our Common Future,” considered to be one 
of the paradigm statements of ecological modernization (but with far less of the 
modernizer’s focus on technological innovation and efficiency). See WORLD 
COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987); see also MAARTEN HAJER, 
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE: ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION AND 
THE POLICY PROCESS 26 (1995); Arthur Mol & Gert Spaargaren, Ecological 
Modernization Theory in Debate: A Review, 9 ENVTL. POL. 17, 23 (2000) 
(presenting a more nuanced position on an ecological modernization focused on 
“redirecting and transforming ‘free market capitalism’ in such a way that it less 
and less obstructs, and increasingly contributes to the preservation of society’s 
sustenance base in a fundamental/structural way.”). 
 267. Richard York & Eugene Rosa, Key Challenges to Ecological 
Modernization Theory, 16 ORG. & ENV’T 273, 274 (2002). 
 268. See Albert Weale, Politics of Ecological Modernization, in DEBATING THE 
EARTH: THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS READER 237-249 (John Dryzek & David 
Schlosberg eds., 1998). 
 269. Mol & Spaargaren, supra note 266, at 36. 
 270. See Peter Christoff, Ecological Modernization, Ecological Modernities, 5 
ENVTL. POL. 476 (1996); see generally Mol & Spaargaren, supra note 266; and 
HAJER, supra note 266. 
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conceived as an approach to operationalizing the controversial 
precautionary principle that also emerged in the late 1980s.  This 
principle emphasizes the need to avoid damages to the natural 
world even where there is no conclusive scientific understanding 
of the threat posed by a new technology, industrial emission, or 
production practice.271  Weak versions of ecological modernization 
focus on the role of technology and the market to help reach 
existing industrial objectives and new environmental goals 
through production that is technologically “smart” and 
economically hyper-efficient, achieving “clean production” 
through “closed-loop” technologies.  In contrast to this reformist 
industrial model, the “strong” version critically reflects on the 
industrial goals themselves, seeking to shift from a technocratic 
model of efficiency-oriented management to a more 
interventionist model of wholesale industrial redesign.272  Such a 
shift would be attained not only through technological and cost-
effective economic innovation, but through new forms of 
environmental governance and institutional reflexivity.273 
Not surprisingly, the stronger conception has not taken hold.  
Instead, as two scholars trenchantly argued, the popular rhetoric 
and practice of ecological modernization has tended toward “a 
joyful fairy tale of low-hanging £10 notes and . . . an undue 
preoccupation with company innovations only at the margin of 
traditional production practices.”274  Weak ecological 
modernization thus infuses corporate strategies of eco-efficiency 
and green consumerism (e.g. electric cars) but it does so by 
eschewing more dramatic approaches that would lead to 
wholesale industrial rethinking that might entail significantly 
reduced levels of consumption and growth (e.g. displacing private 
 
 271. See Mikael Skou Anderson & Ilmo Massa, Ecological Modernization – 
Origins, Dilemmas and Future Directions, 2 J. ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN. 337, 338 
(2000). 
 272. For an interesting discussion of the science behind current environmental 
policy versus an alternative precautionary science more consistent with the 
precautionary principle, see Katherine Barrett & Carolyn Raffensperger, 
Precautionary Science, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT – 
IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 106 (Carolyn Raffensperger & 
Joel Tickner eds., 1999). 
 273. See ECKERSLEY, supra note 247, at 71. 
 274. See Anderson & Massa, supra note 271, at 338. 
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cars within designated urban boundaries).275  The difference is 
manifest, for example, in the embrace of enhanced risk 
management as opposed to systemic risk reduction (especially 
where the latter is undertaken for larger socio-economic goals 
that cannot be justified in advance as being “cost effective”).  The 
dominant approach matches with the common objective of 
ecological modernization to “reconcile the tensions between 
technology and ecology, economic growth and ecology, and 
competitive market and ecology.”276  Achieving such a 
reconciliation draws on two complementary approaches: 
technological innovation from within business and the use of 
market-based instruments within governments to internalize 
environmental costs.277 
One of the best known books to espouse the benefits of eco-
efficiency is Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, and Hunter Lovins’ 
Natural Capitalism (1999).  The book’s central premise is the 
need for a resource productivity revolution that could be brought 
about through radical changes in design and technology.278  The 
authors note the important outcomes that can be achieved by 
taxing, rather than subsidizing, environmentally destructive 
activities.  They also point out that restructuring in some sectors 
is “gaining its momentum not from regulatory mandates, taxes or 
subsidies but rather from newly unleashed forces of advanced 
technology, customer demands, competition and 
entrepreneurship.”279  They point to a supposed transformation in 
the car industry (touting its development of the super-light and 
fuel-efficient “hypercar”), proclaiming that “if this industry can 
 
 275. See Nicholas Ashford, Government and Environmental Innovation in 
Europe and North America, 45 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 1417, 1417-18 (2002); 
and David Schlosberg & Sara Rinfret, Ecological Modernization, American Style, 
17 ENVTL. POL. 254 (2008). 
 276. Valerie Fournier, Escaping from the Economy: The Politics of Degrowth, 
28 INT. J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 528, 530 (2008); see also I. Blüdhorn & I. Welsh, Eco-
Politics Beyond the Paradigm of Sustainability: A Conceptual Framework and 
Research Agenda, 16 ENVTL. POL. 185 (2007). 
 277. At the risk of repetition, GLT inverts this approach by addressing the 
inherent dynamics of the economic systems underlying these regulatory 
strategies. 
 278. PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM (2d ed. 2010). 
 279. Id. at 22. 
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fundamentally change, every industry can.”280  Dow Chemical is 
held up as a model for energy efficiency, reaching a savings of $9 
billion in energy costs through a $1 billion investment in efficient 
energy use.281  “Protecting the climate is not costly but 
profitable,” they assert, “because saving energy costs less than 
buying it.”282 
This movement has hit its stride in recent years in response 
to the climate crisis where government “command and control” 
regulation has been limited, but economic innovations in the law 
have been plentiful.  A variety of pricing mechanisms are seen as 
capable of reducing the generation of carbon-based externalities.  
One is the carbon tax that places an escalating charge on the use 
of carbon-based fuels such as gasoline.  As the charge increases 
over time, say from an initial 5 cents/gallon to 20 or 30 
cents/gallon or more, producers will be encouraged to improve 
fuel efficiency or to switch to hybrid electric motors.  Another is 
the cap-and-trade system that sets a cap on the maximum 
amount of carbon that might be emitted by an industry, say steel 
manufacturing, and then allows steel manufacturers to trade an 
allocated set of carbon credits amongst themselves so that the 
firm that is best placed to improve its efficiency in a cost-effective 
fashion does so, partly financed by selling its credits to other 
firms that cannot make those changes as easily.  By continually 
reducing the size of the cap over time, new improvements will 
always be needed, the continuing pressure continuously driving 
up the value of the credits, thus keeping the momentum going.283  
 
 280. Id. at 23.  As arch-critic of Hawken and the Lovins, Vaclav Smil points 
out the hypercar has yet to materialize. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY MYTHS AND 
REALITIES: BRINGING SCIENCE TO THE ENERGY POLICY DEBATE 48 (2010).  For his 
devastating contemporary review of Natural Capitalism, see Vaclav Smil, Rocky 
Mountain Visions: A Review Essay, 26 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 163 (2000). 
 281. Id. at xiii. But see PESTICIDE ACTION NETWORK, DOW CORPORATE PROFILE 
(2000), available at http://www.panna.org/resources/corporate-accountability 
/profiles/dow (last visited May 22, 2012).  Dow Chemical is more likely to be 
associated with the hazardous chemicals it produces (including agent orange 
and DDT) rather than environmental stewardship. Dow and its subsidiary, 
Union Carbide, have been named by the EPA as responsible parties for 136 
hazardous waste sites. Id. 
 282. HAWKEN ET AL., supra note 278, at xiii. 
 283. Emissions trading is also recommended as a cost-effective option for other 
air pollutants such as sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. See SUSTAINABLE 
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Following this logic even further is the use of carbon offsets that 
allow individuals and companies that cannot reduce their carbon 
emissions directly (because of costs) instead to contribute to 
others who promise to absorb them in other ways and places 
(where it is cheaper to do so).284  For example, the Costa Rican 
national government in the 1990s paid landowners to preserve 
forested land or to reforest degraded land.  The government then 
sold this “carbon storage capacity” to volunteer markets.  It later 
established Certified Tradable Offsets to expand the sale of 
carbon sinks from its forests.285  The primary role of the state is, 
thus, to “create markets rather than replace them,”286 the 
expected result of these market mechanisms being an explosion of 
innovation that reduces greenhouse gases but also improves 
economic efficiency and economic growth.287 
This approach is embodied in the work of a sophisticated new 
Canadian environmental organization, Sustainable Prosperity.288  
Pricing carbon, they contend, “is the most effective and efficient 
measure for reducing [the] carbon emissions” in addition to 
providing many indirect economic benefits.  In a recent interview 
its founder recalls battling on the front lines of environmental 
legislation for twelve years before coming to the realization that 
“[m]ost CEOs would love to lower their environmental impacts if 
they could still make a profit.  The problem is that we operate in 
a bad system–one that fails to reward good environmental 
 
PROSPERITY, OPTIONS FOR MANAGING INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION IN CANADA: THE 
USE OF MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS (2011), available at http://www. 
sustainableprosperity.ca/article1489. 
 284. At a smaller scale, individuals who cannot reduce their carbon footprint 
may purchase offsets through a fee—such as a charge on an airplane ticket—
that will then be allocated to some project that can offset the flyer’s impact, such 
as planting carbon-absorbing trees. 
 285. TAMRA GILBERTSON & OSCAR REYES, CARBON TRADING – HOW IT WORKS AND 
WHY IT FAILS 25 (2009). 
 286. Keith Stewart, Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons: Green Governance 
Through the Market or the Public Domain?, in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN?: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER (Daniel Drache 
ed., 2001), available at http://www.yorku.ca/drache/talks/pdf/apd_stewartfin.pdf. 
 287. Carbon Pricing, Climate Change, and Fiscal Sustainability in Canada 
(Policy Brief), SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY (Dec. 2010), http://www.sustainable 
prosperity.ca/dl290&display. 
 288. Why Green Business is Crucial, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/article251. 
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behaviour.”289  In the true win-win spirit of ecological 
modernization, the organization declares: “Nobody should have to 
make sacrifices in order to do things that are good for the 
environment. For individuals doing the right things should be 
cheaper than doing the wrong thing. For business, it should be 
more profitable.”290  The key is “to design regulations differently, 
so they promote eco-efficiency.”291 
Market-based strategies, like green tax shifting or emissions 
trading are central to Sustainable Prosperity’s approach.  
Emissions trading is seen as not only necessary to avoid runaway 
climate change, but as an important way to assist poor countries 
to develop in environmentally friendly ways–“like foreign aid but 
better.”292  Developing a range of ecosystem markets is highly 
encouraged.  These would include such things as conservation 
banking which compensates for plants and animals species 
harmed by a development by creating a habitat that provides for 
a similar number of species or plants; wetland mitigation banking 
that allows a developer to compensate for damage to a wetland in 
one place by restoring or enhancing a degraded wetland in 
another place, preserving an existing wetland, or even creating a 
new wetland; or biodiversity offsets which create new protected 
areas or conservation projects outside an area that is negatively 
impacted by development.  Other trading schemes include 
nutrient trading, where industrial polluters pay farmers to 
reduce their nutrient loading of a waterway in place of limiting 
their own discharges; and renewable energy credits that allow 
energy companies to meet renewable energy targets by buying 
 
 289. Lynn Moore, We Operate in a Bad System, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Aug. 5, 
2010 (interview with Stewart Elgie), available at http://www.sustainable 
prosperity.ca/article251. 
 290. What We Do, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY, http://eoesi.com/docs/ 
Sustainable%20Prosperity/Sustainable%20Prosperity-Web%20Material.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
 291. 2010/11 Report 2, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY, http://www.sustainable 
prosperity.ca/dl453 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 292. Stewart Elgie & Dan Gagnier, Emissions Trading: Like Foreign Aid but 
Better, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 21, 2007, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/ 
2007/iisd_innovator_may_2007.pdf.  Incidentally, Dan Gagnier was Chair of the 
International Emissions Trading Association at the time the article was written. 
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credits from elsewhere.293  These strategies are designed to 
overcome the failure to accord priced values to nature’s services 
by bringing market values to nature.294  The aim is to create the 
right conditions so that “market forces reward investments in 
ecosystem services” thereby creating a positive feedback loop 
where “increased investments in ecosystem services leads to 
increased production of ecosystem goods, eventually fuelling both 
sustainable economic growth and ecological restoration.”295  This 
approach, as Sustainable Prosperity’s website notes, is firmly 
situated within “non-controversial, standard microeconomics.”296 
Many other environmentalists have also turned to the 
“realistic” strategies of ecological modernization aimed at 
greening market valuations rather than more problematic 
attempts to transform the basic dynamics of growth and capital 
accumulation that provide the over-riding context for market 
pricing and behaviors.  The discourse of efficiency has provided a 
bridge for environmental groups to cooperate with government 
and corporations rather than staying locked in an uphill battle 
against them with limited chances for success.297  As Arthur Mol 
 
 293. Alex Kenny et al., Advancing the Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity in Canada: A Survey of Economic Instruments for the Conservation 
and Protection of Biodiversity, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY (2011), available at 
http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/dl534&display; see also, Eco Markets 
Introduction: Conservation Backgrounder, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, http:// 
www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/web.page.php?page_name=e_m
arkets_intro&section=about_us (last visited May 22, 2012). 
 294. Kenny et al., supra note 293, at 9 (Prices should, theoretically, “reflect the 
marginal change in value of the affected ecosystem service due to its use.”  
While acknowledging that calculating the value of ecosystem services can be 
“tricky,” they maintain that such challenges should not stop policy makers from 
creating incentives based on prices). 
 295. Id. at 3, 4 (Ecosystem services are defined as “the benefits people obtain 
from ecosystems,” and include such things as food, genetic resources for 
pharmaceutical research, bees for pollination, forests for controlling flooding and 
soil erosion, watersheds that produce clean water, etc.); see also, Ecosystem 
Services, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/ 
pages/dynamic/web.page.php?page_id=7182&section=about_us&eod=1#es_3 
(last visited May 22, 2012). 
 296. Background Paper, Smart Budget: A Background Paper on 
Environmental Pricing Reform for Local Governments, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY 
(2010). 
 297. See JOHN DRYZEK, GREEN STATES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: 
ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY AND 
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observes: “A change in ideology and strategy seemed to provide 
environmental NGOs with better access to both the general 
public and the core of policy communities in the environmental 
field.”298  And so environmental groups from Sustainable 
Prosperity to WWF, Environmental Defense, and Greenpeace 
now partner with major corporations to further their “shared” 
economic/environmental agendas.299 
In short, ecological modernization and the allegiances it 
generates has become the dominant strategy of the age.  By 
making a case for the “greening of business” as not only a feasible 
solution to the environmental crisis but a profitable one, 
ecological modernizers appear to overcome the contradiction 
between economic growth and environmental quality.  After all, 
who would disagree with steady-state economist, Herman Daly, 
when he says that “the market is the most efficient institution we 
have come up with.”300  Who would want to refuse the prospect of 
solving the environmental crisis not by questioning the capitalist 
growth model, but by intensifying it?  As Hawken et al. put it, “It 
is easier . . . to ride a horse in the direction it is going.”301 
 
NORWAY (2003) (the extent to which the environmental movement engages with 
the state on ecological modernization depends on the degree to which a state 
allows for their inclusion.  For example corporatist arrangements encourage 
moderate environmental organizations and other “stakeholders” to accept the 
agenda of a weak ecological modernization while more exclusionary 
arrangements force social movements to pursue their goals outside the state). 
 298. Arthur Mol, The Environmental Movement in an Era of Ecological 
Modernisation, 31 GEOFORUM 45, 49 (2000). This in turn led to the 
marginalization of more radical elements of the environmental movement 
resulting in the polarisation of positions within the movement between the 
“fundamentalists” and the “realists.” 
 299. See Michael Dorsey, Climate Knowledge and Power: Tales of Skeptic 
Tanks, Weather Gods, and Sagas for Climate (In)justice, 18 CAPITALISM, NATURE, 
SOCIALISM 7, 10 (2007).  He notes, for example, Environmental Defense’s 
cooperation with BP-Amoco in 1999 to pilot the first major corporate greenhouse 
gas emissions trading scheme; Greenpeace’s collaboration with the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (chaired by the ex-chair of Royal 
Dutch Shell) to promote ratification of the Kyoto Protocol at the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development; and WWF’s eager promotion of carbon 
trading. 
 300. HERMAN DALY & JOHN B. COBB, FOR THE COMMON GOOD 46 (2d ed. 1994). 
 301. HAWKEN ET AL., supra note 278, at 166. 
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VI.  ECOLOGICAL CONTRADICTIONS 
As we turn here from liberal apologia to green critique, let us 
recall two basic lessons of the case studies with which we began 
this article.  First, externalities are not accidental events but 
pervasive cost shifts that are inherent to the design and success 
of entire industrial structures.  Second, these structures were 
directly shaped, extensively financed, and continuously supported 
by the state that is now to be the vehicle for the new modernizing 
innovations.  These lessons have profound implications for our 
social/environmental relations generally and, more particularly, 
for the future character of environmental law.  And so the 
question remains: does the challenge for environmental law lie in 
developing responses to markets that do not presently reflect full 
economic valuations or state-of-the-art efficiencies?  Or do we 
need to address the basic dynamics of the industries from which 
market failures flow and for which enhanced efficiencies seem to 
offer insufficient potential?  In other words, can the 
environmental challenge be solved by perfecting the “economics” 
and passing new “legal laws” promulgated within an accepted 
political/economic context?  Or must environmental law (or 
whatever it evolves into) go further in order to address the 
“constitutive dynamics” of a constructed “political economy” of 
industries that inherently generate structural economic (and 
environmental) consequences that resist correction, especially by 
a state itself so implicated in the history and functioning of these 
industries?  Hawken’s horse may be saddled with a more 
compliant rider, but what help is that if it is simply racing faster 
toward an abyss? 
A.  Lessons from Ecological Theory 
Throughout this paper, we have articulated a new “green 
legal” critique intended to shift analysis beyond the bounds of 
both the neoclassical/mainstream economic calculus and liberal 
theory to one informed by what might be understood as an 
“ecological political economy.”  The following discussion, though of 
a more general nature that addresses economic and political 
dynamics, is directly relevant to environmental law because it is 
in this larger context where new larger forms of socially-
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constitutive (e.g. legal writ large) regulation must be developed.  
Certainly, efficiency has an important place in an ecological 
economy.  Using less energy and fewer resources to do the same 
thing makes obvious sense—why generate needless waste?  
Moreover, great improvements can be made in efficiency and, to a 
degree, even leading to some sort of industrial conversion.  The 
Germans trumpet their achievements with, in 2012, 20% of their 
energy coming from renewables that they promise will completely 
displace nuclear power by 2030.302  As well, organizations like 
Sustainable Prosperity make many useful proposals for reform in 
such areas as development cost charges in urban development, 
energy efficiency, and so on.  Meanwhile, dramatic reforms such 
as constitutionalizing the right to a healthy environment can 
have significant incremental impacts.303 
As we have also seen, however, after more than two decades 
of a market- and technology-based approach, ecological 
modernization has been unsuccessful in altering the trajectory of 
ecological collapse.  Within an unproblematized economic/political 
context, efficiency gains easily lead to their opposite, more 
growth.  As Richard Smith notes, “under capitalism, the whole 
point of using resources efficiently is just to use the saved 
resources to produce even more commodities, to accelerate the 
conversion of even more natural resources into products . . . so the 
cycle can begin all over again.”304  Throughout history efficiency 
 
 302. See CHRIS TURNER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE TORONTO (2007) (describing 
the German green industrial strategy); see also Chris Turner, Germany’s 
Sustainable Revolution, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 30, 2012, at B9 (original source for 
figures in THE GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE TORONTO).  It bears repeating that 
“renewables” are not unproblematic in their impacts and costs.  In its praise of 
state-sponsored corporate innovation and growth, this article makes no mention 
of overall reductions in levels of consumption, the externalities generated by 
renewables, their high costs and the huge subsidies they demand, the 
continuing impacts of economic growth on energy demand, and so on. 
 303. See BOYD, supra note 222 (noting in a review of over 100 countries, that 
the constitutional right to a healthy environment has led not only to stronger 
environmental laws, but also legislation and litigation that compels 
governments to provide basic environmental services such as clean drinking 
water, sanitation, and waste management); see also id. at 238 (noting the 
constitutional right to a healthy environment has led to compensation of 
citizens, whose health has been detrimentally affected by industrial pollution in 
countries such as Peru, Russia, Romania, Chile, and Turkey).  
 304. Smith, supra note 238, at 40-41. 
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gains in technology have, in fact, often translated into increasing 
levels of consumption overall.  This is recognized by mainstream 
economics as a beneficial result, increasing productivity in order 
to get more (not the same) for less. 
The original explanation for this seeming paradox was 
provided by the nineteenth century British coal economist, 
William Stanley Jevons, in his classic work, The Coal Question.305  
Jevons observed that technological advancements leading to more 
efficient use of coal did not result in a decrease in coal 
consumption but rather made coal a more cost effective energy 
source for generating more profits and further economic 
expansion.306  Taking the example of iron manufacturing, he 
explained that if the quantity of coal used in a furnace declines in 
comparison to the unit of production, profits will increase, new 
capital will be attracted and the price of the product will decline, 
which will in turn create an increase in demand for it.  Thus, any 
reduction in the use of coal as a result of improved efficiency will 
eventually be overtaken by a greater number of furnaces and 
expanded production.307  Jevons wrote: “It is wholly a confusion of 
ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a 
diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth.”308  
(Instead, Jevons’ counter-intuitive explanation is fully compatible 
with the mandate for market expansion necessitated by 
competitive capitalism, as discussed above.) 
“Jevons’ paradox” or the “rebound effect” as this insight is 
also known, has been on full display in places like the U.S. where, 
at both a micro- and macro-economic level, economic growth 
repeatedly overtakes efficiency gains.  As Juliet Schor notes, 
“demand is rising fastest in those sectors that have had the 
biggest efficiency gains–transport and residential energy use.”309  
For example, people driving bigger cars over longer distances 
 
 305. William Stanley Jevons, Of the Economy of Fuel, 14 ORG. & ENV’T 99 
(2001) (reprint of chapter 7 of WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THE COAL QUESTION 
(1865)); see also Blake Alcott, Jevons’ Paradox, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 9 (2005). 
 306. Jevons, supra note 305. 
 307. Id. at 100. 
 308. Id. at 99. 
 309. JULIET SCHOR, PLENITUDE: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF TRUE WEALTH 91 
(2010). 
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overtook the savings gained from improved fuel efficiencies in car 
engines in the 1970s.310  Similarly, although fuel efficiency in 
aviation improved by more than 40% since 1975, fuel 
consumption grew by 50% as a result of more passenger 
flights.311  The building industry is another sector applauded for 
its notable gains in energy efficiency, yet energy use since 1978 
has actually increased by 30% for residential buildings and over 
65% for commercial buildings in the U.S.312  Energy efficiency has 
been overtaken by such things as larger building size, air 
conditioning, exercise rooms, swimming pools, home saunas, and 
a plethora of appliances and home electronics.313  In other words, 
efficiency gains actually fuel macro-economic growth, and are 
widely praised for such an effect.314 
 
 310. See KRAFT, supra note 27, at 169 (including note 10) (noting that between 
1995 and 2001, Congress ensured that fuel economy standards for vehicles were 
not reviewed or changed despite the fact that the average fuel economy of 
American vehicles was at the lowest level since 1980.  He further notes that the 
2003 model of cars and passenger trucks had an average fuel efficiency of 20.8 
miles per gallon—6% less than the fuel efficiency high of 15 years earlier.  In 
2006, a modest increase in fuel economy standards was announced for SUVs, 
pickup trucks, and vans with projected fuel savings of 8%). 
 311. SCHOR, supra note 309, at 9. 
 312. Jeffrey Harris et al., Don’t Supersize Me! Toward a Policy of 
Consumption-Based Energy Efficiency, in 2006 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY 
PROCEEDINGS (2006), http://epb.lbl.gov/homepages/rick_diamond/sufficiency% 
20aceee%2006.doc.pdf. 
 313. Id. 
 314. GREENPEACE INT’L, HOW DIRTY IS YOUR DATA? A LOOK AT THE ENERGY 
CHOICES THAT POWER CLOUD COMPUTING 11 (2011), http://www.greenpeace.org/ 
international/Global/international/publications/climate/2011/Cool%20IT/dirty-
data-report-greenpeace.pdf (Resource efficiency is also touted as a major benefit 
resulting from the revolution in information and communication technologies.  
However, as a recent Greenpeace report notes, if the internet were a country it 
would rank fifth in electricity usage just behind Japan.); see also Kris De 
Decker, The Monster Footprint of Digital Technology, LOW-TECH MAGAZINE (June 
16, 2009), www.lowtechmagazine.com/2009/06/embodied-energy-of-digital-
technology.html (moreover, while computers have become smaller and more 
energy efficient in their operation, they are nevertheless constructed out of 
exotic (“rare earth”) elements and require increasing amounts of energy to build 
them.  The energy embodied in a single laptop’s memory chip alone “exceeds the 
energy consumption of a laptop during its life expectancy of three years.”); Eric 
William et al., The 1.7 kg Microchip: Energy and Material Use in the Production 
of Semi-Conductor Devices, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 5504 (2002); Eric Williams, 
Environmental Impacts in the Production of Personal Computers, in COMPUTERS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Reudiger Kuehr &Eric Williams eds., 2003) (an analysis 
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As a transitional strategy, enhanced resource efficiency has 
much to offer but only when approached as a first step to larger 
changes within a larger context.  As Fournier puts it, “The 
problem is not with these eco-efficiency technologies themselves   
. . . but with their inscription within a paradigm of growth: their 
deployment towards increased consumption and production.”315  
This is because a strategy of eco-efficiency in an economy of 
growth is time-limited and quickly self-defeating as improved 
efficiencies become ever more costly to attain, at the same time as 
they are quickly outrun by expanded production.  Indeed, unless 
eco-efficient growth is oriented to creating new institutions that 
do not themselves depend on growth, the result will be to create a 
still larger, over-extended economy but without the inefficiencies 
that are now available to cushion a transition.  Thus would fuel 
efficiency lead not to car-free cities but to more (bio)diesel or 
battery-powered automobiles funneling onto ever more congested 
freeways for ever greater numbers of downtown office complexes 
remote from where people live.  With resources going to maintain 
or extend the infrastructure of “automobility” (e.g. freeways and 
overpasses), that money and physical resources are not available 
to build rail or tram lines or a bicycle infrastructure, let alone to 
rebuild the economy that demands such mobility in the first 
place.  Such systemic changes require collective political choice, 
not just individual economic decisions. 
This is a general problem with market mechanisms as they 
may work well to make incremental decisions but not to make 
collective, transformative ones.  Changes in degree do not easily 
lead to changes in kind and, in fact, often work to pre-empt them.  
The latter requires a collective attention to the basic systems 
themselves, including the ability to address the historical 
economic benefits and dependencies that they have generated, 
and that in turn generate resistance to change.  And, of course, 
prices are a poor guide to system change as prices themselves 
reflect the existing distributions and dependencies of established 
industrial systems, and of the associated attitudes and values 
 
of energy and material inputs reveals that for every gram of a microchip, 630 
grams of fossil fuels are required.  This means that the memory chips for a 
single computer embody roughly 94 kg of fossil fuel.). 
 315. Fournier, supra note 276, at 532. 
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that are socially-constructed by them.  This is why GLT points to 
a paradigm shift away from manipulating the internal 
mechanisms of neoclassical economics (e.g. carbon taxes that lead 
to hybrid cars) to developing external strategies that can foster a 
new ecological political economy (e.g. eco-industrial programs to 
phase out the urban automobile). 
The potential benefits from enhanced resource efficiency thus 
cannot be separated from the larger contexts within which these 
efficiencies actually accrue, especially that generated by the 
dynamics of capitalist economics.  Taken from the perspective of 
the production unit, “the most efficient production method, 
technology, or economic system is the one that gets the most 
output from the least input, so produces the cheapest widgets and 
generates the most product/sales/wealth for a given investment of 
labor and raw materials.”316  On this calculus, mountain top 
removal may well be the most “efficient” method of mining coal 
even though it results in extensive destruction of forests, habitat, 
watersheds, and communities.317  Similarly, it may be most 
efficient for fishing trawlers to use satellite-guided navigation 
systems to maximize their catches even though it leads to the 
overexploitation and collapse of fisheries.318  And if industrial 
agriculture’s use of toxic pesticides and synthetic fertilizers can 
bring higher yields, then it must be the most efficient method of 
farming even if it depletes soil, pollutes water, and strips food of 
its nutritional value. 
One can construct all the scenarios for internalizing these 
costs as one might want—but today’s prices reflect past patterns 
not future realities, as do political interventions.  Given the cost-
shifting nature of state-constructed regimes, many core industrial 
activities such as plastics manufacturing, metal mining, car 
 
 316. Smith, supra note 238, at 39. 
 317. Id. at 40; see also PLUNDERING APPALACHIA: THE TRAGEDY OF 
MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL COAL MINING 1 (Tom Butler & George Wuerthner eds., 
2009) (The process of mountaintop mining in Appalachia is described as turning 
“an entire region into an undeclared national energy sacrifice zone”). 
 318. Smith, supra note 238, at 40; see also Ransom Myers & Boris Worm, 
Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities, 423 NATURE 280 
(2003); Heike Lotze, Repetitive History of Resource Depletion and 
Mismanagement: The Need for a Shift in Perspective, 274 MARINE ECOLOGICAL 
PROGRESS SERIES 282 (2004). 
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manufacturing, and oil extraction could well go out of business if 
they were to internalize their full social and environmental 
externalities.  Serge Latouche remarks, “with proper prices, civil 
aviation would come to a halt, and there would probably not be 
many cars in the world.”319  If “efficiency” were considered from a 
broader standpoint than a neoclassical calculus—personal and 
community and ecological health, global equity and security, even 
collective “utility”—a very different picture would emerge.  But 
such changes would entail actively reducing market demand 
(inimical to the growth economy) so that coal-fired power plants 
could simply be closed and collective decisions made to build 
trams and close freeways (inimical to established industrial 
systems).  These are issues of collective decision, not technocratic 
calculation, of “re-formation” not reform.  That there is a choice 
here is not because reforms are inherently useless; it is because 
the re-formative context for their proper functioning is absent. 
B.  Lessons from Economic Practice 
a.  The Case of Carbon and Green Development 
If all this seems obvious to the sympathetic reader, it is not 
so to anyone working in the bureaucratic let alone corporate 
corridors of power where system maintenance and extension is 
the “realistic” context.  It is thus not surprising that the actual 
experience with market-based schemes that are supposedly 
designed to reduce climate impacts has instead provided for the 
very opposite—for “new outlets for accumulation” through 
financializing a hitherto unpriced entity where the primary goal 
is to make profits from carbon emissions, not to reduce such 
opportunities by taking actions that would slash such 
emissions.320  Some critics go so far as to argue that, rather than 
contributing to a solution to climate change, pricing strategies 
that underlie carbon taxes, trading, and offsets may actually 
 
 319. SERGE LATOUCHE, FAREWELL TO GROWTH 74 (2009). 
 320. Giorgos Kallis, In Defense of Degrowth, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 873, 878 
(2011). 
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contribute to the problem.321  Gilbertson and Reyes note that all 
carbon trading schemes to date have started by awarding the 
worst polluters with the largest numbers of free pollution 
rights.322  This amounts to “one of the largest projects for the 
creation and regressive distribution of property rights in 
history.”323  In many cases, governments have handed over more 
pollution rights than polluters needed to meet their legally-
mandated targets.  For example, in the first phase of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (the world’s largest and longest 
established carbon trading scheme) polluters were allocated an 
extra 130 million tonnes of carbon permits over what they 
actually emitted.324  With a surplus of permits, firms had little or 
no incentive to cut back emissions.325  The next five-year period of 
the trading scheme which ended in 2012 is expected to result in a 
mere 0.3% reduction in total emissions.326  Even this small drop 
is a telling indicator of the real source of the carbon problem (and 
its solution) insofar as the reduction was attributable to the 2008-
2009 economic slowdown that resulted in a drop in emissions in 
traded sectors by 6% in 2008 and a stunning 11.6% in 2009.327  
Similarly, carbon emissions in the U.S. dropped by 7% in 2009 
 
 321. See Larry Lohmann & Sarah Sexton, Carbon Markets: The Policy Reality, 
10 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 9 (2010); GILBERTSON & REYES, supra note 285. 
 322. GILBERTSON & REYES, supra note 285, at 10. 
 323. Id. at 10. 
 324. Id. at 34.  Carbon permits were over-allocated by 36.9% in 2005, 26.9% in 
2006, 25% in 2007, and 31.7% in 2008. Id. at 43; see also Questions and Answers 
on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, EU COMM’N (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/796 (last 
visited May 22, 2012) (the EU itself acknowledges the failure noting that “The 
environmental benefit of the first phase may be limited due to excessive 
allocation of allowances in some Member States and some sectors…”). 
 325. See GILBERTSON & REYES, supra note 285, at 35, 43-44 (while the EU 
blames the over-allocation on a lack of accurate emission projections, the 
concern not to overload the constraints on the economy is omnipresent.  As well, 
corporate influence undoubtedly played a significant role, and the sale of excess 
profits has led to windfall profits). 
 326. DAMIEN MORRIS & BRYONY WORTHINGTON, CAP OR TRAP? HOW THE EU ETS 
RISKS LOCKING IN CARBON EMISSIONS 7 (2010), available at http://www.sandbag. 
org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/caportrap.pdf; see also GILBERTSON & REYES, 
supra note 285, at 315. 
 327. MORRIS & WORTHINGTON, supra note 326, at 5; see also David Gabel, US 
Cut its CO2 Emissions by 7% Last Year, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK (May 6, 2010), 
http://www.enn.com/pollution/article/41295 (last visited May 22, 2012). 
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which corresponded to a 2.4% drop in GDP.  According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, it was the largest drop in 
carbon emissions since the agency began keeping comprehensive 
records in 1949. 
The European scheme also allows a corporation to “bank” its 
allocated permits.  As a result, the decreased industrial output 
during the recession meant that big polluters could carry over 
their surplus permits into the next phase of the trading scheme in 
2013.  For the top ten most over-allocated companies in 2008, 
their surplus of permits could allow them collectively to increase 
their emissions by 50% above 2009 levels by 2020.328  A report by 
the non-governmental organization, Sandbag, comments:  
As the essence of the scheme is to distribute carbon allowances to 
private companies, there is little recourse for reclaiming excess 
permits once they have been allocated. Furthermore, there is 
considerable inertia in the scheme with decisions affecting future 
fixed supplies of permits dictated many years in advance making 
them vulnerable to incorrect assumptions and unexpected 
events.329   
Once again, efficient allocation becomes its opposite: “With 
emissions now below the level of the cap, the cap has become a 
trap–guaranteeing high levels of emissions into the future rather 
than working to deliver reductions.”330 
Even more controversial are carbon offset mechanisms that 
allow emissions reductions to take place outside the capped area 
through “emission-savings projects.”  The UN Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) is the largest offset scheme with projects 
ranging from hydroelectric dam building and biomass projects to 
palm oil plantations and even coal-fired power plants.  It has 
worked by allowing companies and governments in the northern 
industrialized countries to meet their emissions reductions 
mandated by the Kyoto Protocol by buying relatively inexpensive 
 
 328. MORRIS & WORTHINGTON, supra note 326, at 9.  Among these top 10 over-
allocated companies (in proportion to their emissions), most are steel and 
cement companies.  The most over-allocated company, SSAB Steel, is projected 
to be able to increase its 2009 emissions 250% by 2020. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 5. 
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carbon credits or offsets from projects developed in low income 
countries.  In many cases, however, the project’s claimed 
emissions reductions reflect hypothetical scenarios that cannot be 
proven.331  But even where the claimed reductions turn out to be 
accurate, they simply cancel out the carbon emissions produced 
by the buyer of the offset.  Thus, in a perfectly implemented 
system, the net result would be neutral.  However, since a 
significant proportion of projects sold as offsets would have 
proceeded regardless of funding, and the credits they generate 
allow an industry elsewhere to exceed their emissions cap, the 
CDM actually ends up increasing rather than decreasing global 
carbon emissions.332  This is another instance of the pattern 
common to the state-guided development that we have seen in 
our earlier case studies of these very industries. 
Even worse, some of the offset projects lead to significant 
environmental or social costs in the host country, such costs 
effectively subsidizing production in the industrialized country 
that bought the offsets.  In the Greater Mekong subregion, eight 
hydropower projects have applied for CDM credits.333  With the 
majority of people dependent on the rivers for their livelihood, 
culture, and food security, most of these projects will, on top of 
the threats they pose to important biodiversity and fish migration 
routes, have devastating impacts on communities that live along 
these rivers.  For example, one of the first to apply for CDM 
credits was the Xeset 2 Hydropower Project, and it will dewater 
the Xeset and two other rivers.  As a result, the NGO, 
International Rivers, complains that more than 18,000 people 
including many indigenous peoples “will lose domestic water 
 
 331. See Larry Lohmann, Toward a Different Debate in Environmental 
Accounting: The Cases of Carbon and Cost-benefit, 34 ACCOUNTING, ORGS. & 
SOC’Y 499, 504ff (2009); see also MORRIS & WORTHINGTON, supra note 326, at 56 
(a project simply has to prove that “it is cleaner than the norm for existing 
power production in the region or country where it is located. As new plants are 
generally more efficient than old ones, this is rarely a difficult task.”). 
 332. GILBERTSON & REYES, supra note 285, at 53.  Chapter 4 covers a range of 
case studies of the Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil, Indonesia, India, 
and Thailand exposing how such projects routinely support ineffective and 
socially unjust projects. 
 333. They are part of the more than 100 major dams, diversions, and 
irrigations projects planned, and thousands smaller schemes already in place in 
the Mekong River Basin. 
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sources, wild fisheries, irrigation water, vegetable gardens, water 
for raising fish, and recreational and income generating 
opportunities.”334  While the government of Laos claims to have 
conducted consultation processes, “in a one-party communist 
state that does not tolerate dissent, consultation processes are 
rubber-stamping devices where communities feel afraid to speak 
out or raise concerns due to fear of repercussions.”335  If Xeset 2 is 
approved, “it could open the floodgates for similar non-additional 
and poorly designed and developed hydropower projects.”336  
Another example is the Allain Duhangan Hydropower Project in 
Himachal Pradesh, India, one of the largest hydropower projects 
to get credits under the CDM.  Like villages along the Xeset 2, the 
village of Jagatsukh will be detrimentally affected by the 192 MW 
dam that will divert creeks that farmers depend on for their 
livelihood and food security.337  Despite strong local opposition to 
the dam since its inception in 2003, the project is slated to receive 
around 4.94 million Certified Emissions Reduction credits.338  
 
 334. International Rivers Comments on Xeset 2 Hydropower Project, Lao PDR 
1, INT’L RIVERS (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/ 
comments-to-bv-cert-regarding-xeset-2-hydropower-project-laos-3121 (last 
visited May 22, 2012). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id.; see also Philip Hirsch, The Changing Political Dynamics of Dam 
Building on the Mekong, 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES 312 (2010). 
 337. About 2,000 people live in the village of Jugatsukh and almost all oppose 
the project.  The project will also destroy habitat used by threatened, rare or 
endangered species. See Terri Martin, Muting the Voice of the Local in the Age of 
the Global: How Communication Practices Compromised Public Participation in 
India’s Allain Dunhangan Environmental Impact Assessment, 1 ENVTL. COMM. 
171, 176 (Nov. 2007); Comments on the ESIA of the Proposed Allain Duhangan 
HEP, SOUTH ASIAN NETWORK OF DAMS, RIVERS AND PEOPLE (2003), 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/flawed_environmental_and
_social_impact_analysis_pdf.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012). 
 338. The 4.94 million credits derive from the total estimated reductions of 
4,946,648 tonnes of CO2 over the project's 10 year period. UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CDM Project Design Document 
Form (for Allain Duhangan Hydroelectric Project) 5 (2007), available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/L/Y/Z/LYZSN7J5RUYNO8DZTC236SF3POYN
WK/PDD.pdf?t=ZFZ8bWxmMzQyfDB92RmTymFGCyS3ip3Wo-sE (last visited 
May 22, 2012); The 75 Million Dollar Fraud, SOUTH ASIAN NETWORK ON DAMS, 
RIVERS AND PEOPLE, http://www.sandrp.in/comments_CDM_HEPs/ 
Allain_Duhangan.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012) (using the 2010 EU ETS 
average market rate of around U.S. $16 per credit, this would come out to 
around $75 million). 
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With larger plans to add 150,000 megawatts of hydropower to the 
Himalayan region, the situation risks being repeated hundreds of 
times throughout the region.339  While these and other major 
hydroelectric developments are promoted as being “in the public 
interest” most projects are developed not to meet local needs for 
electricity, but to feed the growing demand of South Asia’s urban 
industries and middle classes.340  The real decision makers, 
moreover, are global corporations and their institutional financial 
backers.341  The overriding motive is to increase energy supply for 
producing computers, textiles, and other consumer goods for the 
world’s wealthy, while literally hundreds of small-scale 
communities are vanquished, taking with them diverse ways of 
living, knowledge systems, and cultural practices. 
The examples go on.  Although the topic deserves more 
detailed analysis than can be presented here, it is important to 
note how the massive offset program, REDD (or Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) follows this same 
pattern and on a grand scale.  In this case, southern countries sell 
the carbon-sink capacity of their forests to northern countries.  
These top-down models increase expert and state control over 
forests thus amplifying the risk of violating the sovereignty of 
indigenous peoples and their right to prior, free, and informed 
consent.  As a result, these schemes are strongly opposed by 
many indigenous and forest peoples who fear that such policies 
will lead to “anti-people and exclusionary models of forest 
conservation . . . to protect lucrative forest carbon ‘reservoirs.’”342  
 
 339. See SHRIPAD DHARMADHIKARY, MOUNTAINS OF CONCRETE: DAM BUILDING IN 
THE HIMALAYAS (2008), http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-
files/ir_himalayas.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012). 
 340. Id. at 1. 
 341. Philip Hirsh, Beyond the Nation State: Natural Resource Conflict and 
“National Interest” in Mekong Hydropower Development, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 399, 411 (1999). 
 342. TOM GRIFFITHS, SEEING ‘RED’? ‘AVOIDED DEFORESTATION’ AND THE RIGHTS 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES (2007), available at http:// 
www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2010/01/avoideddeforestationre
djun07eng_0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012); For a critique of a project widely 
considered to be a model for REDD, see ARIANA DENSHAM ET AL., CARBON SCAM: 
NOEL KEMPFF CLIMATE ACTION PROJECT AND THE PUSH FOR SUB-NATIONAL FOREST 
OFFSETS (2010), http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2010/1/carbon-
scam-noel-kempff-clima.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012). 
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This large scheme, the many specific projects worldwide, and the 
whole array of carbon markets and offset mechanisms all reflect a 
common, double-edged phenomenon.  On the one hand is the 
displacement of substantive action to address real environmental 
problems and its accompanying problematic.  On the other hand 
is the promotion of the pricing mechanism as a procedural tool 
with the technical allure that rewards enviro-capitalism while it 
lets the state off the hook for substantive action.  This pervasive 
process is now reaching into the tiniest of ecological crevices with 
the growing application of pricing to all manner of ecosystem 
services.  As Dempsey and Robertson note, such strategies 
“simplify the complexity of natural ecosystems, prioritize single 
exchange values over ecological complexity, and mask the 
unequal social relations embedded in the process of buying and 
selling environmental services.”343 
b.  When Clean Energy Meets Economic Growth 
The rush to clean energy production reflects a similar pattern 
where, again, historical interests and imperatives prevail, and 
incrementalism confronts systemic obstacles.  As Vaclav Smil 
argues, it is one thing to hypothesize a revolution in energy 
production, and another thing to attain it.344  For example, a 
clean energy revolution based in renewable production would 
“greatly increase the fixed land requirements of energy 
production and necessitate more extensive rights-of-way for 
transmission.”345  In addition, since the energy density of 
 
 343. Jessica Dempsey & Morgan Robertson, Ecosystem Services: Tensions and 
Developments within Neoliberal Environmentalism, PROGRESS IN HUMAN 
GEOGRAPHY (forthcoming); Inge Røpke, Trends in the Development of Ecological 
Economics from the Late 1980s to the Early 2000s, 55 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 262, 
279 (2005) (contingent valuation provides decision makers with a simplistic 
technical solution that may be used to justify policies while simultaneously 
evading fundamental moral and political dilemmas.  The source concludes that 
“prices are not worth much” since not only are many factors unquantifiable and 
incommensurable, but prices are necessarily a reflection of historical and 
existing power structures). 
 344. See Vaclav Smil, Twenty-first Century Energy – Some Sobering Thoughts, 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Dec. 2006), at 22-23, http://www. 
oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/2083/21st_century_energy:_Some_soberi
ng_thoughts.html. 
 345. Id. 
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renewable fuels is lower than fossil fuels, no readily available 
renewable energy source of a large enough scale presently 
exists.346  There are also the problems of intermittency of 
renewable flows, lack of storage, and uneven distribution of 
favorable sites.347  Even if there were alternatives immediately 
available, the financial cost for broad deployment would be 
enormous and would mean writing off the existing infrastructure 
for extracting, transporting, and refining fossil fuels worth well 
over $5 trillion.348  Moreover, even with extraordinary 
commitment, such a transition requires decades.  One of the most 
committed countries like Denmark, after 30 years, still gets 20% 
of its power from windmills and 80% from coal.349  On the other 
hand, while addressing global warming is critical and urgent, a 
complete and rapid switch to clean energy (or dubious sources of 
“cleaner” energy such as the energy now touted as coming from 
 
 346. Ottmar Edenhofer et al., Summary for Policy Makers, in IPCC SPECIAL 
REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (O. 
Edenhofer et al. eds., 2011) (refuting such claims with its projection that 
renewable technologies could make up 80% of the world’s energy by mid-
century.  While the report asserts that “there are few, if any, fundamental 
technological limits” to developing the renewable energy technologies outlined, 
it also notes that “the substantial increase of renewables is technically and 
politically very challenging.”); see also World Energy Outlook 2011 Factsheet 2, 
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite 
/2011/factsheets.pdf (the immense challenge involved in shifting away from 
fossil fuel to renewable fuel sources is underscored by the International Energy 
Agency’s 2011 World Energy Outlook.  Its central scenario projects that by 2035 
world oil demand will increase by 15 million barrels per year while the use of 
coal will rise by 65%.  The report points out that because of the long economic 
life of much of the world’s energy-related capital stock such as power stations, 
buildings, and factories, some of this infrastructure will need to be retired early 
in order to limit global carbon emissions to 450 ppm.  It contends: “This would 
theoretically be possible at a very high cost, but is probably not practicable 
politically.”). 
 347. SMIL, supra note 280, at 22-23. 
 348. See Vaclav Smil, Moore’s Curse and the Great Energy Delusion, THE AM., 
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-december-
magazine/moore2019s-curse-and-the-great-energy-delusion (last visited May 22, 
2012).  “Moore’s Law” refers to the tendency (observed by Intel cofounder, 
Gordon Moore) for a computer’s power to double every 18 months.  While some 
people have extended this observation to energy systems more generally, Smil 
emphasizes that the rapid technical innovation in computer processing does not 
represent the norm for energy systems. 
 349. Id.; see generally JEFF RUBIN, THE END OF GROWTH (2012) (discussing 
Denmark’s progress). 
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“fracking”) would not stop destructive mining and forestry 
practices, nor overexploitation of global fisheries and water 
resources, nor the production of toxic chemicals and excessive 
garbage.  On the contrary, “given the Jevons paradox, the advent 
of cheap, clean energy could even accelerate these trends.”350 
One can understand the popularity of these strategies 
because, again, they promise to marry prosperity in the old mode 
with production in a new one.  But no matter how great the risks 
entailed in achieving them, they cannot work for a simple reason: 
in a world driven by the relentless pursuit of economic growth, 
the benefits generated by clean technologies will be overtaken by 
the external costs inflicted by economic growth.  For the green 
economy, this is the definitive party crasher.  The government-
appointed UK Sustainable Development Commission report, 
“Prosperity Without Growth,” makes this very clear.  It notes that 
energy intensity (that is the amount of primary energy needed to 
produce a unit of economic output) has overall declined worldwide 
by 33% since 1970.351  The drop in energy intensity for the U.K. 
and U.S. was even more dramatic—a 40% decline since 1980.352  
At the same time, however, because of overall economic growth, 
world carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by a stunning 
80% since 1970.353  Despite commitments within the Kyoto 
Protocol to bring greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 
2012, current measurements of carbon emissions are 40% higher 
than they were in 1990.354 
It is tempting to point the finger at rapidly industrializing 
countries such as China for the increase in emissions since 
 
 350. Richard Smith, Green Capitalism: The God that Failed, 56 REAL-WORLD 
ECON. REV. 112, 126 (2011). 
 351. TIM JACKSON, PROSPERITY WITHOUT GROWTH 48 (2009), available at 
http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/data/files/publications/prosperity_without_ 
growth_report.pdf. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 50. 
 354. Id.  In the Kyoto Protocol, thirty-seven industrialized “Annex I” countries 
agreed to reduce their average greenhouse gas emissions by 5% from 1990 levels 
by 2012.  These targets exclude emissions from aviation and shipping. See Press 
Release, Industrialized Countries to Cut Green House Gas Emissions by 5.2 
percent, U.N. Press Release (Dec. 11, 1997) available at http://unfccc.int/cop3 
/fccc/info/indust.htm (last visited May 22, 2012). 
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according to standard data, developed countries have reduced 
their collective emissions by almost 2% between 1990 and 
2008.355  However, a recent report on international emissions 
transfers shows that wealthy countries have been lowering their 
emissions by sending production overseas.356  The Kyoto Protocol, 
developed at the height of the neoliberal era when heavy 
production was being moved offshore, assigns emissions to the 
country where they are physically released during production of 
goods.  However, when emissions embedded in imports and 
exports are taken into account, developed countries end up with a 
collective increase in emissions of 7% while China’s emissions 
drop by almost 20%.357  As a result, “emissions from increased 
production of internationally traded products have more than 
offset the emissions reductions achieved under the Kyoto 
Protocol.”358  This means that “even if all the unenforceable 
pledges made in the Copenhagen Accord were honored, carbon 
cuts by the rich nations between now and 2020 would be 
cancelled out by their imports from developing countries” and 
“nothing will have been achieved.”359 
This is no incidental concern as economic growth remains the 
main policy goal of almost every government in the world.  Speth 
notes that the size of the world economy has quadrupled from 
 
 355. See Duncan Clark, New Data on Imports and Exports Turns Map of 
Carbon Emission on its Head, GUARDIAN, (May 3, 2011), http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/environment/datablog/2011/apr/28/carbon-emissions-imports-exports-trade 
(discussing a summary of changes in carbon emissions between 1990 and 2008, 
both with and without consumption emissions, for individual countries and 
Annex B and non-Annex B countries collectively). 
 356. Glen Peters et al., Growth in Emission Transfers via International Trade 
from 1990-2008, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 8903 (2011), 
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/04/ 19/1006388108.full.pdf+ 
html; see also Stephen Davis & Ken Caldeira, Consumption-based Accounting of 
CO2 Emissions, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 5687-92 (2010). 
 357. Duncan Clark, Carbon Cuts by Developed Countries Cancelled out by 
Imported Goods, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2011/apr/25/carbon-cuts-developed-countries-cancelled.  For 
example, once trade is included, the UK’s emissions go from a reduction of 28 
million tonnes in standard calculations to an increase of 100 million tonnes. 
 358. Id. 
 359. George Monbiot, Pass the Parcel, GUARDIAN (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.monbiot.com/2011/05/23/pass-the-parcel/ (commenting on the Peters 
et al. report). 
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around $10 trillion in 1960 to more than $40 trillion in 2000.360  
With this continuing momentum, economic activity is projected to 
quadruple again to $160 trillion by mid-century.361  Assuming the 
same rate of growth, by the end of the century the economy will 
be 80 times what it was in 1960.362  This is obviously impossible 
considering that the economy’s five-fold increase in size over the 
past half a century has already resulted in serious erosion of 60% 
of the world’s ecosystems.363  As one critic remarked, “[I]n the 
face of mounting ecological disasters worldwide, from droughts to 
floods, desertification to species extinction, the continued 
insistence on the efficacy of technological and market solutions 
and the concomitant denial that the capitalist principle of infinite 
growth is unsustainable can only be qualified as pathological.”364 
To further illustrate the point, Jackson and colleagues 
estimated the level of technology that would be required to meet 
an atmospheric carbon concentration of 450 ppm by 2050, as 
suggested by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.365  This would 
require a reduction in carbon emissions by 4.9% per year between 
now and 2050.366  Using the I=PAT formula,367 they calculated 
that in a business-as-usual scenario, a decline in carbon intensity 
(T) of 0.7% per year (the average decline since 1990) would 
balance out the expected 0.7% per year growth in population (P) 
(based on the UN’s mid-range projection).368  Carbon emissions (I) 
 
 360. SPETH, supra note 211, at 4. 
 361. Id. at 4. 
 362. JACKSON, supra note 351, at 102. 
 363. Id. at 102. 
 364. Fournier, supra note 276, at 530. 
 365. JACKSON, supra note 351, at 53-54. 
 366. Id. 
 367. See Paul Ehrlich & John Holdren, Impact of Population Growth, 171 SCI. 
1212 (1971).  Where I = environmental impact, P = population, A = affluence or 
economic growth, and T = technological intensity of economic output.  Relative 
decoupling requires that the T factor be decreasing relative to A (the main focus 
of ecological modernization) while absolute decoupling requires that the I factor 
be going down as well.  The IPAT formula was developed forty years ago by Paul 
Ehrlich and John Holdren. 
 368. See United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World 
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.210, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_highlights.pdf 
(this population growth rate is based on the UN’s mid-range estimate for world 
population which projects a total of 9 billion people by 2050). 
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could then be expected to grow at about the same rate as the 
average global annual income (A) which is projected at 1.4% a 
year.369  At this rate, by the year 2050, carbon emissions would 
have increased to 80% over current levels.370  In order to reduce 
carbon emissions by 4.9% per year, technology would need to 
improve by 7% per year or nearly 10 times current levels.371 
This situation points to a major contradiction for economic 
growth.  If one were to assume continued economic growth of even 
just 2% per year (well below the macro-economic optimum of 3%) 
from 2050 to the end of the century, then “to all intents and 
purposes, nothing less than a complete decarbonisation of every 
single dollar will do to achieve carbon targets.”372  That is, 
instead of the “relative decoupling” that allows for reduced energy 
use for every unit of growth, what is needed is “absolute 
decoupling” that allows for energy use to decline overall even as 
growth continues.  This is especially necessary if, as many 
scientists state, the necessary level of carbon in the atmosphere 
should be 350 not 450 ppm.  For Jackson the conclusion is 
inescapable: 
[S]implistic assumptions that capitalism’s propensity for 
efficiency will allow us to stabilize the climate or protect against 
resource scarcity are nothing short of delusional. Those who 
promote decoupling as an escape route from the dilemma of 
 
 369. See JACKSON, supra note 351, at 53.  This is based on the average increase 
in per capita income (in real terms) since 1990. 
 370. Id. at 54. 
 371. Id.  This would mean that by 2050 there would need to be a 21-fold 
improvement in the current average carbon content of economic output.  Keep in 
mind that this is to reach a target of 450 ppm which many would consider far 
too high to stabilize the climate. 
 372. Id. at 56.  If population growth decreases, it will relieve some of the 
pressure on technology improvement.  Conversely, population could increase 
even more and hit the UN’s high range forecast of 11 billion people by 2050.  
However, with approximately 20% of the world’s population consuming 80% of 
the its resources, lowering the consumption of the affluent 20% combined with 
truly equitable global redistribution would be vastly more efficacious.  As 
greater social equity decreases the need for, and pressure on economic growth 
while inequity drives economic growth through the rising tide principle, the 
latter is a more “rational” economic policy. 
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growth need to take a closer look at the historical evidence – and 
at the basic arithmetic of growth.373 
This conclusion poses a direct challenge to the ideology that 
underpins today’s environmental law, ecological modernization, 
the central premise of which is the ability to harmonize economic 
and environmental objectives through enhanced efficiency.  
Breaking free of the economic imagery of capitalism is clearly 
not easy, and even those who challenge the economics of growth 
often still do so within the bounds of a capitalism that they see as 
capable of being reshaped if not by visionary corporate leaders 
then by progressive state-based legal reforms.374  Indeed, most of 
the proponents of the “heterodox” field of ecological economics 
that was founded on the limits of growth explicitly eschew a 
challenge to capitalism.  Under the influence of neoliberalism, 
they have increasingly adopted the discourse and strategies of 
mainstream neoclassical economics (e.g. pricing ecosystem 
services).375  Even the burgeoning “degrowth” movement that 
specifically targets exponential growth and growth-based 
solutions to environmental degradation does so within careful 
bounds.  A strategic explanation of this situation comes from one 
of degrowth’s primary exponents who suggests that the concept of 
degrowth is really “a conceptual or ideological weapon . . . that 
fosters a spirit of critique.”376  Serge Latouche argues that society 
 
 373. Id. at 57. 
 374. Id.  Jackson’s critical report falls prey to this.  His proposed “policies” and 
reforms include sharing available work, strengthening the planning capacity of 
local communities, creating and protecting public spaces, increasing taxation on 
high earners, instituting a Tobin tax on international financial transactions, 
improving access to quality education, and banning advertising to children.  
Jackson acknowledges that such a transition would require fundamental 
changes to underlying structure, but contends that such changes are possible 
through government action. 
 375. See Anderson & M’Gonigle, supra note 246 (discussing how this situation 
has been manifested). 
 376. Fournier, supra note 276, at 532; see also LATOUCHE, supra note 319  
(providing a review and analysis of the concept of degrowth and explores how it 
can be implemented at various levels.  Latouche argues that degrowth is the 
“only political project capable of renewing the left” as it provides a “radical 
critique of consumption and of development . . . ipso facto a critique of 
capitalism.”); see also Serge Latouche, Can the Left Escape Economism?, 23 
94http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
  
2013] LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1099 
 
is so locked into the paradigm of growth that “imaginative 
thinking outside the box is impossible.”377  This requires us, first 
and foremost, to “decolonize” our imaginations.  Degrowth’s 
emphasis, therefore, is not so much on policy as it is on creating 
“a political alternative that seeks a popular mandate for radical 
changes.”378  Recognizing the impossibility of implementing 
degrowth under the current configuration of power, it appeals in 
the first instance not to powerful politicians but to a new cultural 
narrative that can lead to the development of autonomous spaces, 
both intellectually and physically, for social interaction, 
production, and experimentation.379 
C.  Lessons from State Practice: Carbon Democracy 
If it is difficult for environmental lawyers (and anyone for 
that matter) to break out of the economic imaginary that infuses 
the theoretical underpinning of environmental law (ecological 
modernization), it is well nigh impossible for us to break out of 
the political imaginary that infuses its practical possibilities (the 
state).  This form of political organization has so colonized our 
political (and “regulatory”) visions as to become “naturalized.”  
The state is all that there is, and all that is possible to be.  And 
so, writes Tim Jackson: “The state is society’s commitment device 
par excellence, and the principal agent in protecting our shared 
prosperity.”380  He argues that by shifting the macro-economy 
 
CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM 74, 75 (2012).  The limited degrowth critique is 
a telling manifestation of “discourse hegemony.” 
 377. Serge Latouche, Why Less Should be So Much More: Degrowth 
Economics, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE – ENGLISH EDITION (Nov. 14, 2004), 
http://mondediplo.com/2004/11/14latouche. 
 378. Kallis, supra note 320, at 878. 
 379. Id.  This is in line with David Korten’s model of revolutionary change 
where new cultural narratives are cultivated that “nurture a culture of 
partnership, redefine prosperity and security, affirm the possibilities of the 
higher orders of human consciousness . . . .”  In contrast to imperial narratives 
and the culture of domination it nurtures, these “earth community stories” open 
up new cultural spaces to experiment with relations of partnership and 
cooperation essential for creating a new era; see DAVID KORTEN, THE GREAT 
TURNING: FROM EMPIRE TO EARTH COMMUNITY 302-12 (2006). 
 380. JACKSON, supra note 351, at 11.  The proposed changes would require 
unprecedented levels of state regulation and involvement in running the 
economy and significant reductions in business activity. 
95
 1100 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
away from the structural requirements of growth, the state will 
be freed to “play its proper role” and protect the long-term 
interests of society and ecology.  Others, such as the 
environmental theorist, Robyn Eckersley, concur.  In The Green 
State, Eckersley calls for a dramatic environmental turn by the 
state: “There are still few social institutions that can match the 
same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have 
to redirect societies and economics along more ecologically 
sustainable lines.”381  Furthermore, the state’s role as “final 
adjudicator and guarantor of positive law” puts it in the most 
powerful position to discipline market actors and consumers, as 
well as to redistribute resources.382  Eckersley and, indeed, 
almost everyone concerned for such a conversion agree that “the 
key . . . lies in deepening the democratic accountability and 
responsiveness of states to their citizens’ environmental concerns 
while also extending democratic accountability to the 
environmental concerns of transnational civil society, 
intergovernmental organizations and the society of states in 
general.”383 
As we have seen in our initial review of diverse resource 
regimes, the contradictions of capitalism have long molded the 
shape of governmental policies and laws to accommodate the 
state’s own dependence on the growth generated by these 
regimes.  As governments became the macro-managers of the 
economy over the past century, this dependence deepened 
particularly as economic crises were transformed into political 
crises for which governments were held responsible.  As a result, 
like environmental lawyers, governments have become not more 
but less empowered to engineer an environmental conversion.  
This is why we must now look beyond “legal laws” to consider the 
higher level, law-like dynamics of systems and institutions that 
are both authoritative (i.e. regulatory in effect) and socially 
constitutive (i.e. determinative of our material and cultural 
character).  What more binding social law could there be today 
than that of the imperative of economic growth?  And was such a 
 
 381. ECKERSLEY, supra note 231, at 7. 
 382. Id. at 12. 
 383. Id. at 15. 
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social law not “created” by society such that it could/should be 
capable of social “re-form” (i.e. systemic reformation)?  
Undoubtedly, the most common panacea for what ails the modern 
world—a dramatically invigorated democracy—must be at the 
center of an eco-conversion, but one must query what sort of a re-
formed democracy it might take, within what sorts of new 
economic contexts, with what new forms of cultural and 
discursive institutions, and what sorts of knowledges and social 
processes to support them?  And how to achieve (to “constitute”) 
these?  To interrogate what we now have, and what new forms 
might be necessary, is a primary contribution for a future GLT 
that takes us beyond the limits of environmental legal analysis as 
we have come to know it.  For example, with serious 
constitutional amendments,384 Eckersley argues that her “green 
state” would act as a radical extension of liberal democracy rather 
than a radical departure from it.385  She describes her proposals 
as embracing a new “reflexive modernization” that is similar to 
widely discussed proposed new forms of legal rights for nature, 
constitutional rights to a clean environment, public trust 
doctrines, and new procedural obligations.  But, as we have seen, 
all these proposals would, if effective, inherently pose a common 
threat to growth, to capitalism and, inevitably to the liberal state 
itself.  This prospect undermines the proponents’ claims of 
adopting a “realistic” strategy that implicitly fits within the 
liberal mold, in comparison with more “radical” and unrealistic 
proposals that challenge this tradition and its associated 
 
 384. Eckersley’s central proposal is to create a green constitutional framework 
which has as its central reform the constitutional entrenchment of the 
precautionary principle.  A green constitution would also include such things as 
a commitment to protect biodiversity and the earth’s integrity, environmental 
rights for citizens, rights to negotiate environmental standards, and rights to 
information regarding risk-generating proposals.  The precautionary principle 
would, she argues, be the single most effective means for controlling the adverse 
impacts to future generations, non-citizens, and the non-human world; see id. at 
135-36, 243; see also BOYD, supra note 222 (discussing similar hopes on a 
constitutional right to a healthy environment.  Others similarly speak of “earth 
rights” and “ecosystem rights.”); see generally EARTH LAW CENTER, 
http://earthlawcenter.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).  This discussion is 
reminiscent of the longstanding critique of “rights discourse” that is well 
rehearsed in other areas of critical (feminist, race) legal theory. 
 385. ECKERSLEY, supra note 231, at 137.  Eckersley characterizes it as “post-
liberal” rather than anti-liberal. 
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institutional embodiments.  This naturalization of the state is but 
another historical trend that accompanies the historical “loss of 
innocence marked by a step back from an anarchist rejection of 
the state.”386 
But recall that the translation of the rise of the state into 
liberal democracy derives from two related traditions: economic 
liberalism and liberal democracy.  As Chantal Mouffe notes, 
“[t]here was no necessary relation between those two distinct 
traditions but only a contingent historical articulation.”387  The 
central value of economic liberalism is individual autonomy; 
under capitalism, economic inequality is unavoidable insofar as 
only a small minority owns productive capital and the majority 
are required to labor for others.  At the same time, the capitalist 
system allows for superior productivity and thus the possibility 
for mobility.  By contrast, the original meaning of democracy is 
“rule by the common people” where the lowest and largest class 
holds greatest sway.388  In its modern incarnation, it has as its 
core principles state sovereignty and political equality, the former 
freighted with particularly suspect historical baggage.389  The 
renowned political theorist, C.B. Macpherson noted that, until 
about 150 years ago, democracy was feared by “everybody who 
was anybody” since, as he put it, they “knew that democracy, in 
its original sense of rule by the people or government in 
accordance with the will of the bulk of the people, would be a bad 
thing–fatal to individual freedom and to all the graces of civilized 
 
 386. MATHEW PATERSON ET AL., GREEN THEORY IN THE STATE: THEORIES AND 
ISSUES 135, 135 (Colin Hay et al. eds., 2006).  The environmental political 
philosopher, Mick Smith, similarly criticizes Eckersley’s green state on the basis 
that state sovereignty is “by no means as flexible as Eckersley suggests” and, on 
the contrary, when “it deems its own security is threatened” will be the vehicle 
by which “states of emergency and antipolitical technocratic solutions” will be 
exercised; MICK SMITH, AGAINST ECOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY: ETHICS, BIOPOLITICS 
AND SAVING THE NATURAL WORLD 201 (2011). 
 387. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 3 (2000). 
 388. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 5 (1965). 
 389. See KARENA SHAW, POLITICAL THEORY AND INDIGENEITY: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE LIMITS OF THE POLITICAL (2008); SMITH, supra note 386.  Both authors 
address sovereignty as a cultural/philosophical construct, a practical effect of 
which was to define, exclude, and control the non-human “other,” in Shaw’s case, 
Indigenous peoples and, in Smith’s case, nature. 
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living.”390  Consequently, the merging within “liberal democracy” 
of the very different logics of economic and political liberalism 
resulted in contradictions and tensions arising from democracy’s 
commitment to socio-political equality, and economic liberalism’s 
tendency to create immense economic inequality.391 
So-called “liberal” markets were in place nearly two centuries 
before the advent of representative democracy, and this form of 
governance developed only on the prior foundation of the values 
generated by these markets.392  More particularly, the open 
democracies in which most Westerners live today developed on 
the basis of the almost boundless wealth generated by the rise 
and expansion of industrial capitalism, wealth that could satisfy 
the worker as it also enriched the capitalist.  All of the 
accoutrements of modernity (below in italics) were only made 
possible with the development of dense energies, first coal and 
then oil–industry with its new machinery and vast labor force 
that was centered in the swelling manufacturing cities and drew 
on a globe-spanning transportation network that carried incoming 
raw commodities and outgoing produced goods.  In turn, this 
productivity machine was directed to process a vast storehouse of 
non-fuel resources—forests, fish, rivers, geological landscapes—
into the commodities of lumber, food, and ore that is the stuff of 
wealth.  Only with this physical deluge of natural wealth was 
democracy itself transformed from a threat to the liberal state 
and market capitalism into a stabilizing force that could now 
 
 390. MACPHERSON, supra note 388, at 1.  As conservatives during the English 
civil war argued, there were five times more people without landed property 
than those with.  Thus, “if the master and servant shall be equal electors . . . the 
majority may by law . . . [enact] an equality of goods and estate” and result in 
chaos; Hanna Pitkin, Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance, 27 
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 335, 339 (2004) (quoting A.S.P. Woodhouse 1951).  In 
the U.S., James Madison argued in The Federalist Paper #10 that “pure 
democracies . . . have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention: have 
ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; 
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in 
their deaths.” James Madison, Federalist No. 10 ¶13 (1787), available at 
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fedindex.htm (last visited May 
22, 2012). 
 391. MACPHERSON, supra note 388, at 7; ROBERT DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998); 
see also HELD, supra note 230. 
 392. MACPHERSON, supra note 388, at 6. 
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reward the masses who were willing to “take their fully and fairly 
competitive place within those institutions and that system of 
society.”393  Thus does liberal democracy rest on a very specific 
historical foundation, with particular on-going needs and 
expectations that cannot merely be assumed. 
To maintain this stability, the liberal democratic state 
necessarily became the central defender and developer of 
capitalism.  The flows of energy and nature-based commodities 
that it demands are essential for the development of current 
forms of political and economic life ranging from new forms of 
urbanization and governance to modern modes of eating, 
building, working, moving, playing—in short, the whole of 
modern life, including the global financial order upon which the 
post-war West has developed.  Ours is literally a “fossil fuel mode 
of governance,” that is, a “carbon democracy.”394  This whole 
package underpins the idea of an economy that can be both 
sustainable and inequitable as long as it can keep growing.  Thus, 
while fossil energy made possible the huge increases in economic 
production and growth, it also shaped the boundaries and 
expectations of the modern social and political imagination. 
If abundant supplies of energy have provided liberal 
democracies with seemingly limitless growth, material 
abundance, global financial order, and the emergence of 
democratic politics, the passing of the era of dense fuels (whether 
from exploitable limits in supply or environmental costs in their 
use395) portend an uncertain future for liberal democracies that 
 
 393. Id. at 11.  While those who gained the vote demanded various services 
from the state such as education, health and welfare, and regulation of the 
economy, Macpherson argues the state would have eventually had to provide 
these things regardless of democratic franchise.  Social services, he notes, are 
necessary in order to quell social unrest and ensure the stability of the state, 
while regulation of the economy, as the great depression of the 1930s showed, is 
required to keep the economy operating. 
 394. See Matthew T. Huber, Energizing Historical Materialism: Fossil Fuels, 
Space and the Capitalist Mode of Production, 40 GEOFORUM 105 (2008) 
(discussing an analysis of the “fossil fuel mode of production”); see also Timothy 
Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, 38 ECON. & SOC’Y 399 (2009). 
 395. See James Murray & David King, Climate Policy: Oil’s Tipping Point has 
Passed, 481 NATURE 433 (2012) (arguing that the wild fluctuations in fuel prices 
that has led (currently and historically) to economic crises, is more likely to 
motivate a move away from fossil fuels than limited supply or climate change). 
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are unable to move beyond the capitalist metabolism from which 
they have emerged and have since become dependent upon.  With 
ecological scarcity, can the liberal state respond in a way that 
preserves both its liberal and democratic character?  History does 
not give cause for optimism, including the recent history of 
neoliberalism which, through a so-called “new constitutionalism” 
of global institutions such as the WTO and on-going free trade 
regimes, moved economic management beyond the reach of 
democratic politics.396  As access to resources and the continued 
operation of the “free” market inevitably comes under increasing 
pressure, and with modern societies so highly leveraged (both 
economically and environmentally), normal economic cycles of 
expansion and contraction (recession) become real threats to 
system stability.  This does not bode well for calls to expand 
democracy, green the state, de-grow the economy, or even merely 
to maintain those constraining forces (such as environmental law 
and social welfare regimes) that arose in periods of more robust 
growth. 
Here again, this assessment demands that “legal” 
understandings reach beyond assumed philosophical premises, 
long established institutional arrangements, and pre-existing 
power relations that underpin our liberal order.  Leading political 
theorist, James O’Connor, suggested years ago that 
environmentalism itself was essentially “sub-theoretical”397 
because it took on the tenets of liberal economics and democracy 
in a naturalized manner that is almost Fukuyamian in 
character.398  From its birth in the 1960s to the present day, the 
 
 396. On the constitutive rule-making of this “new constitutionalism” (also 
called a new “constitutionalism beyond the state”); see ISABELLA BAKKER & 
RACHEL SILVEY, BEYOND STATES AND MARKETS: CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL 
REPRODUCTION (2008); DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE (2008). 
 397. James O’Connor, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism: A Theoretical 
Introduction, 1 CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM 11 (1988).  O’Connor notes that 
in failing to comprehend the dynamics of capitalism, the legal successes of 
environmental lawyers in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in the 
migration of polluting industries to the global south where associated 
environmental damage has been more severe, both locally and globally. 
 398. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).  We 
refer here to Fukuyama’s highly touted, but controversial book, and its thesis 
that liberal democracy marks the final triumph of a single mode of thought and 
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panoply of laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines that fall 
under the general rubric of environmental law and policy remains 
rooted in, and propels forward, the “modernist project.”  Its 
assumptions pervade environmental law: that (neutral) science 
can provide the knowledge to control environmental problems, 
and technology can provide the means; that markets can 
“internalize” externalities, and governments can act to make sure 
that they do if only they have “political will;” that progress is still 
possible under conditions and thinking inherited from an age long 
passed.  All we really need is to do what is rational.  According to 
English legal theorists Sean Coyle and Karen Morrow: 
The question of the ‘philosophical foundations’ of environmental 
thinking in law may strike the lawyer, as well as the legal 
philosopher, as a strange one. For while a search for the 
philosophical commitments of environmental thinking 
undoubtedly makes sense in the context of ethics, or political 
theory, environmental law (it might be felt) lacks any such 
philosophical underpinning . . . .  [T]here is not (on this view) to 
be found any deeper rationale or overarching principle beyond 
this purely instrumental concern with human wellbeing.399 
This situation for environmental law contrasts with the 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement that, beginning in the 
1970s, propelled a transformation in legal theory beyond the 
narrow confines of the old jurisprudence.  Environmental law has 
been absent from this movement because it is embedded within 
the dominant liberal paradigm and has nothing to offer it.400  Yet 
 
social organization that will put past ideological battles to an end.  His thesis 
was widely attacked as another in series of failed end-of-history promises 
especially as it was quickly displaced by an on-the-contrary “clash of 
civilizations” thesis that actually seemed to be playing out.  Nevertheless, the 
continued dominance—indeed, the pervasive “naturalization”—of capitalist 
ideology and state management suggests that the Fukuyamian thesis of but-
one-way-forward does in fact prevail (and, in a strange contradiction, actually 
helped to generate and sustain the clash of civilizations). 
 399. SEAN COYLE & KAREN MORROW, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND NATURE 1 (2004). 
 400. Supportive evidence for this assertion can be found in the texts 
accompanying the long history of critical legal studies (CLS), and its evolution 
into a diversity of theorizing—from feminist legal theory to postmodernism and 
the law—where environmental law is scarcely to be found; see generally GARY 
MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S 
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its absence is bizarre on both sides as the exploitation of the 
environment with which environmental law is concerned props 
up the unjust modernism with which critical theory is concerned.  
While CLS flourished, however, environmental law took root as a 
reformist project that avoided the critical concerns of “race, class, 
and gender” and the postmodern insights of late twentieth social 
thinking and practice.  As a result, the Left largely dismissed it 
as a bourgeois field concerned primarily with middle class 
quality-of-life concerns.  This failure to engage from either the 
inside or outside of the field has left environmental law 
impoverished.  Despite its countless challenges to particular 
economic and political developments, it remains bereft of a larger 
critical theoretical base, and thus absent the ability to be self-
reflective.  At the same time, the Left has still only partially 
embraced the values of “nature.”  It is time for this to change on 
all sides. 
VII.CONCLUSION: TOWARD A GREEN LEGAL    
THEORY 
Two days after delivering his 2012 State of the Union 
address, President Obama hit the campaign trail with a central 
message: the need to expand domestic oil production.  Speaking 
at a fuelling depot for UPS air parcel transport planes in 
Colorado (a metaphor for modernism if ever there was one), 
Obama exhorted: “We need an all-out, all-in, all-of-the-above 
strategy that develops every source of American energy.”401  This 
includes expanded production in the Gulf of Mexico and 
“fracking,” as well as new sources that are “cleaner and cheaper 
and full of new jobs.” 
The same day, on the other side of the Atlantic, Canadian 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper addressed the World Economic 
Forum.  At home, Harper was in the midst of a media storm after 
he labeled environmentalists as “radicals” who were enemies of 
Canada for their opposition to a proposed pipeline to carry Tar 
 
END (1995); REZA BANAKAR & MAX TRAVERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
SOCIAL THEORY (2002) (an example of its absence). 
 401. Shawn McCarthy, Obama Touts Domestic Oil, Gas, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 
27, 2012, at A8. 
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Sands bitumen through the mountains to ports on the West Coast 
for export to Asia.402  In Davos, the Prime Minister outlined a 
“grand plan” for his next five years that included enhanced 
energy exports and the need to reduce “regulatory delays for 
mining and energy projects.”403  On that same day, on the front 
page of the Business section of the national newspaper, a federal 
document was leaked where environmental organizations and 
aboriginal groups were described as “adversaries” while industry 
associations, energy companies, and the National Energy Board—
which is supposed to serve as an independent government agency 
evaluating new proposals—are listed as “allies.”404  Meanwhile, 
the federal environment minister was reported to have addressed 
the Calgary Chamber of Commerce, an “audience packed with 
some of the top oil patch executives,” where he stated that 
“Environment Canada is a strategic partner to everyone in this 
room . . . .  I’m not here to kill your buzz.”405  His message to was 
to streamline the regulatory process to avoid blockages to 
hydrocarbon development.406 
This paper has analyzed the common frame that bounds 
these two political leaders despite their positions at seeming 
opposing ends of the ideological spectrum: a frame where the 
sustainability ideals of state-based environmental law blends 
with the material dynamics of the state to produce the central, 
and seemingly irresolvable, contradiction of modernity.  We have 
attempted to understand this contradiction by considering how it: 
 has historically shaped the structural character of 
various resource sectors; 
 has produced patterns of development and 
environmental impacts that reflect commonalities 
across these sectors; 
 
 402. David Ebner, Oil-Sands Pipeline Hits its Highest Hurdle, GLOBE & MAIL, 
Jan. 9, 2012, at P. A1 
 403. Joe Friesen & Bill Curry, Harper’s Grand Plan, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 27, 
2012, at A1. 
 404. Federal Documents Spark Outcry by Oil Sands Critics, GLOBE & MAIL, 
Jan. 27, 2012, at B1. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
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 continues to embody a liberal economic and political 
rationality that, today as in the past, limits the 
conditions of future possibility; 
 inherently defines “green” initiatives so that they 
support continued economic growth and capital 
accumulation while excluding consideration of systemic 
alternatives, and; 
 effectively defines environmental law to function as an 
incremental instrument of reform within bounded 
parameters that themselves undermine the efficacy of 
reform. 
In summary, GLT is based on the premise of “legal laws” as 
not the true (or at least not the most important) sources of social 
regulation because they are themselves products of “higher” level 
systems, the needs and dynamics of which provide the truly 
authoritative momentum and direction of social evolution.  Thus, 
the hope for effective regulatory “re-formation” demands a diverse 
set of new understandings about, and approaches to, the 
dynamics of constitutive material and cultural forces—from the 
internal needs of capital, to the spatial compulsions of the state, 
to the hegemonic effects of dominant discourses.  The need is, in 
several ways, for a new theoretically-based critique and 
theoretically-informed understanding of “law” itself. 
First, a new critical theory could fill the void that exists in 
environmental law, contribute to a broader range of legal theory, 
and open up new transformative possibilities.407  We have 
addressed how the philosophical and ideological origins of the 
liberal democratic state (its ideal foundations) continues to frame 
legal thought while its material base in the natural world 
provides an essential but minimally theorized context for 
virtually all aspects of modern law.  The very act of creating the 
specialist field of environmental law itself tended to segment 
consideration of this reality rather than seeing nature’s 
presence/absence across the range of the legal system.  In 
response, green legal theory is needed for environmentalists and 
 
 407. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in systematic detail its 
character.  This is discussed more fully in M’Gonigle, EARTH RULES: ON THE 
NATURAL LAW, BEHIND THE SOCIAL LAWS, THAT HOLDS US TO ACCOUNT, supra note 
24. 
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environmental lawyers while the greening of legal theory is 
necessary more generally.408 
Second, GLT opens up to environmental legal scholars the 
analysis of constitutive social systems and dynamics that exist as 
law even though they exist above or behind the “legal law” as it 
has been narrowly conceived, and beyond the legal preoccupation 
with the rule of rules.  This dominating conception has been 
much challenged in recent decades with, for example, Michel 
Foucault’s concept of the self-disciplinary character and micro 
reach of “governmentality” (as compared to the more explicit 
sanctioning quality of central government enforcement).  It is also 
evident in the rise of legal pluralism that recognizes how laws are 
created by non-state actors, from organized religions to 
indigenous communities to the family.  GLT takes this expansion 
further by looking at the effectively legal (i.e. socially structuring) 
impacts inherent in the dynamics of meta-systems such as 
capitalism and the sovereign state.  Understanding these 
dynamics in this regulative way offers important, and timely, 
work for the GLT scholar.409 
Third, and following from the broader insights of the 
“cultural turn” of which Foucault was a signal contributor, GLT is 
not about legal reform.  This is perhaps its most difficult 
challenge to the environmental lawyer.  To understand why this 
must be so, consider the invocation of Paul Kahn in The Cultural 
 
 408. It might be noted that this double bind contributes mightily to their 
having been no paradigm revolution in environmental law with environmental 
lawyers not being critical theorists, and vice versa. 
 409. The range of this examination necessarily reaches to the very foundations 
of modern legal positivism.  Although based in a strongly materialist critique, it 
is at this intersection with the nature and limits of positivism that GLT engages 
with the more “idealist” (that is philosophical) basis of “wild law” and its “earth 
jurisprudence.” See CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH 
JUSTICE (2d ed. 2011); see also Judith Koons, Earth Jurisprudence: The Moral 
Value of Nature, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (2008).  The limits of a 
philosophically-based green jurisprudence can be seen in Koons’ espousal of 
morally-based reforms to corporate practices. Id. at 325.  Despite the much 
greater situatedness of GLT in a critical political economy, wild law and GLT 
share a prospective concern to develop a post-positivist “naturalism.” See R. 
Michael M’Gonigle, A New Naturalism: Is There a (Radical) ‘Truth’ beyond the 
(Postmodern) Abyss?, 8 ECOTHEOLOGY 8 (2000). 
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Study of Law that a “new discipline of legal study must abandon 
the project of reform.”  He states: 
We cannot trust our conclusions if we are writing for an audience 
to which we have ceded a power over our own personal interests. 
We cannot study law if we are already committed to law. We 
cannot grasp the law as an object of study if the conceptual tools 
we bring to the inquiry are nothing but the self-replication of 
legal practice itself . . . . 
 
A new discipline of law needs to conceive its object of study and 
its own relationship to that object in a way that does not, at the 
same moment, commit the scholar to those practices constitutive 
of the legal order . . . . Understanding the constructed character 
of the rule of law allows us to see its contingent character and to 
understand that law’s claim upon us is not a product of law’s 
truth but of our own imagination—our imagining its meanings 
and our failure to imagine alternatives.410 
This turning away from reform seemingly makes no sense—
and yet is obvious.  On the one hand, no theorist concerned with 
the economy/environment contradiction would want to eschew 
issue-specific reforms where important natural amenities are 
threatened.  On the other hand, to seek systemic reforms (like 
challenging growth) is “deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists 
and revolutionaries.”411  Instead, what reforms are permitted 
increasingly only reinforce the contradictions that pervade their 
implementation.  Under a vigorous neoliberalism, problems are to 
be “resolved” not through the old battles of a Left/Right dissensus 
over possible futures, but through the embrace of a “post politics” 
that seeks a managerial consensus where the fundamental 
conflict in values and vision is no longer seen as necessary, or 
tolerable.412  And so environmental lawyers now embrace what 
 
 410. PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 27, 39 (1999). 
 411. JACKSON, supra note 351, at 102. 
 412. This loss of the benefits of politics-as-dissensus is most notably associated 
with the work of the French political theorist, Jacques Ranciere. See Erik 
Swyngedouw, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic 
Politics of Environmental Production, 33 INT. J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 601 
(2009) (discussing this in the context of urban environmental politics). 
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they once decried—green growth, corporate self-regulation, 
market-based solutions—as the “realistic” way forward in the era 
of neoliberal closure. 
Ironically, the promise of theory is to help activists break out 
of this self-imposed box of ineffective practice.  As the English 
literary theorist, Terry Eagleton, explained it, the value of theory 
is akin to that offered by a new person who quietly enters a room 
through a hidden passage and encounters a group of people 
arguing about how to find a way out.  After listening for a while, 
“it occurs to her that though some of the talk is indeed 
constructive, much of it is more of a symptom of the situation 
than a strategic response to it.” 
What she needs to do is fashion a form of discursive intervention 
which will somehow succeed in illuminating the relation between 
the talk and the situation; she must find some ‘meta-discourse’ . . 
. which will persuade her trapped fellows to grasp their talk as 
bound up with their material conditions rather than simply as a 
potential solution to them . . . . In this situation, the new 
individual is the theorist, and the ones already in the room are 
the ideologues.413 
The theorist here is thus not some irrelevant interloper, some 
high-minded abstractionist but maybe the most practical one in 
the place.  After all, the task is still the same—to get out of the 
room by discovering its trap.  So it must be with environmental 
law and GLT.  But first, as they say, we must change the 
conversation. 
Of course, a still skeptical reader might ask what any of this 
grand speculation has to do with the real world of environmental 
law where new coal mines are being opened every day, carbon 
concentrations keep increasing in the atmosphere, species keep 
going extinct—and we must act to challenge these now!  Despite 
the depth of the present critique, the development of a green legal 
theory toward which this critique points ultimately is not directed 
to a rejection of environmental law but its transformation within 
a larger framework of theoretical understanding and strategic 
action.  As we have acknowledged from the start, GLT is certainly 
 
 413. TERRY EAGLETON, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEORY 36-37 (1990). 
108http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4
  
2013] LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1113 
 
not seeking to replace the role of environmental law as resistance, 
although it would definitely question its role as reformer.  Given a 
new understanding of the limitations of environmental law’s 
capacity for prospective action, a corollary need exists to open a 
new, critical, and theoretically-informed landscape beyond intra-
systemic “reform” and toward larger “re-forms.”  Still addressing 
the real world of the present but opening up the discourse, GLT 
should help to unveil a “new narrative” of our past, a more 
informed context for environmental action in our present, new 
imaginaries of possible futures and, above all, new strategies for 
getting there.  In the process, the practice of environmental law 
would evolve into a praxis, that is, a practice that is theoretically-
informed and committed to manifesting where that theory leads. 
Neither can this discussion be dismissed as environmental 
lawyers “being realistic” while green legal theorists engage in 
mere speculation.  As we have argued, social practice without an 
explicit theoretical frame is blind, and easily leads to outcomes 
that contradict its own avowed goals as environmental law now 
does with its promulgation of carbon taxes, ecosystem pricing, 
green energy, and so on.  Action without the right frame is akin to 
an American in London in a hurry to cross the road, looking left 
as he steps off the curb, not having taken the time to learn the 
new frame that demands that one must look in the other 
direction because cars there are on the “wrong” side of the road.  
The result is mission failure.  At the same time, social theory 
without a practical commitment easily becomes detached and 
self-indulgent.  Having said that, however, the yawning gap that 
exists in critical legal theory provides sufficient justification on 
its own for GLT in its general green(ing) function to address all 
aspects of the modern legal order, not just environmental law.  
GLT has immense practical value, for example, in helping to 
understand why democracy is necessarily imperiled and how we 
might begin to address new “constitutive” arrangements that 
could actively constitute new economic and political 
imaginaries.414  At more immediate levels of action, it would 
 
 414. Without delving into a prospective green legal theoretical analysis here, 
one example of such an imaginary can be found in a recent article. Wes 
Nicholson, Getting to Here: Bioregional Federalism, 40 ENVTL. L. 713 (2010).  As 
well, insofar as it is motivated by making the state accountable to a “natural 
109
 1114 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
situate environmental reforms (for example, for the industrial 
sectors discussed in the opening pages of this article) within an 
agenda of the broader, post-industrial re-formation.  In this task, 
it would also help identify principles not for legal law reform but 
for what might be seen as the re-formation of culturally 
constitutive logics.  Merely by way of illustration, such principles 
might include: radical demand reduction (as compared with 
incremental eco-efficiency); displacement of capital dependence 
(as compared with capital growth); substantive project 
assessments (as compared with price-based assessments) and so 
on.  As guiding principles for responding to climate change, their 
goal would not be to internalize or create new rights that 
legitimate the problematic context, but to re-form that context.  
Thus, green legal re-form would explicitly work not for energy 
efficiency for a new generation of hybrid cars but to escape the 
“social economy” of automobility. 
In his recent book about climate change, Anthony Giddens 
complained that “we have no politics of climate change” because 
the politics being applied to this global threat remain rooted in a 
world now past, a world still stuck in a set of naturalized 
economic and political realities that lead people to believe that a 
deal to resolve climate change will “be reached as soon as the 
nations of the world see reason.”415  Such a world would, of 
course, turn to environmental law to enshrine this reason—but 
this world is now past.  If there is no politics, there is certainly no 
law of climate change, just a law of symptoms.  This paper has 
begun to hint at the vast new conceptual, analytical, and 
practical spaces that need to be opened up, spaces that would 
allow environmental lawyers to make common cause with the 
wide new array of constituencies and knowledges pointing the 
way to the needed “legal” reformations.  Humanity is at a turning 
point, but we fail to embrace its possibilities.  Instead, in the well-
worn phrase of American cultural theorist, Frederic Jameson, “it 
 
law” order (i.e. where the state is seen as accountable beyond its own positivist 
constitution), Mary Wood’s application of the public trust doctrine has a green 
legal character. Wood, supra note 23.  What is significant with both of these 
approaches, independent of the problem of implementation, is the new 
“constitutive” (and constitutional) context in which they situate the state. 
 415. ANOTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 209 (2009). 
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is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of 
capitalism.”416  Like Giddens, Mitchell comments that “the 
democratic machineries that emerged to govern the age of carbon 
energy seem to be unable to address the processes that may end 
it.”417  At the liberal limits of environmental law, the time is upon 
us to move beyond a bounded heritage so that we might let loose 
new imaginaries without which our shared goals will fade from 
the world. 
 
 
 416. Fredric Jameson, Future City, 21 NEW LEFT REV. 65, 76 (2003). 
 417. Mitchell, supra note 394, at 399. 
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